DÆDALUS

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

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Preface to the Issue "Themes in Transition"

THE IDEA for this issue derives from a concern, which many on the Board of Editors have expressed, to see a study made of the contemporary use of certain commonly accepted words or concepts. The extent to which individual themes, almost like securities, rise or fall in the intellectual market, showing strength one year and weakness the next, has its own particular interest. In a time of rapid change, the intellectual securities board needs constantly to be added to, as new concepts claim attention. Also, new research and experience make necessary the redefinition of themes whose contours were once fairly precisely known. If this issue requires a more general justification, it may be offered in the words of Erwin Panofsky, who wrote some years ago: "Philosophical and psychological theories, historical doctrines and all sorts of speculations and discoveries, have changed, and keep changing, the lives of countless millions. Even he who merely transmits knowledge or learning participates, in his modest way, in the process of shaping reality—of which fact the enemies of humanism are more keenly aware than its friends. It is impossible to conceive of our world in terms of action alone."*

The issue opens, appropriately enough, with an article on a theme which is receiving increasing attention every year, that of economic development. William Letwin's somewhat ironic treatment makes us wonder whether this may not be one of the "underdeveloped" subjects of our time, despite all the attention that is given to it. Overton Hume Taylor, in his discussion of the "free enterprise" ideology, seeks to remove the concept from the area of political controversy so that it may be examined in its eighteenth-

* Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), p. 23.

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century intellectual setting, with its relevance to our own affairs seen in something other than political terms. H. Scott Gordon, in writing about ideas of economic justice, concludes with the following: "The various ideas of economic justice—exchange, desert, equality, merit, needs, expectation—are simply the components of a cultural compound. They are the fibres of the 'justice nerve' of mid-twentieth century Western, liberal, democratic, pleasant-tempered man."

The idea of progress, in its historic and contemporary expression, is the theme which Bruce Mazlish sets for himself. His judgment about the future of the idea is one which is calculated to raise controversy. Robert Jay Lifton, in a very different vein, gives us reason to pause when he writes about the psychological effects of the atomic bomb on those who survived the Hiroshima holocaust. This is a long essay on the theme of death, showing the complex consequences for those who identified with the dead, "not merely . . . with a particular loved one, as in the case of an ordinary mourning experience, but rather . . . a lasting sense of affiliation with death itself."

The theme of sovereignty is an old one, made novel by political experiments in the contemporary world which few would have thought possible some decades ago. Amitai Etzioni demonstrates what has happened to the idea of sovereignty as a result of various sorts of unification efforts which have been attempted in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The theme, religion in the university, was already a subject of controversy when Newman wrote his *Idea of a University* in 1852. Krister Stendahl shows that the issue remains a live one today, and that we are far from having achieved any consensus about it.

Ours is an age which talks increasingly about the need for experts. George A. Kelly considers this theme in a way which suggests why our present occupation with the problem is so intense. Those who deplore the tendency in modern society for men in different professions to stay apart, each tending his own specific affairs and giving little thought to what the other is doing, will be interested in the article, "Why an 'Insanity Defense'" by Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz. In this study a law professor and a psychiatrist join to ask why we maintain "insanity" as a basis for relieving persons of criminal responsibility.

Instinct is another one of those traditional terms which seem to call for constant redefinition. The argument put forward by S. A. Barnett is that recent experiments have taught us much about the

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subject, but that we are still very far from understanding it in all its complexity. Mr. Barnett writes: "It is often assumed (unconsciously as a rule) that because there is a *word* there must be a *thing* (or at least a well defined class of phenomena) to match it." He demonstrates that this is an instance where a single word is used to cover many different sorts of phenomena. The final article is about another ancient theme, nature, whose representation in art and literature constitutes a sort of intellectual biography of different societies and epochs. Agnes Mongan is concerned with describing and explaining the representation of nature in European drawing from 1400 until Cézanne abandoned perspective and, with it, ordered, contained space.

S. R. G.

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WILLIAM LETWIN

Four Fallacies about Economic Development

By FALLACY I mean a truism that has been misunderstood. It is a statement which, if hedged in by enough qualifications, would be correct, but which, as commonly understood, is false.

It cannot be demonstrated that the human mind is especially given to fallacies when exercising itself on problems of economic development. But the idea of economic development is so vague that it invites confusion. Development is generally understood as the going from an underdeveloped economy to a developed economy, and an underdeveloped economy is generally supposed to be less developed than a developed economy. This circularity in the definition leads to quite unnecessary paradoxes. For instance, the national income of Nepal (the most underdeveloped economy presently on record) has been growing recently; despite that, Nepal must now be considered more underdeveloped than ever before—because the highly developed economy of the United States has been growing faster. Nobody would be satisfied to have it said that a growing boy was becoming less developed because a bigger boy was growing faster. Such a paradox is not essential to the subject.

Economic development can be spoken of simply as the process by which a nation grows richer. An underdeveloped economy, then, is an economy that is poor in a special sense—by comparison with its own economic potential in the foreseeable future. A nation founded on a tiny island in the Antarctic wastes, its land consisting of naked volcanic rock, snow-bound, ice-locked, and wind-swept eleven months of the year; peopled by a race that is unskilled, untaught and unteachable, possessing no capital—that nation would be poor but not underdeveloped, for it might have reached the limits of its economic capacity. Most poor nations are not poor in quite so ultimate and hopeless a sense.

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The practical problem of economic development is how to make poor countries richer absolutely. To make them as rich or nearly as rich as the United States or any other rich country is irrelevant and meaningless: are they to be made as rich as the United States is now, was some time ago, or will be hence? We can hope to help the underdeveloped nations eradicate hunger; it is fatuous to hope that the citizens of all nations will some day eat the same amount of food; it is utopian to hope that all men will some day have the same incomes. In any event, to eliminate hunger and misery is a far more commendable and humane goal than to aim for mathematical equality.

The question then is how nations have become richer in the past and how others can become richer in the future. Much is known about this and much more surmised. The four fallacies cover only a small part of the ground, although all alike are fundamental and popular.

The first fallacy: Manufacturing is more productive than agriculture.

This fallacy underlies the widespread belief that the prime or exclusive cure for national poverty lies in industrialization.

Folklore has it that human beings, when they first appeared on the earth, earned their living by hunting. Later, understanding how efficient it would be to keep their prey in easy reach, men supposedly turned to grazing. As communities formed, peace and order were established, and with them the likelihood that a man could reap without hindrance where he sowed; thus cultivation began. And finally—so the legend goes—when farmers had become so proficient that they could raise more food than they needed themselves, the surplus was used to sustain urban workers who earned their claim to food by exchanging for it fabricated things, or manufactures, as they are still called.

Some such broad historical scheme—sketching a development from husbandry to industry—has been borrowed from folklore by social philosophers and social scientists, who by endorsing it and systematizing it have reinforced the public faith. This picture underlies the schematic views on economic history of men as diverse as Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson and Thorstein Veblen, to mention only a few. It underlies also, for instance, the classification of goods that is part of an economist's everyday vocabulary: "primary" goods

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being those produced by agriculture and extractive industries; "secondary" goods, manufactures; and "tertiary" goods, those commodities and services generated by "service industries."

Although the notion of the historical priority of agriculture is embedded in folklore, it is not false. On the contrary, the fundamental assertion—leaving aside the details of the story—is more nearly correct than its opposite: it is certain that industry did not predate the extractive occupations, including agriculture. But the historical doctrine in its ordinary form is nevertheless fallacious, for the truth is that agriculture and industry have always coexisted; extraction and fabrication both have gone on together ever since the beginning.

Endless evidence exists for the early practice of manufacturing. Stone-Age arrowheads show that the act of capture was preceded by handicrafts; Stone-Age scrapers and knives show that the act of capture was immediately succeeded by acts of fabrication. Man is, among other things, a tool-making animal; and tools are essential because men are neither strong nor agile enough to capture many animals without tools, and also because Nature does not provide many raw materials that human beings can use, without first transforming them, for food, shelter, or especially clothing. Even the life of men as primitive as can be, is cluttered with spears, knives, pots, bags, huts, ropes and cloths—all fabricated things. Taking things from the earth and molding those things to human ends are equally essential parts of human activity.

History cannot clearly distinguish between agriculture and manufacture according to the order of their appearance; theory cannot more sharply distinguish between their natures. Both activities use land, labor, and capital in the production of commodities. The way each uses them and the character of the commodities that each produces do not fall into the neat and expected categories.

Does manufacture use more capital relative to labor than agriculture? Quite the contrary; it turns out that now, at least, and in many places, agriculture is more capital-intensive than manufacturing. Does manufacture use more power than agriculture? Some forms of it probably do; but on the other hand, the highly mechanized branches of agriculture use more power than an industry as advanced and complex as electronic-components manufacturing. Is the planning period for agricultural production longer than for manufactures? Possibly; but whereas it takes about four or five years from the time a particular automobile model begins to be planned

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until it comes off the assembly lines, agricultural processes such as mushroom culture take only a few weeks from seed to fruit. Does agriculture produce food, and manufacture other sorts of things? Obviously not, since manufacture produces bread, whereas agriculture produces jute, indigo, and beeswax. Does agriculture produce necessities, and manufacture luxuries? No; manufacture produces boots and brooms, but agriculture produces silk, strawberries, and orchids.

Everyone knows the difference between a farmer and a mill hand, but for the purposes of economic policy too much is usually made of that difference.

These caveats having been entered, it should be pointed out that all underdeveloped economies depend heavily on agriculture, whereas all highly developed economies generate very little of their income by agriculture. Only 5 per cent of the income of the United States arises in agriculture, forestry and fishery; and only 8 per cent of the American labor force is engaged in those activities. In Nepal, by contrast, 93 per cent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. In India, about half of the national income derives from agriculture, forestry and fishery. But in New Zealand, whose citizens enjoy the third highest average income in the world, only one-sixth of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, and they produce only one-fifth of the national income. The other countries of the world arrange themselves more or less neatly on this scale, neatly enough so that one would be warranted in betting that a country which specializes in agriculture is a poor country and that a country which does not is relatively rich.

That this is not a mere happenstance, but an outcome of the general process of enrichment can be seen by examining the long history of the American economy. In 1840 probably more than half of American output was being produced in the agricultural sector; by the end of the Civil War the contribution of agriculture had shrunk to one-fifth; by the end of World War I to about one-tenth, and by now to less than one-twentieth. The same pattern could be exhibited in the history of the United Kingdom or of any other industrialized society. An inevitable concomitant of national enrichment is that agriculture ceases to be the single greatest contributor to national income and in time becomes, instead, one of the lesser contributors.

But the evidence should not be misread. Agriculture ultimately becomes less important when a nation has become fairly rich; al-

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though its agricultural output may continue to rise absolutely, the *fraction* of the national income produced by agriculture steadily declines because other forms of production take on greater significance. But this does not mean that agriculture is a crutch that can be abandoned. Although agriculture is superseded in rich nations, there is good reason to think that during the period of its primacy it was agriculture, above all, in nations such as the United States or New Zealand or Great Britain, which established the base for enrichment. At some points in the development of any economy, agriculture rather than manufacture *may* be the best means of enrichment.

Agriculture, then, though neither historically prior nor analytically distinguishable, tends to be superseded by manufacture in the course of enrichment. And it should be added, manufacture in turn tends to be displaced somewhat by service industries. For what reason?

The fundamental cause of this sequence is a fairly universal human taste for refinement. In the history of the Western world, for instance, white wheaten bread has always been preferred to wholegrain wheaten bread. But white bread is inevitably more expensive than dark—all else being equal—because the former uses up more wheat per ounce of bread; in consequence, the bread of the rich was always whiter than that of the poor. For similar reasons the linens of the rich have always been finer and whiter, their furnishings more delicate, their manners more elaborate. To refine nature's products to the standards which the human imagination invents requires much transformation, that is, much manufacture, which is costly. Hence, as men's incomes rise, they spend an increasing fraction of their incomes on the manufacturing processes that turn the immediate products of nature into the goods and services that fancy requires.

A poor savage, for want of better, sits in the sand eating meat of the bear that he has himself slain, quartered, and roasted over fire. The wealthy aesthete eats the meat of a duckling that has been reared in domestic tranquility, which has been pressed and cooked with the aid of ingenious machinery and talented labor and in the presence of artfully contrived wines, and which is served to him in a setting far from natural. The former, whose income is small, eats a meal the main ingredient of whose cost is an agricultural or extractive effort. The latter, in paying for his meal, pays mainly for the labor and capital that went into setting the dish before him, the

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refined dish in its refined setting; only a miniscule part of the cost is accounted for by the effort of producing the duckling, that is, by specifically agricultural costs.

The technical terms describing this behavior are that the income-elasticity of demand for agricultural products is low. It is not, of course, as low as all that. "Food" is not a homogeneous stuff. As their incomes rise, men choose to consume foods of the more tender and delectable sorts: spareribs and lamb forequarters are replaced by tenderloin, in the American version; in France, ordinary wine gives way to Burgundy; among Indian peasants, millet is abandoned in favor of rice. Nevertheless, in all places, the *fraction* of income devoted to the raw—that is, purely agricultural—ingredients of the diet falls as income rises. That is the chief reason why the fraction of income generated by agriculture—as "income" and "agriculture" are defined in national income statistics—is lower in rich countries than in poor countries.

This indisputable fact has been widely misinterpreted after the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fashion. If rich countries do much manufacturing, does it not follow that a country wishing to be rich should expand its manufactures? Such reasoning is part of the doctrine, albeit only part, which suggests to impoverished nations throughout the world that to erect a steel mill is to make the first step toward national opulence.

It is easy enough to specify circumstances in which it would be anything but reasonable to set up a steel mill, or any other manufacturing enterprise. Imagine a very poor nation, very sparsely settled, absolutely closed off from the rest of the world; and suppose that each inhabitant had the same income, an income hardly sufficient to keep his family alive. In those circumstances agriculture and other extractive occupations would be the only ones; everyone would farm and fish and hunt, and in his spare hours everyone would be busy making clothing and housing, preparing meals, and fashioning implements. In such a setting, were incomes miraculously to rise a bit, nobody would think of spending the increase on anything but extra food. Nobody would think of buying any manufactured goods whatsoever, unless his income were to rise vastly beyond its existing range. Even if a foreign expert could demonstrate that the same effort required to increase the output of rice by one pound could produce instead one hundred pounds of steel, the demonstration would fall on deaf ears—for the inhabitants would want rice so badly that no amount of steel, or gold, would be an acceptable

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substitute. In a very poor and utterly closed economy, manufacture would be an inimical luxury.

Underdeveloped nations are neither so poor nor so closed as that hypothetical one. Since at least some of their inhabitants are not on the verge of starvation, the nation is already consuming a certain amount of manufactured goods, which may be made inside the country or imported from abroad. At that point it becomes plausible to ask whether the most efficient way to raise the average incomes of inhabitants is by investing capital—supposing there be some to invest—in agriculture or in manufacturing. The manufactured goods might, of course, find no buyers within the country; but that would be immaterial as long as the goods could be exchanged elsewhere in the world for additional food, if additional food were wanted. On the other hand, the manufactured goods might be of such a sort that they could find no buyers abroad; but that would be no fatal objection if they could be sold domestically to persons who until then had been buying similar goods imported from abroad. Whether the manufactured goods increased the nation's exports or decreased its imports, either way the foreign exchange acquired in the process could be used to buy extra food, if extra food were wanted.

In an open economy, in short, manufacturing may be a better way of getting food than the practice of agriculture. Similarly, agriculture may be a more efficient way of getting manufactured goods. The rational rule, then, is to pursue that activity which is most efficient. A nation that wants steel should not produce steel unless producing it is the cheapest way to get it; the possibility of international trade means that the cheapest way for some nations to get their steel is by producing butter or by catching fish.

Whether manufacturing is more productive than agriculture is therefore a question that cannot be answered in general, but only when one knows which branches of either group are being considered, and where, and when, and at what prices and costs. If an underdeveloped nation can produce radio circuits at a price far below world prices, but cannot produce its staple breadstuff as cheaply as others can, it will enrich itself more quickly by making the former and buying the latter. But which of these two, or of any other form of production it can carry on most efficiently, depends on the intricate relations, at each given moment, between such variables as the levels of income and rates of change of incomes throughout the world; of wage rates, interest rates, and rents at home and

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everywhere; of private tastes and diplomatic relations at home and abroad; and many more considerations of that sort.

All such qualifications being made, and in view of the fact that incomes have been rising throughout the world—despite the fears of neo-Malthusians who warn that the world's population will soon outrun the world's capacity to grow food—it is a safe general rule that *eventually* it will pay every nation to devote an increasing fraction of its productive efforts to manufacturing. But this is not all. The day may come when incomes have risen so high everywhere that manufactured goods too, like agricultural goods now, despite being more plentiful become insignificant in the budgets of consumers, who will begin to satisfy increasingly their desire for services.

The second fallacy: More capital is better than less capital.

This fallacy underlies the supposition that the problems of underdeveloped countries can be overcome merely by providing them with more capital.

A simple example will demonstrate the nature of the fallacy. Consider a small farm cultivated by farmer and ox. The man follows the plow from morning until night, under a hot sun: his life is hard. Imagine that the farmer acquires a tractor. The tractor chugs merrily through the day's work in an hour, the farmer driving it comfortably under an awning: his life has become easy and leisurely. The picture rightly comforts all humanitarian observers. The only difficulty is that the farmer is now starving. True, he has more leisure, but his crop is no larger than before, and the cost of keeping up the tractor (including as its main ingredient the interest charges on the loan with which he bought the tractor) is eating up a great deal of the food he previously had. The handy, efficient piece of machinery is impoverishing him.

The case of the farmer and his tractor, translated into technical terms, shows that the use of more rather than less capital is economically rational only if the labor saved by introducing an additional capital good is worth more than the costs added by using the capital good. As underdeveloped economies typically suffer from considerable unemployment, overt or disguised, the labor saved by introducing *certain* capital goods into *certain* occupations has a proper economic value of zero. That is to say that the real economic

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cost of using an hour's labor in any given enterprise is measured by its "opportunity cost," the additional output which that hour's labor would have produced in alternative employment. If Robinson Crusoe can gather a pound of brambleberries in an hour or catch half a pound of fish, then what the pound of fish really costs him is the two pounds of brambleberries he must forego for it. To return to the peasant and the tractor, the opportunity cost to the peasant of the hours of labor that the tractor saves him may be zero because he cannot use the saved time productively. In that case, the use of labor-saving capital goods is sheer waste.

The more general rule under which the peasant's case falls is that the most efficient combination of resources—efficiency being measured by costs—in the production of any goods is that which uses but little of the most costly resources and much of the cheaper resources. In an economy where wages are high and the use of machinery is cheap, goods that technically could be produced either by hand work or by machine work, will tend to be produced by machine. The converse would naturally hold in an economy where wages are low relative to the price of machinery.

The application of this rule explains, for instance, why Americans buy so many new cars. The American motorists' buying habits are generally thought to be a manifestation of lightheadedness, a proof that the consumer is enslaved by advertisers, and an illustration of conformism. By contrast, the tendency of motorists elsewhere to keep their cars for much longer stretches is supposed to result from a higher sobriety or more elevated taste. All that may be; yet the contrast can be explained simply in terms of economic rationality. In countries where labor is plentiful in comparison with producers' capital goods, the cheapest way to repair a car is by hand labor, that is, labor equipped with a minimal supply of simple tools. In a country like the United States, where labor is more expensive relative to capital goods, the cheapest way to keep a car up to a certain standard of performance is regularly to buy a new one from an automobile factory, where relatively little labor is combined with a vast supply of highly mechanized tools. The most efficient way to repair a car in the United States is to build a new car; the most efficient way to build a new car in most other places is to repair an old one.

In the same way it is equally sensible to build roads in the United States with bulldozers and diesel earthmovers and to build roads in China by using large gangs of laborers shifting gravel with

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no equipment other than picks, shovels and buckets. From the purely economic standpoint, to save much of that labor in China by using many bulldozers would be a sheer waste.

It is a fallacy, therefore, to believe that using more capital in any given enterprise is economically more efficient than using less. Capital goods, like other productive factors, are efficient only when they are properly allocated among all of the various uses to which they can be put.

The decision as to how much capital should be invested in any particular enterprise cannot be divorced from another decision, how much total capital a nation should accumulate, create or use.

At any given moment, to be sure, the amount of capital at a nation's disposal is not a matter of choice but of fact. Over any stretch of time, however, the amount can be expanded or contracted. Capital goods are produced, like all other goods, by the use of land, labor and capital. The only way a nation can by its own efforts expand its stock of capital goods, therefore, is by using resources that could otherwise have been devoted to making additional consumption goods. This interchangeability, in the production process, of capital goods and consumption goods is illustrated in a farmer's choice between eating his harvest and planting it as seed; the more he eats, the less he can plant; the more he uses for current consumption, the less he can use as capital. The monetary counterpart of this choice is that income can be spent on consumption goods, or set aside as savings; and in an economy that is working smoothly, the relative outputs of consumption goods and capital goods will match the ratio of consumption expenditures to savings. All that the people of an underdeveloped economy need do to expand the national stock of capital is to consume less than they produce. Leaving aside economic perturbations and peculiarities, the less they consume relative to current output, the faster their supply of capital will grow.

A slight defect in this prescription is that underdeveloped nations are so poor that they cannot generate much capital. The income of a very poor man hardly suffices for the ordinary needs of life; he cannot be expected to restrict his consumption in favor of future benefits; his needs press too urgently to allow much concern for the future. A man who is twenty and starving would be whimsical to invest in an annuity payable at sixty. A nation full of such men would not rationally do much saving, hence would not generate much capital. It would not, that is, if the voluntary individual choices of its citizens were allowed to prevail.

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But the rate of capital formation in an underdeveloped economy can be speeded up by its government. Suppose the citizens are on the average currently saving 5 per cent of their incomes. If the government increases the tax rate and spends the added revenue on capital goods it can push the *national* savings rate, and the national rate of capital formation, up to any level it chooses short of the limit imposed by the size of national income. Programs of forced savings have been instituted by the governments of many underdeveloped nations. Insofar as the tax burden falls on the relatively wealthy citizens of those nations, the policy of forced savings is in effect a program of redistribution, open to approval or disapproval on the grounds generally applicable to schemes for equalizing income and wealth. Unfortunately, however, in very poor economies the national rate of capital formation cannot be raised much by any level of taxation applied to the wealthy few. Where that is the case, and it is probably a fairly typical case, the regime of forced savings may be extended to citizens who are poor absolutely, with the result that those who were already underfed are required to reduce their consumption further. The offer held out to them is that by making this coerced sacrifice now, by foregoing current consumption in order that extra capital may be created, they are guaranteeing themselves a higher income at some future time. But if it would be whimsical or mad for a very poor man voluntarily to save too much, it is surely whimsical or inhumane for a government to force him to save too much. One reads with shock of the aged bachelor brothers discovered lying dead of starvation on mattresses stuffed with money; the spectacle would be hardly more edifying had they died so because the state commandeered their income to build, for the national good, a splendid atomic power station.

There is still another way in which a nation can increase the supply of capital at its disposal, which is to borrow it from foreigners. This method, which has been used by underdeveloped nations for many centuries, is especially suitable since it can put at their disposal, quickly, capital far in excess of the amounts they could generate at home. Moreover, it is made feasible not only by the benevolence of foreign governments; the self-interest of foreign capitalists moves them, too, to invest in underdeveloped countries, for the rate of return in countries that as yet possess little capital is apt to be much higher than the rate capital can earn in richer economies. Unfortunately capital borrowed from private lenders is seldom or never received so warmly by the underdeveloped nation

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as when it is proffered to the government by other governments or international agencies. The reason is not only that public lenders are more likely to offer bargain rates. More often reluctance is dictated by the feeling that when foreigners invest in and own a country's facilities, especially its public services, they acquire too great a power in its political affairs. Whether this fear is realistic, and if realistic, so compelling that a nation should forego possibilities of more rapid enrichment in order to exclude the threat, is a question fruitless to consider in the abstract. It can be usefully answered, in concrete instances, only by the exercise of fine political prudence. As to the purely economic issue, there is no doubt that foreign financing is the quickest way for underdeveloped nations to expand their supply of capital. It is convenient, also, that transfers of capital, conceived as loans, sometimes end life as gifts.

To accumulate capital, no matter how a nation comes by it, means necessarily to defer current consumption. As men can be short-sighted, so too can they be excessively long-sighted; they can cheat the present as easily as they can cheat the future, and in that sense more capital is no better than less.

The third fallacy: More roads are better than fewer roads.

In this fallacy, "roads" stands as a symbol for all installations having to do with transportation and communications, or more broadly, all those commonly called public works. The fallacy urges that economic development is peculiarly dependent on a dense network of avenues and wires.

As all public works are capital goods, the general arguments given earlier as to getting and spending capital apply to them also. It is urged in extenuation, however, that public works have a special character, indicated by the technical titles commonly assigned them, Infrastructure or Social Overhead Capital.

Roads are called "Social" capital not only because they are generally owned by and used by the public, but mainly because a road bestows benefits on persons who have never seen it, much less travelled it. The parson in farthest Utah, as he drinks his morning's orange juice, drinks it cheaper because of a little road in Florida that enables the oranges to reach their market with less effort. It can be said, of course, that though he has not travelled that road in the flesh, he has travelled it vicariously by the motion of those oranges

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he consumes. Yet similar benefits will be realized also by persons who are utter strangers to the public improvement, such as the driver of a car who finds his journey to work eased because so many other commuters have taken to travel by subway, or the village gossip who sparing the expense of a telephone nevertheless feasts on the news it carries. Every public facility does social good far outside the circle of its users.

A road is "Overhead" capital because the cost of the road does not vary with the services it provides. Its cost is overhead in the same way that the cost of maintaining a factory building is no less or greater when the factory is working overtime than when it is standing idle. It is overhead cost by contrast with variable costs, such as the cost of the wood or labor that goes into table making, the total amount of it varying with the number of tables the factory constructs.

Because a road is overhead capital, and the amount of it required cannot be meted out in accordance with how intensely it is used, the investment required for it is said to be "lumpy." Some considerable investment is needed to build a length of road, whether one man or a hundred were expected to walk on it during any day. Moreover, the investment may take a long time to yield fruit. From the first moment capital begins to be sunk in the building of the road until the road is bearing enough traffic to justify its cost, years may elapse.

Now because of these three characteristics imputed to roads and other such facilities—the large investment, the long time elapsing before the investment yields commensurate benefits, and the enjoyment of benefits by people who do not in any direct or ordinary sense "use" the facility—some experts argue that social overhead capital must necessarily be provided or subsidized by the state. They argue that private investors cannot or will not make such big investments, that they cannot or will not wait so long to start earning a return on their investment, and that in any event they cannot get a sufficient return on their investment because so many of the beneficiaries are unknown, or even if known, could not be required to pay for their benefits.

Let us consider the arguments in order. A road needs a big investment, but private investors do not make big investments. But surely a big investment is only required for big roads. A short and narrow path does not need much capital. A long superhighway needs very much capital. But is it not surprising, then, that many of the

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biggest and longest superhighways in the United States, built by huge investments of capital, were financed by private capital, accumulated by the sale of turnpike-authority bonds in the open, competitive, private bond market? If it is said that in no underdeveloped economy could private citizens provide the capital to finance such a project, it might be answered that no underdeveloped country needs such roads at this point in its development—its scarce stocks of capital can be put to much more efficient uses.

The second argument is that private individuals will not wait as long as is required to realize returns on such investments. There is much evidence to the contrary. A young man freshly awarded his Ph.D. can be thought of as a capital good into which investment has been poured for a quarter of a century before it even begins to yield any monetary return. Shortly thereafter, the young man will begin investing about 5 per cent of his income in life-insurance, an investment guaranteed, on the average, to pay no return until half a century later. Orchards bear no fruit for five to fifteen years after planting; yet many private men invest in orchards. Private lumber companies plant seedlings that will not be harvested for thirty years. It is not clear that the state has a monopoly of patience.

The third argument is that the benefits of roads leak off, as it were, to many people who do not use them; hence the private investor could not capture an adequate return from investment in roads. The premise that leakage of benefits takes place is undeniable; but in the context it is fallacious because it implies that this is a special characteristic of roads as contrasted with other capital goods or other commodities. It is not special at all. A small boy who buys a chocolate for a penny may feel that he has been favored by a gift from the gods; he would gladly have given three cents or seven, had it been demanded. Every bargain in the eye of the buyer represents a leakage of benefits in the eye of the seller; the seller is prevented from charging a price exactly equal to the benefit only by force of the competition that presses prices down toward the cost of production. Moreover, in private production it also regularly happens that benefits leak off to persons that were not privy to the transaction. When the lady of fashion walks out in her latest creation, the boulevardier glories at the sight, but Mme. Chanel knows no way to levy a charge on him for the pleasure that her creation is occasioning. Neither can my neighbor who plants a beautiful garden.

If leakage of benefits were a fatal objection to private industry,

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there could not be any private industry at all. But private investors do not base their calculations on whether they can charge for *all* the utility their efforts give rise to, but only whether they can charge for enough to yield a suitable rate of return for the investment. It is true that were the leakage exceptionally severe, private investors would be dissuaded from investing, *even though* the total of all benefits realized by the whole community might amply justify the investment. In such cases, where the social benefit of an undertaking vastly exceeds the rate of return that the private investor could make it yield to him, there is occasion for the state to invest in the facility. A prime instance is a lighthouse.

Yet the abstract case that can be made for state investment in such projects encounters one great difficulty in practical application. The value of leaked benefits—or non-pecuniary social income—is difficult or impossible to assess: they are spread widely and nobody knows what precise value, in dollars, to attach to any one of them. To make investments in such cases is risky because the poverty of information subjects government officials to error, but safe because the critics of government investment cannot conclusively demonstrate that the investment was wasteful. For both reasons, the presumption ought to run against government investment in roads and other social facilities. The existence of privately financed railroads, turnpikes, airlines, canals, telegraph companies, newspapers, radio and the like demonstrates that private investors have not refused to construct social overhead capital.

Although, if the building of all public facilities were left to private enterprise, there would almost certainly be somewhat too few of them; if government builds and operates them on a subsidy basis —that is, in such a way that the charges to direct users do not completely cover the costs—there will almost certainly be too many of them. This tendency will result inevitably from the fact that every individual has a private incentive to be subsidized by government, that is to have benefits conferred on him at the expense of other citizens. This incentive operates all the more forcibly to the extent that the citizens have been taught to make a sharp distinction between subsidies from government and subsidies from their fellow citizens; the former can be claimed proudly as of right; taking the latter could not fail to have an ethically dubious tone when the grantee knows that his fellow citizens are giving the gift under compulsion. It would be too much to say that every man looks forward with delight and an ardent sense of righteousness to receiving

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public subsidies; yet many do. Does the man living on top of a remote mountain doubt that his letters have an immutable right to be transported to the other end of the country for 5 cents, if that is the fee required of all other Americans, for instance of a New Yorker mailing an announcement to his next-door neighbor?

The private citizen demands that his government build better roads, better schools, better facilities of all sorts. There are many private citizens; taken together, they issue commands for facilities far beyond the resources available to satisfy them. Each, after all, is asking for something that would in fact benefit him considerably but that would cost him little or nothing. Would not the total demand for foodstuffs, housing, or automobiles be exorbitant if the price to the individual demanding it were a negligible part of its cost?

Faced with such demands, may not the government provide too much road? It is possible; to answer whether it is true would require a most exquisite calculation to determine whether the benefits to be realized by the community from an additional dollar invested in roads are at any moment greater or less than the benefits from that dollar's investment in any other capital good. The question cannot be answered.

But, since every one who talks about roads says that there are not enough roads, it is important to notice that there *can* be too many roads and that a democratic government may systematically err in favor of too many roads.

The fourth fallacy: Rapid economic development is better than slow economic development.

The need for rapidity is emphasized by those who point out that the impoverished masses in underdeveloped areas are impatient and that public impatience must lead to political disorder and perhaps to communism, unless it is soothed by quick and dramatic improvements in the standard of living.

Leaving aside important doubts as to whether the citizenry of the underdeveloped nations really are as impatient as all that, and whether the inevitable outcome of impatience is more likely to be political chaos than increased economic effort, one should nevertheless point out that the remedy proposed is impossible to achieve. It is

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impossible to accomplish simultaneously the *greatest* possible increase in the standard of living and the *speediest* increase.

The most feasible means—though neither a certain nor a unique means—to improve the standard of living is to build up one's stock of capital. But every addition to capital is necessarily made at the expense of current consumption; it is therefore impossible simultaneously to consume as much as possible in the present and to make the best possible arrangements for increasing future income. If a man wants to maximize consumption *this year*, he should consume all his current income and more: that behavior would reflect the extreme of impatience. If another one wants to maximize his consumption next year, ten years hence, or at any future date, he should consume nothing this year, next year, or any year up to the final one, but invest, invest, and invest; in the year when he finally turns to consumption, the income available to him will be the highest possible, a proper reward for uncommon patience. If one compares the standard of living of the two, it is clear that the first one is better off for each of the years while the other is biding his time and building his fortune, and after that the second is able to live much better. In short the *level* of consumption that can be achieved and the *speed* with which it is achieved stand in direct opposition to one another.

Economic policy, to be meaningful, must be based on a choice as to *when* the maximum level of consumption that the system is capable of producing should be achieved. To decide *when* is also to decide on *how high* the attainable level will be. These two variables are linked; they are the pans of a scale, and to raise one is necessarily to lower the other.

The choice of how much economic growth a nation should aim for and when it should start enjoying the fruits of that growth in increased consumption is not a single choice but a never-ending succession of choices. In order to make those choices rationally, a great array of tastes must be consulted. Each individual knows more or less well his own tastes about how much of his income he prefers to use now and how much he prefers to set aside for the future. It is not essential that this matter of individual choice be turned into a political question, to be decided by majority vote or the judgment of experts.

If rapidity of economic growth were not costly in terms of other human objectives, everyone should endorse it without qualification; as it is, no reasonable man can prefer it to the exclusion of all other

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goals. It is one of many objectives, and must be weighed against the rest.

However difficult and complex the whole problem of economic development is, one of its most confusing aspects is the difficulty of ascertaining exactly how poor the poor nations are.

There is no doubt that the standard methods of national-income accounting exaggerate their poverty. In rural and simple economies, people make for themselves many of the things that the inhabitants of complex industrialized economies do not make for themselves but buy from others. National income statistics usually and necessarily differentiate between goods exchanged in markets and identical goods that do not enter the market; the value of the former appearing in the total, the latter not. The textbook instance is that national income falls when a man marries his housekeeper, and rises when instead of shaving himself he goes to a barber. But in African villages, householders build their own huts; and throughout the underdeveloped world, neighbors sing and dance for each others' entertainment instead of going to concert halls to buy the services of paid performers. National income statistics cannot easily register the value of unbought services since those do not leave tangible traces in accounting records. The standard of living in non-industrial nations is therefore much understated by ordinary statistics.

This is all the more true because national income statistics cannot and do not take into account the value of leisure. Imagine two identical farms, each producing one thousand bushels of wheat in a year, the only difference being that one farmer works fourteen hours each day and the other somehow manages to do the work in six; from the standpoint of national income statistics, the two farmers would be enjoying identical incomes even though it is obvious that the true income of the second is very much greater if he attaches any positive value to leisure. Time free from labor is not necessarily leisure, as it may yield nothing but boredom or frustration; but it should be remembered that men who live in industrialized societies have very assiduously trained themselves to attach a lower value to leisure than men have at other times and places. To the extent that people in underdeveloped nations do attach a high value to leisure, the statistics badly understate their total in-

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comes by leaving out of account the psychic, non-pecuniary components of their incomes.

A further consideration suggesting that the poverty of underdeveloped nations is different in character than we suppose, arises from the reflection that the poorest nations are almost all tropical and tropical nations are poor. Not much is made of this beyond the platitude that men do not thrive in extreme heat, but insects and bacteria do. It seems a more plausible generalization, however, that a perpetually warm climate is highly favorable to human life; it reduces man's need for food, clothing and shelter; and at the same time it puts in his hands throughout the year—and not only in one short season—a plentiful supply of plants and animals.

From this standpoint the economic civilization that northern peoples have developed is a colossal exercise in irony. Having deliberately planted themselves in inhospitable regions, they have been forced to overcome the hazards of nature by donning heavy clothing, erecting bulky housing, and forcing crops from a reluctant earth. Then, having made all those things, the need for which was imposed only by the unsuitable setting in which they perversely decided to live, they have weighed all those goods, and finding them many, they call themselves rich.

But, if by contrast the inhabitants of perpetually warm places have Nature as an ally, why are they in fact so poor? The answer, perhaps, is that only in warm places can people as poor as they continue to live.

It cannot be denied that in the underdeveloped nations, however high a value the inhabitants may assign to leisure and the other pleasures of a simple life, many of them are too poor to enjoy anything at all. The entirely laudable desire to help relieve them will not have been very effective if, in the rush for a remedy, it urges cures that eradicate old miseries only to install new miseries in their place. A physician carried away by the pain of the victim and the impatience of the victim's friends does not work at his best.

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OVERTON HUME TAYLOR

The "Free Enterprise" Ideology and American Ideals and Institutions

THE WIDE PREVALENCE in the United States of the old "free enterprise" ideology, as the economic and political faith of millions of "conservative" Americans, is a very striking American phenomenon and one to which both modern "liberal" Americans and European observers tend to react with uncomprehending, impatient scorn. To all its severe critics, it seems clear that this ideology is simply a long outmoded and, in the context of modern realities, entirely absurd, nostalgic dream. The spell of the unrealistic vision of a "free enterprise" economy is said to be preventing nation-wide acceptance of the measures necessary to bring about continuous full employment of the nation's people and resources, appropriate allocation of manpower and resources among all the important employments in the economy, humane attention to the welfare of all the people, and steady economic growth. Our modern "liberals" look with envy at Western Europe, where the virtual non-existence of anything like our business community's "free enterprise" ideology enables European governments to carry out constructive, national economic plans, with the willing cooperation of the business leaders as well as the labor leaders and others. Is not the "free enterprise" myth a wholly baneful, American obsession?

To that question, the answer in this article is a qualified "no." In my opinion, an economic system of *relatively* free enterprise and competition among all private citizens and their private organizations is desirable and possible, with "the government" playing an important and growing, but still carefully defined role. It is important that all Americans alike should have substantial private economic freedoms and responsibilities, opportunities and incentives. These are important not only on economic but even more so on humanistic or moral grounds. This kind of ideal-conception of our

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economic system harmonizes best with our national government and political life, and is properly a part of the traditional, still sound "American dream" of an open society of free individuals. Equal freedom for all men, in all departments of their lives, including the economic sphere, and adequate cooperation among all for their common welfare, are the two equally important sides of the American ideal. While extreme devotees of "free enterprise" are often too uncooperative when intelligent concern for the common welfare conflicts with their private interests, it is equally true that too extreme or enthusiastic "liberals" often fail to show sufficient, impartial concern for the proper economic freedoms of all Americans, including businessmen.

Of course, no utopian conception of a good society can ever be fully realized in any actual society. But a useful system of political thought must include a manageably simple and coherent, ideal conception of the good society to be achieved. There must be realistic understanding and acceptance of the inevitably wide gap between the ideal and the existing reality, and freedom from the illusions generated by confusing them. There must also be continuous effort to narrow that gap and to revise the ideal-conception itself in the light of changing conditions and advancing knowledge.

Today the old conception of the "free enterprise" economy needs much revision. In our increasingly complex, rapidly changing society, there is much necessary growth of *organization* of all life and activities, necessitating new extensions of the role of the government. The pattern of private freedoms and restraints on government has to be revised in the interest of the general welfare of all the people.

What is needed above all is more effort by both "liberal intellectuals" and those who represent what may be termed "fundamentalist" Americanism to understand each other. A gulf has been created between them by the speed and character of modern change in both our society and our intellectual and moral culture. The conservative and unsophisticated millions have not assimilated new knowledge; and too many of the advanced thinkers have not remained fully in touch with the still sound elements of our national spiritual inheritance from the great epoch of "the founding fathers" —the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. In its early growth "the American dream" or vision of our good-society-to-be developed from an excellent though simple social-moral philosophy, widely understood among the people. The same philosophy—prevalent in the

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Enlightenment—originally produced the classical-economic-liberal (libertarian) ideal and theory of political economy of Adam Smith and his successors—the intellectually best, *authentic* version of the "free enterprise" philosophy of economic life and public policy. And this, too, in a much cruder, popular American form may be said to have been from the outset an essential part of "the American dream" itself.

The original "American dream" has remained alive mainly on the level of partially articulate, mass-popular, quasi-instinctive attitudes, ideals, beliefs, and assumptions. On the higher level of our intellectual life and culture, there has been in recent times too little explicit and reflective development of the original American moral-philosophic vision of the good society. In the modern evolution of the latter, two related "trends" have been tending to break up such continuity. The growth of a too intensive and absolute intellectual specialization has been making most scholars—economists, political scientists, students of law and jurisprudence, and others—unable to keep their specialties properly in touch with each other or to share any broad outlook or perspective. The decline of the moral-philosophic interest that formerly flourished strongly in all the social studies, along with the "scientific" interest in the study of existing societies—the "trend" toward a pure positivism or scientism in the modern "social sciences"—has been yielding unfortunate results. Increasingly preoccupied with positive-scientific research and analysis in their special fields, and sceptical to the point of nihilism about the common realm of thought that is moral philosophy, modern scholars, in general, have almost ceased to try to develop a common, comprehensive, philosophical vision of the good society and the conditions for its realization. They are instead building up only in their separated fields increasingly exact and useful bodies of instrumental knowledge—useful to all kinds of diverse groups in our society in their efforts to pursue more effectively their own particular ends or objectives. Such knowledge, indeed, has great value but does not by itself imply or yield the kind of humane-and-rational, over-all wisdom that is needed for the development and improvement of the old "American dream," and for its progressive adaptation to emerging realities and problems. As a result of the increasing technical intricacy of their knowledge, modern scholars not only have been losing power to communicate their superior understanding of their subject matters (aspects of public affairs) to the general public, but also have been ceasing *to have* wisdom of adequate breadth *for*

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communication to the public, or to be responsive to all its proper questions.

What we need and lack is a modernized American philosophy —economic, social, moral, legal, and political. It must explicate the ideals at the basis of our institutions, in the terms and with the revisions needed to make them fully relevant to present-day realities and problems. We also need effective, widespread popularization of this modernized Americanism. On the way toward achieving such a public philosophy for our time, we need first to "re-visit" the Enlightenment and its contributions to "the American dream"—including the "free enterprise" ideology—and then to develop and revise that entire inheritance.

Surely, it is true that the United States is deeply indebted to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment for the basic ideas that still underlie all its institutions. The Enlightenment, indeed, was an all-Western phenomenon, occurring throughout Western Europe *and* the British North American colonies which became the United States; but for reasons to be reviewed here, its on-going effects in this country have been peculiarly profound, all-pervasive, and enduring. A main source of the Enlightenment itself, and *the* main source of all that Americans took from it, lay in the development of English thought and institutions from the Middle Ages on, especially through the seventeenth century.

In the eighteenth century itself, the French *philosophes* stood out as the most numerous and brilliant representatives of the Enlightenment, and there is a common tendency to think about them too exclusively in connection with it. Their ideas, it is generally recognized, were derived to a great extent from those of Locke and thus from seventeenth-century English thought, and from just that part of the latter which found the *most* widespread and complete acceptance among the English-colonial-Americans. To some extent the Enlightenment developed in different ways and along different lines on the two sides of the Atlantic. In France especially, and in Europe generally, the new "enlightened" libertarian ideas tended to develop *as* the ideas of the militant, dissenting, and innovating minds. What they owed to Locke took extremely radical forms in their struggle against the strong, opposing, and later resurgent, older European traditions. But in colonial America the same ideas met much less opposition and developed in moderate, native forms—

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owing little to French influence—which became the common outlook of much more nearly the entire population. Hence when the American Revolution came, though it was much more than just a war for independence from Great Britain, its revolutionary impact was extremely mild—yet real and decisive. It led to the creation here, with general consent, of a national society, government, economy, and civilization, founded on the ideals of extensive and equal freedom for all men severally, and a scheme of institutions designed to channel the free activities of all into the best service to their common welfare and progress.

In nineteenth-century America, the prevailing conditions and experiences of the people long remained especially conducive to their continuing adherence to those ideals. Our initially sparse and always highly mobile population, and long almost empty, rich continent to be occupied and developed, meant abundant opportunities for most Americans to be successfully and independently enterprising. In large measure they could realize their own diverse ambitions—mainly through market-rewarded contributions to communal wealth and welfare—in a developing economy and society in which the roles required of our governments—federal, state, and local—were indeed important but far from all-important. Through the nineteenth century, moreover, the relative mental as well as political "isolation" of the United States from the rest of the world worked strongly to limit the influence here of the different movements that became widely influential in nineteenth-century Europe. Both Europe's old, resurgent and reactionary, and its newer, more radical creeds, which there opposed and modified the influence of the libertarian faith carried on from the Enlightenment, had far less impact on this country. The romantic reaction against the rational temper of the Enlightenment, which profoundly influenced nineteenth-century European culture, was here much milder and more limited. Above all, the renewed enthusiasm for everything mediaeval as opposed to everything modern—hence opposition to both Capitalism and Democracy—was never significant in this country. Nor has European socialism ever achieved much enduring strength here, for our society has no "feudal" past and carry-over, and our "capitalism" has been from the outset uniquely pure as it has evolved in our open society without rigid class lines and under conditions enabling most of the people to participate in it more as beneficiaries of the system than as victims of its faults.

Having glanced at the reasons for the uniquely great and en-

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during influence of the Enlightenment here, let us consider more closely the nature of that movement and its influence. Out of Western culture's mingled strands of ancient-classical and Christian ethical idealism, there developed the Enlightment's crusading concern for freedom and justice for all human beings and its vision of a new growth of mutual good will and cooperation among all for their common welfare. Out of the seventeenth-century intellectual revolution in philosophy and the sciences—"natural" and social or "moral"—developed the Enlightenment's wider popularization of that movement and the new "scientific" outlook on both all nature and all human affairs. Thus what above all characterized the Enlightenment was *the blend of* humanitarian idealism *and* the spirit of scientific inquiry in the social studies: psychology and ethics, jurisprudence, political philosophy or science, and political economy which combined the rudiments of modern economics with the most closely related elements of the other studies. The numerous, lively "intellectuals" of the period were generally interested and proficient in all those studies. They were seeking the way toward a rational and humane reorganization of all human relations and affairs, which would bring to full realization the potential, harmonious "natural order" in the social world, by enabling every man to develop and exercise, as freely as possible, his own best potentialities of simultaneous service to his own economic and human welfare, and to that of his fellows and society.

A special influence was exerted, moreover, on most of the epoch's varied thought by the philosophy of Locke—both his general philosophy (epistemology) and his civic-ethical and political philosophy. The former—the Lockeian "empiricism" or insistence that all trustworthy knowledge must be grounded in and confirmed by adequate, authentic, direct, and specific human "experience"—contributed not only to scientific thought but also to the libertarian, social-moral outlook. This theory of knowledge implies, first, that everyone has the intellectual right and duty to take his own experience as his starting point; to add what he can learn about the experiences of others; and on that basis to do his own independent thinking—critically examining all views or doctrines proposed to or urged upon him, and the *regimes* supported by those doctrines, however strongly sanctioned by tradition and authority. Moreover, the "experience" theory of knowledge also leads logically to belief in democracy as the best form of government; for it follows that if, in a society, the judgments that underlie all the public decisions

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which affect all the people are to be wise judgments, they must have the benefit of the experiences of all the people, of their own desires and circumstances, and not rest merely on the insufficient, limited experience of the members of a governing *élite*.

The main ideas in Locke's civic-ethical and political philosophy —in his second essay or treatise on civil government—have their background in the evolution of the English Constitution. There had been a long, fluctuating growth of the power of Parliament and progressive limitation of that of the monarchy, together with growth of the independent power of the courts and common law: a progressive building up and safeguarding of English freedom or "the rights of Englishmen." In the crucial phase of the struggle with the Parliamentary party, the Stuart kings had failed to create an absolute monarchy in England. The settlement of 1688 decisively established the supremacy of Parliament, and was seen as a victory for the libertarian principles of the Parliamentary party. Locke's essay was written to explain and justify his version of those principles, to which he imputed a universal, timeless validity. Thus, the substance of the essay was also Locke's own political philosophy, which later profoundly influenced the entire all-Western, eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and particularly the American inheritance.

It is impossible here to discuss the very difficult problem of reconciling with Locke's "empiricism" his use of the age-old idea of the "natural" moral law, or set of principles of ideal justice in all human relations, held to be "evident" to the "reason" of all reasonable men. It must suffice to recall his interpretation of that idea, which became centrally important in most social thought in the Enlightenment. Under the "natural" moral law, he held, *all men* are alike entitled, because they all have the same "human nature," to a certain set of extensive and equal "natural rights" of free choice and action in the conduct of their lives and affairs. Hence everyone also has the moral duty toward all other men which their rights imply—the duty always to respect, not violate, others' rights, viewed as equal to his own. Of equal importance are Locke's further ideas about the extent and the limitations of men's "natural" abilities and propensities to grasp, agree on, and voluntarily obey the moral law; and about the institutions—system of government and positive law —required to make the moral law, or justice among all men, as effective as possible.

About the rational-and-moral capacities of "human nature," Locke in this essay adopted a moderately optimistic and/or moder-

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ately pessimistic premise: he held that men in "the state of nature" (under no government) would have a *partial, imperfect* tendency to apprehend and obey the "natural" moral law, which would make their condition as a group considerably better than the all-out "war among all" of Hobbes. This tendency would lead them half-way toward achieving, even as a wholly ungoverned society, a harmonious, peaceful, orderly, and well-working society of men respecting each other's rights and fulfilling the requirements of their common welfare, while within the limits thus accepted, freely pursuing realizations of their own ambitions. But the degree of achievement would remain imperfect and inadequate because in the insecure, anarchic state, with every man perforce relying solely on himself to define and defend his own rights in disputes with others, "*the bias of self-interest and passion,*" says Locke, would too often lead men to form and act upon diverse and conflicting, private, distorted ideas of justice or the moral law, unduly favorable to themselves and adverse to others.

Government, then, is indeed necessary; and for the sake of its potential, superior benefits to all, all should be led alike by their interests, rights, and duties to agree among themselves to create, support, and obey a government—with an appropriate constitution defining and limiting its powers and functions. The essential role of the government should be simply to develop (through both legislation and judicial decisions) and to enforce throughout the society, a complete, just system of positive law, impartially protecting the "natural rights" of all men *vis à vis* both each other and the government itself. With the moral law thus made fully effective, the society would "naturally" develop and function optimally for the welfare of all its members through their interdependence and the free play—within the bounds of justice to each other—of their self-interests *in* serving each other *for* the services obtainable in return.

As that last sentence indicates, implicit in Locke's essay is a general foreshadowing of the "free enterprise" economic philosophy, which was to be fully developed only much later. Roughly a century later, as I shall explain hereafter, the Physiocrats and Adam Smith fully agreed with Locke about the importance and the character of the moral climate and legal order required to make the "free enterprise" economy an effectively working system, serving the common welfare of all men. But let me first speak of the influence of Locke's political philosophy on that of our American Constitution's "found-

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ing fathers," and the character and development of the American system of government and political life.

It is hardly possible to overstate the importance in American political thought and government of that at once half-optimistic and half-pessimistic view of "human nature" which was central among the ideas of Locke. Authoritarian systems may be said to rest upon the utterly pessimistic premise that were the people as the governed "let alone," they would do each other and society in, completely; that only absolute, authoritarian government can create a well-ordered and well-working society. To some extent, libertarian-and-democratic systems tend to involve the opposite, optimistic premise: that the people generally are well endowed with native "natural goodness"—spontaneous, mutual good will and moral reasonableness—and hence are fit to be entrusted with freedom and self-government. But unless that assumption is much qualified, it is of course foolish; and the solid, libertarian philosophies and systems conceived by Locke and the American "founding fathers" rested upon their rather evenly balanced mixtures of trust and distrust of "human nature." They sought extensive and equal freedom for all men severally, *but* saw as required to insure that freedom, a careful limitation of all governmental, *and all* power of men over other men. On the one hand they believed that in general, men in society—*if* none among them have or gain too much power over others—can spontaneously develop, arrange, and adjust their relations and activities so as to make unnecessary very extensive, external, coercive control of their behavior for their common good; limited government can be sufficient. On the other hand they also believed that the general proneness of men to be misled—in Locke's telling phrase—by "the bias of self-interest and passion," into taking unfair advantage of others when they can, i.e. when they have unchecked power over them, makes all great concentrations of power dangerous to the just rights and freedoms of those subjected to them. This mixed and balanced view is the essence of the traditional American philosophy of government.

Such is the outlook underlying the elaborate system of "checks and balances" devised by the framers of our Constitution. One consequence is that our system of government is not an unqualified democracy in the simple sense of very wide suffrage and majority rule. American democracy in that sense is much qualified by a set of firm, hard-to-change, Constitutional protections of essential rights and liberties for all minorities and all individuals, even as against

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what at any time appears to be the will of the majority. And the Supreme Court as interpreter of the Constitution is there to enforce those protections—although it, too, is properly influenced in the long run by enduring changes of prevailing public opinion. Then there are the many allocations of special powers to parts of the government owing their mandates to different, special constituencies—the Congressmen, the Senators, and the President—and divisions of power also between the national, state, and local governments, and within all the latter severally. And the purpose is to insure that, as nearly as possible, every important part of our society or interest-group in it shall have always, in relation to every proposed action by government, enough power to defend in some measure its own rights or insist on some concessions to its special views, but *not* enough power to get its own way completely or avoid having to make concessions to all other such groups.

It is, as we know, a cumbersome system with maddening defects; and workable only with much all-around willingness to accept the necessary compromises. Never wholly static, repeatedly revised in the past to meet new needs, it no doubt calls for further new revisions in our time. But its fundamental principle is profoundly wise: the purposes and views of all groups being as a rule diversely biased, all must share power evenly enough to counteract each other's biases, and thus to approach, through fair compromises, a consensus approximating impartial justice—a collective wisdom or synthesis to which all views contribute. It may be true that in relation to modern needs, our system de-centralizes power, to the point of making it often impossible to get necessary things done, or possible to get them done only through the worst devices of "politics"—in the absence of enough of that readiness on all sides to reach reasonable compromises, honorably and rationally, which the ideal-conception of the system presupposes.

But surely the experience of the world at large in the present century points rather clearly to the far greater evils of excessive centralizations of power in national societies. Finally, the nature of our governmental system has a further corollary: it is not a system that is suited to handle well an indefinite enlargement of its functions or of the volume and variety of governmental business. It presupposes that the greater part of the necessary work of our society is carried on, satisfactorily in the public interest, through a great multitude of free, private initiatives and arrangements, in general needing but little attention from the government; all of

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course developing and operating within the bounds set by the general body of law provided by the government. In that sense a largely "free enterprise" economy is the required, logical complement of our constitutional, governmental system.

As I indicated above, the theory of that system of economy was first created by the French Physiocrats and Adam Smith. It was as both moralists and economists that they advocated economic liberty for all men alike. A system of free enterprise they regarded as both morally imperative under their ideals of freedom and justice, *and* sure to work best for progressive growth and wide distribution of wealth. Above all, they explicitly recognized the need to develop, as the basic condition of (approximate) realization of their ideal vision of the "free enterprise" economy, an appropriate moral climate and legal order or framework.

In other words, neither the *laissez faire* maxim nor the assumption-and-approval of "self-interest" or "the profit motive" as the main spur and guide of men's economic behavior, was set down by those founders of the "free enterprise" philosophy in anything like absolute or unqualified terms. The "Physiocrats" were as much ethical, legal, and political philosophers as economists, and followed Locke in their stress on and conception of the "natural" moral law and the "natural rights" of and obligations among all men. And they urged the need of France (not long before the French Revolution) for a radically reformed and then vigorously reforming government, which should re-fashion the nation's system of positive law into an ideally just legal system, *and thereafter* allow a general free play of all private interests and market forces *within* that reformed legal framework.

Adam Smith, who also was both a moralist and an economist, had written before he produced his great work on *The Wealth of Nations,* an earlier, forgotten book, *A Theory of the Moral Sentiments,* which was a treatise in both social psychology and ethics. He grounded his ethical philosophy in a theory of men's human-natural, mutual "sympathies" and desires for approval from each other, as the potential source of a social, moral consensus that would shape and support the right institutions and legal order. It would so modify the motive of "self-interest" in all individuals as to make that consistent with reciprocal justice among them all, and with their common welfare. The existence of a society with such a moral con-

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sensus and legal order was then presupposed in the economic theory of Smith's later work on the socially well-working, free-enterprise or free-markets economy in which the supplies of all wanted services and products would respond and adjust to the public's demands for them; all prices would adjust under market pressures to the levels just sufficiently rewarding the producers; all incomes would adjust to the market values of the productive services through which they were earned; and all workers and resources would move into the parts of the economy in which they could be most productive of things most in demand. In the Adam Smithian ideal economy, universal competition as opposed to monopoly would mean such a universal distribution or dispersal, balancing and neutralizing of all power, e.g., of firms in their markets—such a perfect economy-wide system of "checks and balances"—that adaptation to market conditions, not control of them, would alone be possible for everyone, and everyone's self-interest would lie entirely in best service to the public. Behind that regulating force of competition would lie the moral one: the society's moral consensus and legal order, forbidding and preventing all acquisitions of private gains *not* earned as rewards for services to others, would make competition a civilized rivalry in public service, and *not* strife or a "war among all."

That ideal conception of the good "free enterprise" economy never has been by any means fully realized in any real society. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that it never has been *fully* realized; but an important question is why even the best approximate realizations have fallen *as far* below the ideal as they have. One part of the answer lies in a defective feature of the eighteenth-century outlook, shared by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith—and many of the latter's nineteenth-century successors. This defect was the too easy optimism, originally reflected in the ambiguous use of the adjective "natural" to mean both morally ideal and that which societies of men—once they became "enlightened"—would "naturally tend" to bring into being more or less spontaneously without much sustained effort. Having too much "tendency" toward that confused and optimistic frame of mind, the philosopher-economists advocating the "free enterprise" economy, *although* they originally recognized its need for an appropriate moral climate and legal order, did not sufficiently emphasize that part of their vision nor spell out any adequate positive program for its realization. Secondly, in the nineteenth century the libertarian economists became so specialized as economists only that (with a few exceptions, most notably John

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Stuart Mill), they carried on development only of the economic theory of the to-be-expected working of the "free enterprise" economy, and *did not* go on developing the moral-and-legal philosophy of its required socio-cultural *milieu* and institutional framework. As economists lost contact with the other "moral sciences," so also the latter—e.g., the study of law and jurisprudence, and political science —tended as specialties to lose contact with economics. Hence the general public has not been given, over the generations, adequate assistance or "enlightening" leadership by all or any of those groups of scholars, in developing the required institutions of well-working, libertarian societies and economies.

The scholars, however, could not have played *the main* role in any case. Inevitably, the evolution of every great society's real institutions is controlled much less—especially in an age of advancing democracy—by full public understanding and acceptance of any wise philosophy evolved by great thinkers, than by two other interrelated factors: the crude, narrow "interests" of the classes and groups that acquire predominant, political power, and the distorted versions of special ideologies that became prevalent in those classes and groups as expressions of their mixed ideals, beliefs, and "interests." Thus the "free enterprise" ideology *in the forms in which* it has been really widespread and influential, *never has been quite the same thing as* the original, admirable vision of Adam Smith and his peers within the Enlightenment. In its *earliest* popular and influential form, however, *it was not mainly* a "capitalist-class" or "business-community" gospel. Later, these groups developed a seriously distorted version, in effect unduly favorable to the dominant business interests and adverse to those of broader masses of the people; and the modern, popular reactions against this later version have become the great political trends, going in important respects to their own unfortunate extremes.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the first wide spread of the libertarian outlook on economic life and policy *was not mainly* among the leading (urban) businessmen—merchants, bankers, etc. —of that time. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith decidedly were *not* spokesmen for the businessmen of their period, nor in special sympathy with them. Their economic philosophy stood forth *in opposition to* the much older "mercantilism," which long had been, and to no small extent still was, popular among the leading businessmen of those times—merchant-capitalists of the age that preceded "the industrial revolution." In the early-modern centuries, commer-

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cial "capitalism" evolved along with, and in much interdependence with, the centralized and "sovereign" national states that were new, post-mediaeval institutions. The oligarchic governments of those national states were active on many fronts in efforts to foster growth of national wealth and power through foreign trade or commercial, monetary, fiscal, and, in a sense, economic "planning" policies, all designed both to stimulate and to regulate expansions of the branches of each nation's (handicraft) industry and commerce thought to be most beneficial to its wealth and power. The great merchants, moreover, generally were much benefited in their private fortunes by those governmental policies, and actively supported them from mixed motives of patriotism and self-interest.

The "mercantilist" policies were by no means entirely wrong or foolish *as* policies for accelerating economic growth. But "mercantilist" economic thought had no broad, humanistic aspect and no idealistic concern for equal rights and liberties for all men. It was a purely pragmatic search for the most effective means to nationalistic and capitalistic ends. At the same time, the "mercantilist" policies which favored industry and commerce, both neglected and hampered agriculture, though that was still (as a rule) the predominant sector of each national economy, employing most of its people and resources.

Hence the revolt against those policies and in favor of more "free enterprise" and "free trade" or less governmental control of economic life, first became widespread among the scientific-farming-minded agricultural landlords and country gentlemen of the eighteenth century, the leaders in the "agricultural revolution" that preceded the "industrial revolution." The new economic theory appealed to them as revealing the best route to general economic growth or progress, benefiting all men through a universal extension to all farmers of wide-free-market opportunities and incentives to make their farms more productive. The "Physiocrats," who were strongly of this mind, advocated *laissez faire* for the benefit of the French peasants primarily, and their education in scientific farming. They went so far in their agrarian bias as to maintain that the cultivators of the soil were the nation's *sole* producers of its annual surplus of new wealth or output above current consumption and maintenance requirements—the surplus available for investment in economic growth, by the great landlords to whom the peasants paid it.

Adam Smith's touch of agrarian bias was far less pronounced.

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He saw growth of national wealth as dependent on business investment and skilled labor in industry as well as in agriculture; but he scolded the businessmen, "merchants and manufacturers," of his time for their "wretched spirit of greed and monopoly" which made them supporters of the "mercantilist" policies that he condemned. He praised the "country gentlemen" for their relative freedom from that "wretched spirit." In this country, among our "founding fathers," it was above all Thomas Jefferson—thoroughly an Enlightenment intellectual and idealist, and a country gentleman and scientific farmer—who was an admiring student of the writings of both the Physiocrats and Adam Smith. He made the "free enterprise" philosophy his own and combined it with his very democratic political philosophy and his agrarianism. He was morally hostile to great cities and expanding industry and commerce, and to the public policies favored by the leading American businessmen of his time.

In the first phase, then, of the evolution of the national economy and the federal government of the United States and of the government's economic policies, the party conflict was between the Jeffersonian (democratic-popular and pure "free enterprise") party and program, and the Hamiltonian party and program of the Northern "capitalists." These leading businessmen wanted a strong, active federal government, and favors from it; they wanted the foreign-trade and monetary and fiscal policies that would accelerate the growth of the nation's industries and commerce. It was a conflict not simply between two men, but between two parts of the nation—broadly, the party of farmers, working men and democratic idealists, and the party of "the business community." The "free enterprise" ideology was in vogue truly and fully in the former, *not* in the latter. The Jeffersonians were not more virtuous and/or wise than the Hamiltonians. Jefferson's agrarianism was not realistic for the long run, and policies to aid industrial development had much to be said for them; pure, rigid *laissez faire* was never a faultless ideal. But in this early part of American history, the more nearly pure or strict "free enterprise" ideal tended mainly to be that of "the people"—most of whom were farmers—while the seekers of more active aid from government for both their own enterprises and economic growth generally, were mainly in "the business community." To a great extent, this grouping continued to be true until after our Civil War.

One part of the change in the over-all situation since the early nineteenth century has been the evolution of our national political

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democracy, and the conception of it in the minds of its most ardent supporters. The proponents of democracy in its early history conceived it mainly not as a powerful instrument with which the popular majority or its political leaders could actively control the economy and make it better serve mass-popular welfare, but rather as a way of giving the people, as voters, the power to veto unduly ambitious, governmental plans, which still were most likely to reflect and serve the purposes of the ambitious and prosperous minority.

Only in the post-Civil War decades did "the industrial revolution" have its first full impact on the United States, and begin to transform the previously simple, mainly rural society into a complex, urban, and industrial one. The swift, bewildering change created new problems and attitudes in nearly all quarters. The old economic individualism did not work so well for the millions of immigrant factory workers confronting ambitious, powerful, and often ruthless employers; nor even, in those troubled decades, for Western farmers who felt "exploited" in various ways by Eastern business interests. As cities and slums burgeoned, the toiling millions grew restive under often grinding hardships; the "plutocrats" strove with too much success to dominate society and all levels of government, and to use the latter for their private ends; reformers, "muckrakers," and social-service workers strove to arouse the national conscience. Vague threats of "radical" action through political democracy began to alarm the largely unregenerate "business community" of that era. Only then did the latter first embrace—in a new, distorted form of its own—the "free enterprise" ideology.

To aid them in their efforts to realize their own business ambitions, its members actually continued not only to welcome but to seek many kinds of governmental "interference" in or with the economy—the very kinds of "interference" against which the "free enterprise" philosophy in its original, authentic form had been mainly directed. The ban against such "interference" came to be construed as forbidding only all policies viewed by businessmen as adverse to *their* interests and designed to benefit, and/or win the votes of, other parts of the electorate.

Out of the reaction in other quarters against that distorted version of the "free enterprise" ideology, modern American "progressivism" and "liberalism" have evolved. As movements, they have sought, through democratic, political, and governmental action, to reform and control the business economy and to make it better serve the welfare of all the people. In the last half century, and especially

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in the last thirty years, much good work in that direction has been accomplished; and the confused struggle for needed, new advances still goes on. But the "liberal" movement has never yet achieved a clearly defined philosophy and program; nor has it made an appropriate adjustment of its basic attitudes to the more democratic, humane, and responsible outlook within a great part of our modern business community. Except in the extremist circles of "the radical right," the most distorted form of the "free enterprise" ideology is dead. What is needed at present is clarification of the now dominant, "middle-way" outlook of the main, central body of American thought.

There is prevalent among "liberal intellectuals" a much exaggerated notion that the classical economic theory of a self-adjusting market or price mechanism and its power to "harmonize" a tolerably free pursuit by all men of their private interests with efficient service by all to the common welfare, has become *entirely* unrealistic or invalid under modern circumstances. The "free" economy can no longer function well in the public interest, it is said, because "competition" as conceived by the classical economists no longer exists, but has been superseded by "monopoly power" in the hands of big business firms, which enables them to dis-serve the public and unduly enhance their own profits unless they are sternly controlled by the government.

To leap to this conclusion is to misinterpret the modern economic theory of this matter. As economic theory or refined analysis, it is a real improvement of the loose, classical theory of competition; but it does not prove or imply by any means all of what is too often read into it. The regulative mechanism of competition, "the protector of the public interest," does work only imperfectly—and always did—but it still works, although in altered ways, about as well as it ever did. It works better, except in some special cases, than any available alternative would be likely to work in practice, human nature and government and politics being what they are. Although the big organizations in our economy and society—both of business and of labor—do have and use substantial amounts of power, and although their special interests are not in perfect harmony with the public interest, they all still "check and balance" one another to a great extent. They find it necessary to make large concessions to each other and the public, to negotiate fair compromises with each other, and on the whole to serve the nation well as the condition of long-run success in continuing attainment of their own objectives.

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There is much that the government must do, but much also that can still be done best through a large measure of "free enterprise" on the parts of all the people severally and their countless, private organizations of all kinds, at once competing with and serving each other in the markets. "The system" that we have works imperfectly, but all human social systems do, inevitably. I think that all systems much more centralized than ours, entrusting more largely untrammeled power to governments, bureaucracies, and the collaborating heads of all big organizations, are more dangerous to the proper freedoms and the common welfare of all the people involved. They may under some conditions achieve more rapid economic progress, but even somewhat slower and more halting progress is not too high a price to pay for a wider distribution of well-secured individual and private freedoms, and for extensive reliance on voluntary, mutual accommodations among all to reconcile their diverse ambitions and their common welfare.

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H. SCOTT GORDON

Ideas of Economic Justice

THE PROBLEM of *justice* is correlative with the problem of *conflict.* The one exists because of the existence of the other. To the economist, however, justice is not a matter that extends over the whole range of conflict. It is more narrowly viewed in terms of the conflicts that exist, or perhaps one should say "remain," in organized human societies in which the use of individual force has been repudiated as a method of settling disputes. Because force has been foresworn and conflict must nevertheless be resolved, one searches for criteria that may be employed to judge between conflicting claims. However inadequate such a conception may be philosophically, and it is certainly too narrow to serve the needs even of all the social sciences—criminology for example—it is the conception that will best serve the purposes of this essay.

A functioning economy is a system of *order,* and it is important to recognize that the conflicts that exist in economic society do not necessarily threaten the order and harmony of the whole. There is, indeed, a large body of economy theory, an abstract of which may be found in almost any elementary textbook, that presents a scenario of the economic world achieving harmonious order *by means of* the competition and conflict of egocentric economic activity. In the early nineteenth century, when economics was in its infancy, the doctrine of *laissez faire* owed more to the harmonistic metaphysics of Leibniz and Pope, and to the concept of "Natural Law" than to any specific economic analysis. The most that Adam Smith could do was to suggest that there was an "invisible hand" which led the self-serving efforts of individuals to cohere into the general good, but since his time the structure and operation of the invisible hand—the competitive market—have been examined by economists with great generosity of detail and elegance of analysis.

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There has long been an "underworld" of economics based on a fundamentally different view. To this underworld belong Robert Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, and all the other projectors of New Harmonies—the adjective is significant—labelled caustically by Marx "utopian socialists," but Marx also belongs. These social theorists sought to eliminate injustice not by the development of perfect criteria of arbitration, but by creating a world in which the very problem of justice disappears. To create such a world, it is not enough to produce a harmonious order; the competitive market can do that. The order and harmony must be of such a sort and so profound and pervasive that conflict itself is eliminated. This can be achieved only by a society based on universal benevolence and love. The spirit of a Fourierist phalanx, or Marx's communist society after the state has "withered away," is like that of an ideally harmonious and admirable household in which individual getting and keeping have not only been rejected as spurs to action but do not even exist in consciousness. (A modern injunction: "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.") The only communal societies organized on such principles in the nineteenth century that showed any viability at all were ones in which the dominant theme of life was religious rather than mundane. That is, clearly, a way of eliminating economic conflict—by reducing the scale of material wants felt by the society's members definitely below the economy's actual level of ability to provide material things. Another way, and the one envisaged by Marx and others, is by creating an economy of such great plenty that all may consume to the point of surfeit; the problem of economic justice would disappear because the economic problem itself would have disappeared. The mundane communists of the nineteenth century were probably as much influenced in their thinking by the romantic tales of the South Pacific told by European sailors as the religious communists were by the equally romantic teachings of their theologians.

We shall not be dealing here with an ideal world of this sort. We are concerned not with efforts to *eliminate* the problem of justice, but with efforts to *solve* it by elucidating its meaning and by establishing the proper criteria for its application to a world that is the one we know.

Problems of equity or, more generally, problems of *value*—philo-

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sophical, not economic—may enter economic theory at two places: one where the distribution of the nation's income among her members is considered, the other where the economic wants or desires of the members are taken into account. The orthodox body of modern economic theory closes both these doors by simply considering that, for the purposes of economic analysis, the structure of wants and the distribution of income will be regarded as given. Economics then becomes, in Lord Robbins' famous definition, the study of the use of scarce means of production to satisfy as fully as possible given human wants. This definition says nothing explicitly about the distribution of income because, for theoretical purposes, the only significance of a change in the distribution of income is that it would change the structure of the community's wants. If distribution were more equal there would be less demand for Cadillacs and private swimming pools and more demand, probably, for beef roast and fresh fruit. Questions of equity may enter through the door of income distribution, but this is only a small door within the larger one of the structure of wants. The economic theorist must have wants given because if he does not know what the ends of society are, how can he say how they may be best achieved?

It has often been noted by economists themselves, that there is a normative judgment involved here nonetheless: it is the judgment that people should have what they want, that the function of the economy is to meet the felt wants of its members. Economists are not really ashamed to admit that there is this bit of philosophy at the bottom of their work for, after all, it is a good democratic judgment. There is, however, that troublesome little door cut within the larger one; and when we lock it we have much more disquiet, for then we have to say that the function of the economy is to meet the wants of those who have money. That is not so perceptibly democratic, though, as we shall see, it can be founded—not successfully, however—on a longstanding argument of justice, by enquiring how the money is got.

It is worth noting that not all economists have been content to deal with a world of given wants. Alfred Marshall, who laid down the main lines on which much of modern economic theory has evolved, spoke of the advanced society being one in which wants grow and change as a result of man's very efforts to satisfy them. The study of such an auto-evolutionary society belonged to the realm of "economic biology" which was the "mecca of economics," but it was a chapter in economic theory that Marshall was never

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able even to begin to write. Thorstein Veblen, to mention one other, was also very much concerned about the determinants of the structure of a community's wants. He was able to say some things on the matter that removed cant in great sheets from social discussion, but he was not able to build a systematic economic theory, nor even to fit his conceptions into the body of orthodox theory.

Viewed broadly, the fact that the structure of human wants is a variable in the social process, not a constant, is of immense importance. Professor Frank Knight has suggested that were this not so, were wants constant, there would be no study of ethics at all, other than economics. The study of how best to use our productive resources to minister to the *given wants* of the members of society would have swallowed up everything that the study of ethics customarily includes. Economics has in fact ingested only a small part because wants are variables, not constants.

There is some doubt, however, that economics has succeeded in digesting even the small portion it has ingested. The basic problem is whether one can build an economic theory dealing with the efficiency with which scarce resources are used to serve even given wants, without making interpersonal comparisons. Even if we adopt a utilitarian criterion of what is good or valuable, can we show how to achieve "the greatest good of the greatest number" without comparing one person's utility with another's? Bentham and his immediate followers do not seem to have been particularly worried on this score. Bentham thought in terms of a "felicific calculus" which would measure utilities just as mass or space are measured—a "hedonimetry," F. Y. Edgeworth later called it in a book significantly titled *Mathematical Psychics* (1881). Bentham had even suggested the elements of which this calculus should be composed: the intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of pleasures and pains; but there was little direct effort to construct a hedonimeter by Bentham's followers.

Faith persisted until late in the nineteenth century, however, that it could be done. The neo-classical economists' "law of diminishing marginal utility," for example, was often referred back to the so-called "Weber-Fechner Law" which was an empirically-based generalization in the field of psychophysics, the usual formulation of which stated that the response to a stimulus increases in proportion to the logarithm of the stimulus magnitude—a proposition, one suspects, that all competent torturers knew long before. This line of development led nowhere, however, and no

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other breakthrough in the search for hedonimetry was achieved. Economists came to accept the fact that the "utility" which was to be maximized was an unmeasurable subjective quality and could not be compared as to amount for different individuals.

The result of this acceptance was not despondency, however, but rather an extraordinary outpouring of analytical ingenuity aimed at discovering how much can be said about "economic welfare," defined in utilitarian terms, and what will increase and what will diminish it, without making interpersonal comparisons of pleasures and pains. This astringent investigation still continues today; it may be too early to render judgment, but the conclusion appears to be that very little indeed can be said without making interpersonal comparisons. In terms of our topic, this means, of course, that economic theory and *a fortiori* economic policy, which can never be purely "economic," will always be heavily involved with the question of justice.

Classical economics of the nineteenth century made no attempt to avoid ethical questions as later "welfare economics" did, but much of the ethical matter was confined to a particular branch of economic theory—the theory of income distribution. This resulted from the tendency of the classical writers to think of the economy in strictly dichotomous terms. John Stuart Mill was the most explicit and most famous dichotomizer. "The laws and conditions of the Production of Wealth," he said in his *Principles of Political Economy* (1848) "partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them . . . [But] it is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely." One of the effects of such a dichotomy is that it immediately raises the question of the equity of the income distribution. Social theorists of an egalitarian cast of mind were inclined to agree with Mill that distribution was a matter of social institutions solely. The cake of national income had already been baked and was ready for the sharing, and *alterable* social institutions wielded the knife. What could be plainer than that, *in justice,* these institutions should be altered to produce more equal portions.

We are here, however, in contact with one of the great weaknesses of the classical economics. The early economists failed to see clearly that the distribution of income is part of the more general matter of exchange and prices. What a person calls his income is what he is able to obtain in the market by the sale of his personal services and the services of what property he may possess. The size

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of the income he can command depends on the quantity of these services and the prices they will fetch. The fact that income is obtained by the sale of both *personal* and *property* services would seem to demand a more elaborate criterion of justice than simple egalitarianism. But the matter is made much more complex when one realizes that these services are bought and paid for in the market because they are factors of production—they are the flour and eggs and other things out of which cake is made. The matter becomes more complex still when one realizes that the prices will be important in determining the proportions in which the flour and eggs are combined, and more complex again when one realizes that the quantities of flour and eggs available are not necessarily constant but will depend in part on what prices these things will fetch. In brief, it is not a simple matter of baking a cake and then sharing it. The kind of cake and the size of cake, and the kind and size it will be next year and later, depend in part on how it is shared. John Mill's dichotomy was like the wisdom of Solomon—it was excellent for making people speak up, but it would not have been so fine if they had actually ended by cutting the baby in half.

This complex interaction of the processes of production and distribution is not typically encountered in a kitchen, but it is ever-present in the economy, and anyone who undertakes to be the economy's chef will have to come to grips with it. This is very evident to countries such as Sweden, France and Britain which have undertaken to replace part of the market by state-sponsored economic planning. The planning agencies are soon brought face to face with the fact that they cannot confine themselves to purely technical questions of productive efficiency. Distribution questions are involved. These may present themselves in rather oversimple terms like "wage increases must be kept from getting out of hand" or "irresponsible price increases must be prevented," which may appear to mean only that the children must be constrained from fighting in the kitchen; but lying behind these statements is the realization that when one undertakes to decide how sharing is to take place, one runs out of usable technical economics pretty quickly. Ethical questions of economic justice are involved as well as pragmatic questions of efficiency, and they cannot be disentangled from one another. The growth of economic planning in democratic countries will undoubtedly focus more attention on the problem of arriving at workable and acceptable criteria of economic

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justice; this may shortly become a much less "academic" question than it appears now to be.

Since the problem of economic justice emerges from the fact of conflict of economic interest, it follows that the manner in which we perceive and formulate the problem of justice depends very much on how we perceive the conflict. It makes a great deal of difference whether we view the matter in terms of "class conflict," with the classes being distinguished by the types of production factors, labor or property, that are their sources of income; or whether one thinks of conflict between industrial groupings, agriculture *v.* industry for example; or between occupational groups such as skilled and unskilled; or between racial groups such as White and Colored; or between linguistic groups—the English-speaking French-speaking conflict in Canada, for example, has been more and more focused on considerations of economic justice in recent years and away from the older questions of religion and culture. It makes a difference, too, whether we view the conflict as one of economic interests between the individual and the state or simply as a conflict between unclassified individuals.

The greater part of the literature dealing with economic justice as a problem of public policy discusses the question in terms of the economic relations of *groups;* but the greater part of the literature in which the matter is discussed in abstract terms, as a problem in ethics, treats largely of relations between individuals or between the individual and the state. In the remainder of this essay, I will review briefly the various principles and criteria of economic justice that seem to have emerged from the more abstract discussion.

The idea of justice is a compound of many ideas, and not an orderly compound either. It is like a ragged rope of many strands of different qualities and different lengths. What I shall try to do here is to follow some of the strands that have economic importance, but I shall not, for I cannot, try to disentangle the structure of the whole.

The most common idea of justice that one seems to encounter in discussions among ethicists is one founded on an economic conception. It is the idea of justice as *exchange.* This has a long history, and is an explicit theory of justice in Thomistic philosophy, Aristotle, and the Old Testament. It is the idea that justice is done if there

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is a proper exchange between the parties, a *quid pro quo*, a giving for getting. What "proper" means we shall shortly examine. There is also the associated idea, which is more generally metaphysical, that balance must be preserved and that proper exchange is necessary to this equilibrium.

We find this concept of "commutative" justice applied even to retribution, which one would think had nothing or little to do with economics. The Old Testament speaks of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. The defense of capital punishment, for example, on the grounds of retribution rather than on the pragmatic ground of deterrence, which has nothing to do with justice, is founded on the idea of exchange. The exchange of a life for a life is thought to accomplish some "good" end even though no positive utility is created at all. The basis of punishment, even such an absolute punishment as death, is the justice of proper exchange, and one speaks, *without* metaphor really, of punishment as "balancing the books," "settling accounts," or "paying one's debt."

Since the days of Adam Smith, economists have accorded a certain ethical virtue as well as technical efficiency, to exchanges conducted in competitive markets. The reference here is to the idea of *liberty* as much as to justice itself. The exchange that is "just" is one conducted in the absence of coercion, which is what is involved in the idea of free competition. Even Marx thought of the labor market as unjust because of the coercive power of the buyer over the seller—that is how "surplus value" is unjustly exacted by the capitalists from the laborers. The same idea is present in modern discussions of "monopoly power." Lord Robbins, writing on "the economic basis of class conflict," noted that "the only sense which the economist can attach to the term exploitation of labour is as a description of what happens when a group of competing workers is confronted by a monopolistic buyer." It would be fair to say that he was therein expressing the views of most Western economists, including most of those who regard themselves as socialists.

The Goddess Justice is pictured holding a scales, but she is also blindfolded, signifying impartiality. This quality is also involved in the economists' conception of the competitive market. The picture is one of buyers and sellers exchanging "at arm's length," anonymously even. The seller presents his wares, as in a modern supermarket, and all who wish may buy. But not all exchanges are like this, and when they are not we encounter difficult problems. Sup-

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pose that a white man prefers not to deal with Negroes and is willing to pay to satisfy his racial bigotry, just as he pays to satisfy his hunger or desire for display or any other felt want. Should he be allowed to buy discrimination, like bread, in the market place? Most of us would answer *no*, and it is clear that justice involves more than exchange under conditions of freedom. It may indeed involve coercion in the interests of equality and impartiality, but justice is far from a simple matter, both ethically and pragmatically, as the integration movement in the American South has demonstrated. Such difficulties as now exist, however, are as nothing compared to what will be the case if the principle of commutative justice is carried to the point where discrimination and bigotry by Negroes is regarded as the just *quid pro quo* of the long standing discrimination and bigotry by Whites.

Closely connected with the idea of commutative justice is the idea of *desert*, which, in turn, involves yet another idea, that of *merit*, which will be touched on later. Classical economics gave rise to much consideration of the justice of income distribution based on the ethical complex of exchange and desert. The issue was clearly put by Ricardo's theory of land rent. Land is a factor of production and its scarcity means that it will yield income to its owner, but what does the owner contribute to the production process? The land itself gives its services freely. There is no disutility of work involved, as there is with labor as a factor of production. What does the landlord give in exchange? Why does he deserve an income? Does he not obtain income solely because of the legal fact of possession, which is probably due to an inheritance ultimately traceable to the superior force of his ancestors? These are difficult questions to answer, and led in the nineteenth century to one of the mainstreams of radical advocacy, including the various proposals for land nationalization and the single-tax principles of Henry George. It was not much easier to explain the exchange-desert of the capitalist than to explain that of the landlord, and when Nassau Senior suggested that the capitalist's contribution was that of "abstaining" from the immediate consumption of his wealth, no one was really satisfied.

Later in the nineteenth century the economic theory of income distribution became much more elegant, and it was shown that rent, interest, and wages are not categorically different types of income. Rent is the income equivalent of the "marginal productivity" of land, and interest the marginal productivity of capital, just

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as wages are the marginal productivity of labor. This seemed to remove the Ricardian distinction between the various production factors; and some economic theorists, like John Bates Clark in the United States, asserted that if income were distributed in accordance with marginal productivities, an ethically just distribution would result. This normative judgment mistook the shadow for the substance. The issue was not whether the land or the capital contributed to the production process but whether the landlord and the capitalist did. The distinction that had moved the post-Ricardian radicals was that between income from *work* and income from *possession*. But this distinction, too, runs rather quickly to a dead end when one looks carefully at the rewards of "work." Is the high income of a neurosurgeon due to work or to the possession, largely due to inheritance, of talent, intelligence, skill and training? Is a movie queen rewarded for her work or for her possessions? Is even a day laborer in America rewarded solely for work or partly for his possession of a valuable membership in a rich nation which excludes, by power, hordes of other nationals who would gladly come to compete with him in the American marketplace if allowed? It seems to be clear that economic theory can contribute nothing to an exchange-desert basis of distributive justice, beyond warning ethicists not to travel this road.

In the field of public policy, the exchange-desert criterion of distributive justice and the distinction between the income of work and the income of possessions have exerted some influence which is discernible in the fiscal systems of a number of countries. But a far greater influence has been felt from another criterion, that of *equality*. Much of the fiscal system of the modern state is built upon the view that it is desirable to reduce the degree of income inequality in society. New fiscal proposals are more frequently judged on this ethical criterion than any other. Egalitarianism is not usually referred to any other ethical principle; it is regarded as a principle fundamental in itself. Yet it is quite plain that few of us wish to follow the principle to its end—to literal equality of income.

Economic theory provides, in fact, a rather strong argument for such equality. If we assume that the object of the economic system is to maximize the aggregate happiness of the whole society and if we further assume that all individuals are equally good at, or not discoverably different at, getting pleasures or happiness out of income, then the "law of diminishing marginal utility" leads by strict mathematics to the conclusion that income should be dis-

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tributed equally. Economists have always shrunk from this conclusion, but without really advancing any good arguments to explain why the theorem is "wrong."

The important point here, I think, is that while egalitarianism is a basic principle of economic ethics, the appeal that it makes to our consciences is really a negative one and a very unprecise one. We do not really believe that strict income equality would be just, but that gross income inequality is unjust and should be tempered by public policy. The reception given by economists to the "Pareto Law" of income distribution bears this out. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), an Italian economist of considerable distinction, studied income distributions statistically for different countries and different periods and arrived at the conclusion that the degree of inequality was remarkably constant. He concluded that this feature of economic life must be embedded in something natural rather than institutional, and advanced the suggestion that income distributions merely reflected the gross inequality in the distribution of human abilities. It was easy to conclude that the inequality of income could not and should not, in justice, be tempered. The fact that economists were as unwilling to accept this conclusion as they were to accept the logical conclusion of the marginal utility theorem is a testimony to their good sense. There are times when conscience calls upon us to be vaguely right rather than precisely wrong.

There is another principle of income distribution, though it is not clear whether it is a principle of justice, which usually runs counter to the egalitarian ideal and may partly explain the ambivalence towards egalitarianism. This is the idea of reward for *merit*. A merit principle need not necessarily lead away from equality; the injunction of Christ to the wealthy ruler seeking to earn eternal life, was "Give all that thou hast and distribute unto the poor." The idea that charity earns merit for the donor is a strong theme in Christian thought, which is only now passing away with the institutionalization of charity into the "welfare state."

From the economic standpoint, however, the dominant theme is the other way round: that social merit deserves rewards which will give the meritorious person a high status in society. The theory of aristocracy is involved here; the idea that a society needs men of distinction who may be looked upon as models to be admired and emulated. The North American society, which does not possess a hereditary aristocracy and has always been something less than fully respectful towards the aristocracy of business, is always on

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the search for new models. When a new candidate is found, the argument is inevitably made that he should be handsomely rewarded with money. This reflects the fact that in North America, the only distinction that is readily recognizable is material affluence. This characteristic of the society is clearly present in the recent impetus for higher salaries for teachers and professors. It is not that professors "need" or "deserve" higher incomes but that these are necessary to the elevation of their social status; and moreover, the argument is not that professors "deserve" higher social status but that the society has need for the professor to serve as an aristocratic model.

Closely connected with the equality criterion of economic justice, and in some ways the opposite of the merit principle, is the principle of *need*. The assertion here is that no one should be left without the minimum requisites of existence, regardless of what the cause of his difficulty may be—whether he is the "author of his own misfortune" or not. This principle, which lies at the heart of all private charity and the governmental functions which have come to be called "the welfare state," is easily transferred into benevolence, or love and concern for one's fellows. If carried very far in this direction, it would fall outside the boundaries of the problem of justice, as I have defined it for the purpose of this essay.

The most interesting feature of the needs criterion of economic justice is the change it has undergone, with the enormous growth of state-sponsored welfare activities, in recent years. The change has not only transferred charity from the realm of benevolence into that of justice, but has attempted to provide it with a firm justicial basis in the principle of *exchange*. This development might be called the "Beveridge transform" since it derives from Sir William Beveridge's famous report on the British social security system in 1942. What Beveridge was concerned to do was to eliminate all things, such as means tests, which carried the implication that a person's needs would be served by the benevolent sentiments of the society, operating through the agency of the state, and to place social security and welfare on the firm ground of legal *right*. This is the real significance of the so-called "insurance principle." The suggestion that people really pay by their contributions for their retirement pensions or health services or unemployment benefits, is a sham, for many of these contingencies are not subject to actuarial calculation and in the case of most of those that are, no effort is made to make contributions bear the whole cost. It is a *deliberate* sham,

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however, and serves the same function as the legal practice of transferring valuable property for a one-dollar payment. The payer acquires an unambiguous legal right by this pretended act of exchange. In the same way, the modern welfare state has conferred upon its citizens the right to receive succor from society, with a minimum of reference to the sentiments of compassion and benevolence which actuated the older forms of charity. The "Beveridge transform" may turn out to be the most significant change in the socio-economic relationships of Western society since labor became a commodity that was bought and sold in the marketplace.

One further criterion of economic justice must be briefly discussed, the idea that *expectations* should be fulfilled as much as possible. This idea gives ethical sanction to prescriptive claims, the argument being that when a status or a practice has persisted for some time, people have been led to expect that it will continue and that those who benefit from it have acquired a right to its continuance. The moral basis of this doctrine is the proposition that it is right that one should keep one's promises since they have raised expectations in others. This is usually argued in terms of direct relations among individuals; but if we consider that a society gives an implied promise to its members, by means of the duration or persistence of a practice, that the practice will continue, we arrive at the fundamental doctrine of political conservatism.

Applications of this principle of justice are present in many modern discussions of economic policy, often advocated by people who do not regard themselves as conservatives in political philosophy. A specific application of exceptional recent importance is perhaps worth noting—the problem of *inflation.* If one reads the popular literature on this problem, especially the comments of bankers and financiers, one cannot fail to be impressed with the extent to which inflation is regarded as a problem, not merely economic but moral. It is invested with far more moral phraseology than one finds in discussion of other economic problems. Below the clichés one finds the view that an economic system in which exchanges and debts are made and settled in paper money creates the expectation that the real value of money will not alter. Inflation is immoral because it disappoints this legitimate expectation. The argument that inflation as an economic problem must be given priority over all other economic problems—unemployment, for example—will not stand on solely economic grounds for an instant, but it has in fact been given a very considerable priority in the public policy of some

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nations, including the United States and Canada, during the past several years, largely because of the moral elements that have been attached to it.

What can we say as a result of following these strands of the ragged rope of ideas which is economic justice? Is there a criterion of economic justice that meets the tests of philosophical and economic analysis, appeals to our moral and aesthetic intuitions, and stands up under the test of application? The answer is clearly *no*. Indeed it is evident that none of the criteria discussed in this essay comes even close to meeting these demanding requirements. The fact is, "there ain't no justice in this world." But there is *in*justice, and when it is fairly large we can recognize it. Such a recognition involves using or applying one or more of the ideas of economic justice discussed in this essay. I have not detected any criteria of economic justice that might be used to make fine discriminations in cases of economic conflict. Nor have I destroyed any that are actually used in practice as the final arbitrators of difficult and delicate cases. The hard texture of social life will break any simple rules in their application more surely than any abstract discussion like this will. The various ideas of economic justice—exchange, desert, equality, merit, needs, expectation—are simply the components of a cultural compound. They are the fibres of the "justice nerve" of mid-twentieth century Western, liberal, democratic, pleasant-tempered man.

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BRUCE MAZLISH

The Idea of Progress

We are no longer shocked by the notion that the idea of Progress has replaced a vision of Paradise as the central concern of modern man. From the early seventeenth century on, this displacement, as significant in its way as Copernicus' revolutionary shift of the earth and sun, has increased steadily, though intermittently. The beginnings of the movement are fittingly symbolized by a famous statement of Galileo, which suggests that he was more concerned with "how the heavens go" than with "how one goes to heaven."

From the time of Galileo to the present, it is only natural that the idea of progress should have undergone continuing change. There are difficulties, however, in tracing this change, and these ought to be stated at the onset. For one thing, the idea of progress is intimately related to all of modern intellectual history; therefore, it is hard to pick it out as a single thread. Secondly, although it manifests itself in practice as well as in theory, and filters up as well as down, the idea of progress can be grasped with ease only in the great thinkers rather than in the amorphous masses; and this means that we must deal with familiar figures of major stature and catch in a paragraph that part of their elusive and complex theories which relates to our subject. Lastly, our task must involve us in scandalous generalizations, random selections, and glaring omissions.

I propose to travel the following route: to examine the scientific and historical underpinnings of the idea of progress in the seventeenth century; to look at its classical formulation in the eighteenth century by Condorcet, in the light of antagonistic challenges from Rousseau and Malthus; to estimate the changes in the idea of progress occasioned by the work of Hegel and Marx; to acknowledge the metamorphosis of the idea of progress into a "culture-versus-civilization" controversy (where scientific progress is not automatically equated with moral progress), and, with a side glance at the

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nineteenth-century movement called historicism, to trace the controversy into the twentieth century, with Spengler and Freud; to undertake a summary as to the present status of the idea of progress and then, boldly and speculatively, to launch a suggestion as to the direction in which the idea either will, or should, go.

The progress of the natural sciences in the seventeenth century, of course, was a major step leading to the new ethos. Galen and Ptolemy stood corrected by a Harvey and a Vesalius, a Copernicus and a Galileo; and modern man now saw himself as victorious in the "battle of the ancients and the moderns." This story is too well told, for example by R. F. Jones[1] and by J. B. Bury,[2] to need repetition. However, two points are fundamental to the emergence of the idea of progress and need to be emphasized.

The first is that the seventeenth-century revolution in natural science established one of the pre-requisites for a general faith in progress: the belief in stable scientific laws. Bury was right in insisting that "There can be no certainty that knowledge will continually progress until science has been placed on sure foundations." In the air of the miraculous and of special creation, the small light of man's knowledge would flicker too unsteadily. Essential, then, to the seventeenth-century belief in progress was the commitment to fixed natural laws, which could be constantly accumulated by the generations to come.

The second point concerns historical science. Before modern man could look forward, he had to look backward in a modern way. Fortunately, a new perspective was at hand. There is evidence to suggest that it emerged from the same fifteenth-century work in painting which so strongly affected the natural sciences. The discovery of the principles of linear perspective, whereby the relative appearance of objects at any point in space could be delineated upon a plane surface, made it clear that in terms of mathematical construction all points in space could be regarded as equivalent to one another. Space itself could be viewed as infinite and homogeneous. A consequence was that the earth need no longer be considered as the one point from which an absolutely valid perspective on the universe might be obtained. Another consequence concerned temporal perspective: any viewpoint in the past might be regarded as equally valid with any other; and no frame of reference could be chosen on any absolute basis.

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By various involved steps, the new perspective on historical time eventuated in a reversed criterion as to which was "older," the ancient or the modern period. This development, in turn, led to the displacement of the past as a source of authority. It was Francis Bacon who summed up the matter:

> For the old age of the world is to be accounted the true antiquity; and this is the attribute of our own times, not of that earlier age of the world in which the ancients lived; and which, though in respect to us it was the elder, yet in respect of the world it was the younger. . . . From our age . . . much more might fairly be expected than from the ancient times, inasmuch as it is a more advanced age of the world, and stored and stocked with experiments and observations.[3]

Naturally, from the perspective of this more "advanced age," Bacon could look forward confidently to the continuing "Advancement of Learning."

Bolstered by the new scientific outlook of both physics and history, seventeenth-century progressive man could ignore the economic crises and the crumbling empires around him, and fix his vision on the advancement of humanity. Spain might be in decline, and its lamentations filling the European air; on the periphery, the proud Ottoman empire might be starting its long, slow lapse into sickness. All such events could be construed as proof, not that progress was an illusion, a Quixotic fantasy, but that it required the right methods. In field after field—philosophy, science, political science, and political arithmetic, to take some examples—discourses and inquiries were produced, pointing out to mankind the correct paths to progress.

It is clear that, by the eighteenth century, progress was part of the accepted climate of opinion. A closer look reveals that it was a European and not a universal phenomenon; and that, indeed, it held sway mainly over the minds of "enlightened" West-European thinkers, especially the French and British. This last was only natural, for the predominant, expanding nations of the age were France and England. It is hardly surprising that these countries identified their ways with the progress of mankind, nor that the foci of the new science were the *English* Royal Society and the *French* Academy of Science.

So, too, the challenge came from inside these countries. It took at least three forms, signalized by the names Swift, Rousseau, and

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Malthus. The first lampooned the probability of *scientific* progress. The second assumed scientific progress but denied its beneficial effect on moral progress, and the third placed the probability of *economic* progress in jeopardy. Swift's attack, launched, for example, in *Gulliver's Travels,* with its savage thrust at the scientists' pretensions, and its mockery of their attempts to weigh air, was quickly beaten off. No one, after Newton, could seriously and effectively doubt the reality of scientific progress (though some saw it as finished by his "classic" work in the *Principia* and the *Opticks*).

What could be doubted was whether or not a necessary connection existed between progress in the natural sciences and progress in the moral and political sciences. It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who once and for all called attention to this problem and made it a central feature in the intellectual landscape of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Unlike Swift, Rousseau, taking scientific progress as given, went on in his famous *Discourse* of 1749 to ask whether this progress "had the effect of purifying or corrupting morals."[4] His resounding indictment of science shook the foundations of enlightened thought in a way hard for us now to imagine. Rousseau, in fact, became the unnamed dialogist to whom *philosophes* and philosophers like D'Alembert, Condorcet, and Kant constantly directed their arguments.

We shall single out Condorcet as our protagonist for the eighteenth-century idea of progress. Condorcet was talking against Rousseau, although he seems to address the air, when he remarks, "We shall prove that the eloquent declamations made against the arts and sciences are founded upon a mistaken application of history."[5] Then, after a discussion of the supposed superiority of the "noble savage," Condorcet continues, "we shall see that it is not the growth of knowledge but its decadence that has engendered the vices of civilized peoples, and that knowledge, so far from corrupting man, has always improved him when it could not totally correct or reform him."[6]

Passing rapidly to the offensive, Condorcet set about showing how a new "social art"—the product of increasing scientific knowledge—could reconcile "the interests of each with the interests of all." His exposition is a good, summary statement of the hopes and tenets of the ideologists of progress. It is too well known (though, for this reason, often misconstrued) to need more than the briefest précis. With the correct science of calculation (his "social art" is really a form of game strategy), Condorcet tells us, a form of wel-

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fare state could be set up, complete with a social security system. Poverty will be eliminated, and increased equality of wealth and education as well as of the sexes introduced. Internally, political equality will be made meaningful by a democratic voting procedure (Condorcet favored proportional representation). Externally, the underdeveloped nations will gradually be brought to the level of the most advanced nation. Even Condorcet's own distressing experiences during the French Revolution did not shake his optimism as to mankind's inevitable progress toward these goals.

In reality, however, Condorcet was "talking past" his opponent. Fundamentally, Rousseau, though he claimed to find man's moral degradation in the artificial and scientific society of the eighteenth century, was not interested in society. It was not a reformed society but a converted man whom he was seeking. Perfectibility, and not progress, was his heart's real desire. His model citizen, if such we can call him, was Robinson Crusoe (the only reading suggested for the young Emile). Withdrawing periodically from society, Rousseau also wished to withdraw from time; significantly, he threw away his watch. When he did bow to a time-bound reality and accept a social setting for his model citizen, he took as his ideal, stagnant but moral Sparta rather than changing but corrupt Athens. Thus, essentially, Rousseau was the rebel against society, brilliantly lighting the flare of resentment against the constraints of civilization and against the values of social progress. Many were to follow him in his romantic reaction.

Condorcet's other opponent was Thomas Malthus. Although the protagonist of the "dismal science" had not yet written the first version of his *Essay on Population,*[7] in which he challenged the then dead Condorcet by name, Malthus's thesis was directly anticipated by the author of the *Sketch.* "Might there not come a moment," Condorcet asked, "when, the number of people in the world finally exceeding the means of subsistence, there will in consequence ensue a continual diminution of happiness and a true regression, or at best an oscillation between good and bad?" Condorcet's answer is the one which, in one form or another, has been given ever since. "It is impossible to pronounce about the likelihood of an event that will occur only when the human species will have necessarily acquired a degree of knowledge of which we can have no inkling. And who would take it upon himself to predict the condition to which the art of converting the elements to the use of man may in time be

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brought?"[8] With Condorcet, the Malthusian spectre is simply exorcised by the idea of progress.

In the nineteenth century, the idea of progress took on a new guise as the result of the work of Hegel and Marx. Their theories introduced the first major shift away from the liberal, Condorcet-type position, with its emphasis on a linear progress brought on by continuing scientific inquiry, general enlightenment, and economic expansion, involving free trade. Familiar as are the doctrines of the two German thinkers, we must still indicate their connection with the idea of progress.

Without bogging down in the marshes of Hegelian thought—over which, however, so many brilliant lights play—we can say that what Hegel did was to introduce the notion that progress consisted of Spirit (whose definition would take us too far afield here), making its way through the world and coming into actuality. By way of gross over-simplification, we can then say that Spirit becomes actual by entering into self-consciousness via man; that is, as history progresses, man becomes increasingly self-conscious. For Hegel, to be self-conscious also means to be free. Thus, history is the progress toward a form of spiritual liberation, and in this part of his work Hegel was close to the *philosophes'* belief in enlightenment, though he differed significantly as to details and tone.

Where Hegel took a new path was in insisting that progress was not linear, but dialectical. Although dialectic itself was not a new idea—Hegel admitted Plato and Kant as his predecessors—Hegel used it in a novel way. Instead of employing it merely as part of logic, he projected it onto the real world as well. For him, the dialectical processes of the mind were mirrored in the dialectical process of nature and history. Concentrating on history, Hegel saw progress there coming into existence by triadic contradictions, where one stage of development gave rise to its opposite, and the conflict of the two resulted in a new stage of Spirit's, i.e., man's, existence.

Marx, as is well known, turned Hegel upside down. While retaining the dialectic, Marx resolved spiritual progress into material progress. It was not the mind which, properly enlightened, then changed material conditions. It was the material conditions which, developing according to inexorable dialectical laws of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, changed the ideological superstructure. Further, Marx insisted on a sort of temporary Malthusianism, in which the

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expanding population of workers, increasingly forming part of a surplus labor force, found themselves more and more in a situation of growing immiserization. Their only choice was to break the bonds of this condition. Revolution, violent or gradual, was the inevitable result of Marx's apocalyptic expectations.

In the new communist world to come, Marx thought he had solved Rousseau's problem. He had provided for both society's progress and the individual's perfectibility when, as he announced in the *Manifesto,* "we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." [9] Marx was no Luddite who wished to do away with the arts and sciences, with modern industrial civilization. Instead, he wished to use this machinery in order to pass on, dialectically, to a more idyllic society in which the individual could be a hunter, fisherman, or critic at will. His visionary synthesis of the individual's spiritual perfectibility with society's material progress has had, as we all know, a powerful appeal for millions of people. Indeed, the Marxist version of the idea of progress is the one now embraced by over a third of the world's population.

The changing nature of the idea of progress can be understood properly only with a discussion of the related concepts of "culture" and "civilization." In part, these concepts, although they embrace a wider sphere, embody a rephrasing of Rousseau's dichotomy between moral and scientific progress. Perhaps the best place to start is with Immanuel Kant. A philosopher of the Enlightenment, his *Idea for a Universal History* stands midway between Condorcet and Hegel's schemes. In the *Idea,* Kant, like Condorcet, harkens to Rousseau's protest and comments, "Rousseau was not so very wrong when he preferred the condition of savages, if the last stage [i.e., the joining of all states in a world federation] which our race has yet to surmount be left out of view." [10] At this point, Kant introduces the very important distinction between culture and civilization. Culture is a moral condition, and stems from the enlightenment and cultivation of the individual. Civilization describes an advanced state of the arts and sciences. According to Kant, the present stage, civilization, correctly despised by Rousseau as less moral and cultivated than the condition of savages, is only a temporary one, soon to give way to the last stage, culture.

It is likely that Coleridge picked up this distinction from Kant.

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In any case, in his *On the Constitution of Church and State,* Coleridge writes that the

> progressiveness and personal freedom [of a nation] depend on a continuing and progressive civilization. But civilization is itself but a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence, the hectic of disease, not the bloom of health, and a nation so distinguished more fitly to be called a varnished than a polished people, where this civilization is not grounded in cultivation, in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterize our humanity.[11]

What Coleridge called "cultivation" we call "culture." And as Raymond Williams so well points out in his interesting book, *Culture and Society: 1780-1950,*[12] the distinction made so eloquently by Coleridge becomes a permanent thread in the fabric of English, and indeed all modern, thought from that point on. Williams traces it through such names as Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, Morris, G. B. Shaw, D. H. Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot. We shall pick it up again in a moment with Spengler and Freud.

Before passing on to these two twentieth-century theorists, however, we must notice the rise of the nineteenth-century movement known as historicism. (The term *historicism* is frequently used, or misused, by writers like Karl Popper in his *Poverty of Historicism,* to denote theories proposing inevitability and totalitarianism, such as those of Hegel and Marx. I am not using the term in that sense.) Called by one commentator, Friedrich Meinecke, "One of the greatest spiritual revolutions occurring in the thought of the West,"[13] historicism must be viewed as a major challenge to the doctrine of progress. It involved the conviction that each epoch, each society, is of equal value with every other. Thus, there are no universal norms, as the eighteenth-century *philosophes* believed, with which to judge different cultures. Instead, the past consists of individual, non-repeatable events, with their own unique values and meaning. According to this view, obviously, a belief in progress is untenable.

Now, what Spengler did was to combine the discussion about culture and civilization with the basic position of historicism. He did this in *The Decline of the West,* written in the shadow of World War I and German defeat. In this book, Spengler made two contributions—both negative—to the idea of progress. The first was to substitute a morphology of culture forms for the notion of a linear development of mankind. Spengler singled out three major cultures, the Apollonian, Magian, and Faustian—which really corresponded to the Ancient, Medieval, Modern periodization, although Spengler

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himself attacked the latter as a "Ptolemaic system" based on Western egocentricity—and treated them as completely independent, one from another. No one culture was "more advanced" than another; they merely differed, especially in regard to their views of space and time. Thus, whereas in Apollonian culture the ideal is a closed or circumscribed form; "the sensuously-present individual body as the ideal type of the extended," Faustian or modern culture is characterized by limitless striving and is symbolized by boundless space. In this aspect of his work, Spengler had great appeal for some anthropologists; witness Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture.*

In each culture, however, Spengler claimed that a cycle necessarily worked itself out, till the culture fell into its decline. The last phase of the cycle, Spengler's genius told him, was what he called civilization: a phase marked by a "fact philosophy"; a world-city or megalopolis; a traditionless city dweller; formless masses; and the rest of the paraphernalia of modern civilization. Civilization, therefore, marked, not the latest point on an ascending straight line, but a culture ripening to its limit.

From this new version of the culture-civilization problem, in which the two are now related to one another as life and death, Spengler went on to his next denigration of the idea of progress. The West was not, he declared, the high point of man's development, destined to spread its civilization to the rest of the world. Rather, it was merely the home of one culture which was now in decline. This blow to European egocentricity has been recently echoed in our time by Arnold Toynbee, who adds, however, a dash of hope to the bitter dose.

Spengler's work constituted an impressive, full-scale rebuttal of the optimistic view of progress presented by earlier thinkers like Condorcet and Marx. In the light of the European civil wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, and of the growing withdrawal of European control over Africa and Asia, it has appealed to a number of disillusioned Westerners. Combining some of the currents flowing from romanticism and historicism, Spengler's morphology of cultures has helped spread a general mood which makes many Western intellectuals no longer quite so susceptible to a naive idea of progress.

Along with Spengler, Freud's work has had much the same effect. Indirectly, Freud's stress on the irrational forces influencing, if not controlling, men seemed to cut away the entire foundation of the enlightenment view of progress; and the fact that Freud was offering man, for the first time, a rational way of controlling the

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irrational forces of the past, tended to be overlooked. Directly, Freud also stated, for example in *Civilization and its Discontents,* that while civilization was undoubtedly developing, so was the burden of guilt and neurosis which underlay it. Built on the renunciation of instinctual gratification, civilization took revenge on its individual members by bringing in its train growing unhappiness. On Freud's analysis, the progress of civilization was toward increasing psychic misery (the new form of immiserization?). Thus, on this interpretation, Rousseau's challenge to progress and civilization finds its echo in our "Age of Anxiety," to use the phrase of W. H. Auden.

The extraordinary thing is that with all the blows—exemplified in the names Rousseau, Malthus, Spengler, and Freud—against man's pride of progress, the idea still stands and is the beacon light whereby modern man orients his voyage through time. The reasons for this are, I believe, threefold. Generalizing broadly, we may make the following points.

First, the original underpinning of the idea of progress in terms of historical perspective still holds firm. In spite of the challenge of historicism, modern man sees the past in terms of a historical *development:* a development which is cumulative, expansive, and progressive. We are historical to our core today—in the exaggerated words of Ortega y Gasset, "man has no nature, he has only his history"[14]—and we cannot abandon this perspective on the past, to which is attached the notion of development, without giving up our own identities. Indeed, this is the message of Hegel, and it is confirmed by the new, historical consciousness of the emerging nations.

Second, the evolutionary theories of Darwin, hitherto not mentioned, have given enormous support to the notion of historical development and progress. Darwin, it is true, restricted himself to the biological world. Further, his thory of evolution by means of natural selection is not necessarily a theory of progress: the only value or direction in the theory of biological evolution is pure survival. However, restrained as Darwin was in extrapolating from his theory, he did allow himself, on rare occasions, such remarks as "And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection."[15] With such encouragement, it could be asserted that evolution was headed in the direction of increased differentiation and complexity, and the latter characteristics equated with progress.

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While, obviously, the identification of progress with mere differentiation and complexity was not very satisfying emotionally, still and all, Darwin's theory of evolution created an atmosphere in which belief in progressive change—of some sort—could and did flourish. The nice irony here is that Darwin claimed as inspiration for his theory of natural selection the same Malthus who had used a version of natural selection to demonstrate the impossibility of continued progress.

The third basis for the continuing belief in the idea of progress is the one most under our own observation: scientific, technological, and economic development. This complex of forces dominates our lives, our intellects, and our imaginations. In most Western and a few other nations, it is present reality; in the underdeveloped nations it is a cherished dream. In Europe and North America, from about the middle of the nineteenth century on, it became evident that an unprecedented expansion, the industrial revolution, was in process. Today, in these same areas, it is assumed that a continuing percentage rise in production will occur (or else governments topple), and progress is measured in terms of a Gross National Product, standard-of-living charts, and other such precise indices. So close is the identification of material expansion with progress that one American corporation has taken as its slogan, "Progress is our most important product."

The idea that one "produces" progress is also firmly rooted today in the underdeveloped countries. The so-called colonial revolt, clearly, is not against "Europeanization," i.e., progress, but against the slowness and supposed inequity with which the European nations have been going about their task of "civilizing" the lesser peoples. (It is in this light that President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" must be viewed.) Also in this connection, it is worth noting that while a recent survey found concern for an improved standard of living mentioned as often in the United States—by upper and middle, as well as by lower income groups—as in poorer countries, such as Cuba and Brazil, the people of the latter countries "are even more buoyant about their recent progress and more hopeful of the future."[16] The idea of progress, Spengler and company to the contrary, is now a universal and no longer a merely Western concern. Faustian man is everywhere on the stage of the world.

Interestingly enough, there is a new sort of Malthusian threat to the world's scientific-economic progress which might be mentioned here. It is provocatively put forth by Derek Price, in his

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book *Science Since Babylon*. There he tells us that since about 1660 (and the founding of the Royal Society), scientific activity—measured by the number of scientists, scientific societies, scientific journals, and even scientific abstracts of journals—has been doubling about every fifteen years. Projecting this exponential growth curve a bit, Price comes up with some disturbing conclusions. Remarking that "any slackening of the research pace of pure science must be reflected quite rapidly in our advancing technology, and thereby in our economic state," he summarizes his warnings as follows:

> The normal expansion of science that we have grown up with is such that it demands each year a larger place in our lives, a larger share of our resources. Eventually that demand must reach a state where it cannot be satisfied, a state where the civilization is saturated with science. This may be regarded as an ultimate end of the completed Industrial Revolution. Thus, that process takes us from the first few halting paces up to the maximum of effort. The only question that must be answered lies in the definition of that saturated state and the estimation of its arrival date.[17]

Like Condorcet with an earlier Malthus, most thinkers and peoples today will brush aside Derek Price's gloomy prognosis on progress. The underdeveloped peoples are too far from the saturated point, and the developed nations begin to dream of scientific machines to take the place of scientific men and of uninhabited planets to take the place of underdeveloped countries. So, too, they tend to ignore the possibility that progress in the "process of civilization" (to use the phrase of the sociologist, Alfred Weber) will not mean progress in the "process of culture." This is the general attitude, I believe, because quietly, and almost unwittingly, we have redefined, or are in the midst of redefining, the idea of progress.

First, we are coming to realize that the counterpart of the theory of evolution in the biological world is the idea of progress in the historical world. Both relate to processes which have a direction: increased differentiation and complexity. What is missing as yet from the idea of progress is an acceptable explanation of how the process takes place: the equivalent of a theory of natural selection. For example, Hegel's notion of Spirit coming to self-awareness dialectically is too metaphysical; Marx's economic determinism does not cover satisfactorily the empirical data or the manifold activities of man; and so forth. Nevertheless, whatever the mechanism by which it occurs, and however arguable the precise experience the

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term covers, there is today (as Cantril's study shows) a widespread conviction that progress—the term for man's *historical evolution*—has been and is taking place.

Secondly, and as part of that belief in historical evolution, modern man lives in the conviction that, by knowing the laws of phenomena and obeying them, he can make them obey him: this is the paradox of modern science. It is also a faith, one without which our society could not progress. On this basis of scientific knowledge, therefore, we hope that we can secure control, not only over our natural environment, but over ourselves and over our social environment—both domestic and international.

But this vision of scientific control, i.e., of progress in civilization, is not, except for utopian thinkers like the Marxists, the vision of a fixed goal. In our new view of it, science is seen as a continual process which never rests with the attainment of eternal truths. So, too, with science's creator, man. On this basis, a new definition of the "process of culture" has come into being, which corresponds with the nature of scientific activity itself and in which the activity of civilization, i.e., of scientific and economic development, is now also seen as part of the activity of culture. (A reference to the debate surrounding the "Two Cultures" is in order here.) Thus, neither civilization nor culture, neither material well being nor some definite, fixed moral state, is an end in itself. It is the process of achieving which counts. As E. H. Carr phrases it in his *What is History,* "Belief in progress means belief . . . *in the progressive development of human potentialities* (my italics)."[18]

Increasingly, modern man is coming to realize that it is only in the process of achieving his goals that he discovers what he wants to, and must, do. This is his only real "progress." When Hannah Arendt, in a brilliant passage of her book, *The Human Condition,* views the setting of a man-made satellite in the sky ("where it dwelt and moved in the proximity of the heavenly bodies as though it had been admitted tentatively to their sublime company"), and the desire of man to travel into space, as "the wish to escape the human condition,"[19] she is in error. Efforts such as these *are* the human condition, for modern man, now universal in his habitat, is more and more accepting his Faustian nature. Thus, the significance of space explorations, as indeed those of the fifteenth-century Age of Discovery, is not really in terms of what they will achieve externally, but what they mean for man's achieving of his internal development.

This, today, is the meaning we are gradually coming to see em-

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bodied in the idea of progress. In our efforts at progress of this sort, we can do worse than to take as our guide an earlier traveler in unknown spaces, Ulysses. In the beautiful poetry of Dante (I use the translation by H. R. Huse), the celebrated hero tells us how he desired "to gain experience of the world and of the vices and the worth of men." Setting out on the high, open sea, with only one ship and a small company, he addresses us as his companions:

> "O brothers," I said, "you who
> through a thousand perils have come to the West,
> to the brief vigil of our senses
>
> which is left, do not deny
> experience of the unpeopled world
> to be discovered by following the sun.
>
> Consider what origin you had;
> you were not created to live like brutes,
> but to seek virtue and knowledge."[20]
> (*Inferno,* Canto XXVI)

Virtue and knowledge: culture and civilization. Today, we come in greater measure to see that these, correctly defined, are part of the same quest. We also perceive that progress in this quest for progress, while asymptotic, is unending. This last is only another way of saying that progress, like evolution, is its own end.

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ROBERT JAY LIFTON

Psychological Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima
The Theme of Death

HIROSHIMA COMMANDS our attention now, eighteen years after its exposure to the atomic bomb, perhaps even more insistently than when the event actually occurred.[1] We are compelled by the universal threat of nuclear weapons to study the impact of such weapons upon their first human victims, ever mindful of the relevance of this question to our own future and to all of human survival.

Much research has already been done concerning the physical consequences of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters, particularly in relation to their unique feature of delayed radiation effects.[2] But little attention has been paid to psychological and social elements, though these might well be said to be at present the most vivid legacies of the first atomic bomb.[3]

My own interest in these problems developed during two years of research, conducted in Tokyo and Kyoto from 1960-1962, on the relationship of individual character and historical change in Japanese youth.[4] I was struck by the significance which the encounter with nuclear weapons had for the Japanese as a whole, even for young Japanese who could hardly remember the event. Also involved in my undertaking a study in Hiroshima was concern with the psychological aspects of war and peace, as well as previous interest in the behavior of individuals and groups under extreme conditions.[5]

I began the work in April of 1962, first through two brief visits to Hiroshima, followed by four and one-half months of residence there. My approach was primarily that of individual interviews with two groups of atomic bomb survivors: thirty-three chosen at random from the more than 90,000 survivors (*hibakusha*),[6] listed at the Hiroshima University Research Institute for Nuclear Medicine and Biology; and an additional group of forty-two survivors specially

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selected because of their prominence in dealing with A-bomb problems or their capacity to articulate their experiences. Included among the latter were physicians, university professors, city officials, politicians, writers and poets, and leaders of survivor organizations and peace movements. I also sought out all those in Hiroshima (mostly Japanese, but also Americans and Europeans) who could tell me anything about the complex array of group emotions and social problems which had arisen in the city over the seventeen years that had elapsed since the disaster.

I was aware of the delicacy of my situation as an American psychiatrist conducting this study, and I relied heavily upon the continuous support and assistance of Japanese groups within the Hiroshima community, so that all meetings and interviews were arranged through their introductions. In the case of the randomly selected group, my first contact with each survivor was made through a personal visit to the home, in the company of a Japanese social worker from Hiroshima University. My previous experience in Japan —including the ability to speak a certain amount of Japanese—was helpful in eliciting the many forms of cooperation so crucial for the work. Perhaps of greatest importance was my conveying to both colleagues and research subjects a sense of my personal motivation in undertaking the work, the hope that a systematic study of this kind might clarify important problems often spoken about loosely, and thereby in a small way contribute to the mastery of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of their use.

Interviews were generally about two hours long; I tried to see each research subject twice, though I saw some three or four times, and others just once. I tape-recorded all sessions with subjects of the randomly selected group, and did so with many of those in the special group as well, always with the subject's consent. Interviews were conducted in Japanese,[7] and a research assistant was always present to interpret. After making an initial appraisal of the problems involved, I decided to focus my questions upon three general dimensions of the problem: first, the recollection of the experience itself and its inner meaning seventeen years later;[8] second, residual concerns and fears, especially those relating to delayed radiation effects; and third, the survivor's sense of self and society, or of special group identity. Subjects were encouraged to associate freely to these topics and to any feelings or ideas stimulated by them. And in gathering these data I sought always to evaluate to what degree exposure to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima resembles psychological

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and social patterns common to all disasters, as described in the general literature on disaster, and in what ways it might be a unique experience. What follows is a preliminary statement on work in progress, a composite description of some of the basic trends I have observed.

The Experience Recalled

The degree to which one anticipates a disaster has important bearing upon the way in which one responds, and the predominant tone in the descriptions I heard was that of extreme surprise and unpreparedness. Since it was wartime, people did of course expect conventional bombing; there had been regularly occurring air raid warnings because of planes passing over Hiroshima, though only an occasional stray bomb had actually been dropped on the city. American planes did drop leaflets warning Hiroshima inhabitants that their city was going to be demolished and urging them to evacuate from it. But very few people appear to have seen these leaflets, and those who did tended to ignore them as enemy propaganda. Many wondered at Hiroshima's relatively untouched state, despite its obviously strategic significance as a major staging area for Japan's military operations in China and Southeast Asia. There was general apprehension, the feeling that there was something dangerous about Hiroshima's strangely intact state and that the Americans must be preparing something extraordinarily big for the city (though this latter thought could have been partly a retrospective construction). At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, 1945, the moment the bomb fell, most people were in a particularly relaxed state, since, following a brief air-raid warning, the all-clear had just been sounded. People thus had a false sense of immediate security, as well as a total incapacity to imagine the nature of the weapon that was about to strike them.

It was only those at some distance from the bomb's hypocenter who could clearly distinguish the sequence of the great flash of light in the sky accompanied by the lacerating heat of the fireball, then the sound and force of the blast, and the impressive multicolored "mushroom cloud" rising above the city. Two thousand meters is generally considered to be a critical radius for high mortality (from heat, blast, and radiation), for susceptibility to delayed radiation effects, and for near-total destruction of buildings and other structures. But many were killed outside of this radius, and indeed the number of deaths from the bomb—variously estimated from

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63,000 to 240,000 or more—is still unknown. Falling in the center of a flat city made up largely of wooden residential and commercial structures, the bomb is reported to have destroyed or so badly damaged, through blast and fire, more than two-thirds of all buildings within 5000 meters—an area roughly encompassing the city limits—that all of Hiroshima became immediately involved in the atomic disaster.[9] Those within the 2000-meter radius could not clearly recall their initial perceptions: many simply remember what they thought to be a flash—or else a sudden sensation of heat—followed by an indeterminate period of unconsciousness; others recall only being thrown across a room or knocked down, then finding themselves pinned under debris of buildings.

The most striking psychological feature of this immediate experience was the sense of a sudden and absolute shift from normal existence to an overwhelming encounter with death. This is described by a young shopkeeper's assistant, who was thirteen years old at the time the bomb fell, and 1400 meters from the hypocenter:

> I was a little ill . . . so I stayed at home that day. . . . There had been an air-raid warning and then an all-clear. I felt relieved and lay down on the bed with my younger brother. . . . Then it happened. It came very suddenly. . . . It felt something like an electric short—a bluish sparkling light. . . . There was a noise, and I felt great heat—even inside of the house. When I came to, I was underneath the destroyed house. . . . I didn't know anything about the atomic bomb so I thought that some bomb had fallen directly upon me . . . and then when I felt that our house had been directly hit I became furious. . . . There were roof tiles and walls—everything black—entirely covering me. So I screamed for help. . . . And from all around I heard moans and screaming, and then I felt a kind of danger to myself. . . . I thought that I too was going to die in that way. I felt this way at that moment because I was absolutely unable to do anything at all by my own power. . . . I didn't know where I was or what I was under. . . . I couldn't hear voices of my family. I didn't know how I could be rescued. I felt I was going to suffocate and then die, without knowing exactly what had happened to me. This was the kind of expectation I had. . . .

I stress this sudden encounter with death because I believe that it initiates, from this first moment of contact with the atomic bomb, an emotional theme within the victim which remains with him indefinitely: the sense of a more or less permanent encounter with death.

This early impact enveloped the city in an aura of weirdness and unreality, as recalled by an elderly electrician, who at the time

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of the bomb was in his mid-forties, working at a railroad junction 5000 meters from the hypocenter.

I was setting up a pole . . . near a switch in the railroad tracks. . . . I heard a tremendous noise. There was a flash . . . a kind of flash I had never seen before which I can't describe. . . . My face felt hot and I put my hands over my eyes and rushed under a locomotive that was nearby. I crawled in between the wheels, and then there was an enormous boom and the locomotive shook. I was frightened, so I crawled out. . . . I couldn't tell what happened. . . . For about five minutes I saw nobody, and then I saw someone coming out from an air-raid shelter who told me that the youngest one of our workers had been injured by falling piles . . . so I put the injured man on the back of my bicycle and tried to take him to the dispensary. Then I saw that almost all of the people in that area were crowded into the dispensary, and since there was also a hospital nearby, I went there. But that too was already full. . . . So the only thing to do was to go into [the center of] Hiroshima. But I couldn't move my bicycle because of all the people coming out from Hiroshima and blocking the way. . . . I saw that they were all naked and I wondered what was the matter with them. . . . When we spoke to people they said that they had been hit by something they didn't understand. . . . We were desperately looking for a doctor or a hospital but we couldn't seem to have any success. . . . We walked toward Hiroshima, still carrying our tools. . . . Then in Hiroshima there was no place either—it had become an empty field—so I carried him to a place near our company office where injured people were lying inside, asking for water. But there was no water and there was no way to help them and I myself didn't know what kind of treatment I should give to this man or to the others. I had to let them die right before my eyes. . . . By then we were cut off from escape, because the fire was beginning to spread out and we couldn't move—we were together with the dead people in the building—only we were not really inside of the building because the building itself had been destroyed, so that we were really outdoors, and we spent the night there. . . .

This rote and essentially ineffectual behavior was characteristic of many during the first few hours, in those situations where any attempt at all could be made to maintain a group co-operative effort; people were generally more effective in helping members of their immediate families, or in saving themselves. This same electrician, an unusually conscientious man, kept at his post at the railroad over a period of several weeks, leaving only for brief periods to take care of his family. Again his description of the scene of death and near-death takes on a dreamlike quality:

There were dead bodies everywhere. . . . There was practically no room for me to put my feet on the floor. . . . At that time I couldn't figure out the reason why all these people were suffering, or what illness it was that had struck them down. . . . I was the only person taking care of the

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place as all of the rest of the people had gone. . . . Other people came in looking for food or to use the toilet. . . . There was no one to sell tickets in the station, nothing . . . and since trains weren't running I didn't have much work to do. . . . There was no light at all and we were just like sleepwalkers. . . .

And a middle-aged teacher, who was also on the outskirts of the city about 5000 meters from the hypocenter, describes his awe at the destruction he witnessed:

I climbed Hijiyama Mountain and looked down. I saw that Hiroshima had disappeared. . . . I was shocked by the sight. . . . What I felt then and still feel now I just can't explain with words. Of course I saw many dreadful scenes after that—but that experience, looking down and finding nothing left of Hiroshima—was so shocking that I simply can't express what I felt. I could see Koi [a suburb at the opposite end of the city] and a few buildings standing. . . . But Hiroshima didn't exist—that was mainly what I saw—Hiroshima just didn't exist.

And a young university professor 2500 meters from the hypocenter at the time, sums up these feelings of weird, awesome unreality in a frequently-expressed image of hell:

Everything I saw made a deep impression—a park nearby covered with dead bodies waiting to be cremated . . . very badly injured people evacuated in my direction. . . . The most impressive thing I saw was some girls, very young girls, not only with their clothes torn off but with their skin peeled off as well. . . . My immediate thought was that this was like the hell I had always read about. . . . I had never seen anything which resembled it before, but I thought that should there be a hell, this was it—the Buddhist hell, where we were taught that people who could not attain salvation always went. . . . And I imagined that all of these people I was seeing were in the hell I had read about.

But human beings are unable to remain open to emotional experience of this intensity for any length of time, and very quickly—sometimes within minutes—there began to occur what we may term *psychological closure;* that is, people simply ceased to feel.

For instance, a male social worker, then in his twenties and in military service in Hiroshima, was temporarily on leave at his home just outside of the city; he rushed back into the city soon after the bomb fell, in accordance with his military duty, only to find that his unit had been entirely wiped out. A certain amount of military order was quickly re-established, and a policy of immediate mass cremation of dead bodies was instituted in order to prevent widespread disease, and in accordance with Japanese custom. As a non-commissioned officer and one of the few able-bodied men left,

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he was put in charge of this work of disposing of corpses, which he found he could accomplish with little difficulty:

> After awhile they became just like objects or goods that we handled in a very businesslike way. . . . Of course I didn't regard them simply as pieces of wood—they were dead bodies—but if we had been sentimental we couldn't have done the work. . . . We had no emotions. . . . Because of the succession of experiences I had been through I was temporarily without feeling. . . . At times I went about the work with great energy, realizing that no one but myself could do it.

He contrasted his own feelings with the terror experienced by an outsider just entering the disaster area:

> Everything at that time was part of an extraordinary situation. . . . For instance, I remember that on the ninth or tenth of August, it was an extremely dark night. . . . I saw blue phosphorescent flames rising from the dead bodies—and there were plenty of them. These were quite different from the orange flames coming from the burning buildings. . . . These blue phosphorescent flames are what we Japanese look upon as spirits rising from dead bodies—in former days we called them fireballs.[10] —And yet, at that time I had no sense of fear, not a bit, but merely thought, "those dead bodies are still burning." . . . But to people who had just come from the outside, those flames looked very strange. . . . One of those nights I met a soldier who had just returned to the city, and I walked along with him. . . . He noticed these unusual fireballs and asked me what they were. I told him that they were the flames coming from dead bodies. The soldier suddenly became extremely frightened, fell down on the ground, and was unable to move. . . . Yet I at that time had a state of mind in which I feared nothing. Though if I were to see those flames now I might be quite frightened. . . .

Relatively few people were involved in the disposal of dead bodies, but virtually all those I interviewed nonetheless experienced a similar form of psychological closure in response to what they saw and felt, and particularly in response to their overall exposure to death. Thus many told how horrified they were when they first encountered corpses in strange array, or extremely disfigured faces, but how, after a period of time as they saw more and more of these, they felt nothing. Psychological closure would last sometimes for a few hours, and sometimes for days or even months and merge into longer-term feelings of depression and despair.

But even the profound and unconscious psychic defensive maneuvers involved in psychological closure were ultimately unable to afford full protection to the survivor from the painful sights and stimuli impinging upon him. It was, moreover, a defense not devoid of its own psychological cost. Thus the same social worker, in a

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later interview, questioned his own use of the word "businesslike" to describe his attitude toward dead bodies, and emphasized the pity and sympathy he felt while handling the remains of men from his unit and the pains he took to console family members who came for these remains; he even recalled feeling frightened at night when passing the spot where he worked at cremation by day. He was in effect telling me not only that his psychological closure was imperfect, but that he was horrified—felt ashamed and guilty—at having behaved in a way which he now thought callous. For he had indulged in activities which were ordinarily, for him, strongly taboo, and had done so with an energy, perhaps even an enthusiasm, which must have mobilized within him primitive emotions of a frightening nature.

The middle-aged teacher who had expressed such awe at the disappearance of Hiroshima reveals the way in which feelings of shame and guilt, and especially shame and guilt toward the dead, break through the defense of psychological closure and painfully assert themselves:

> I went to look for my family. Somehow I became a pitiless person, because if I had pity I would not have been able to walk through the city, to walk over those dead bodies. The most impressive thing was the expression in people's eyes—bodies badly injured which had turned black—their eyes looking for someone to come and help them. They looked at me and knew that I was stronger than they. . . . I was looking for my family and looking carefully at everyone I met to see if he or she was a family member—but the eyes—the emptiness—the helpless expression—were something I will never forget. . . . I often had to go to the same place more than once. I would wish that the same family would not still be there. . . . I saw disappointment in their eyes. They looked at me with great expectation, staring right through me. It was very hard to be stared at by those eyes. . . .

He felt, in other words, accused by the eyes of the anonymous dead and dying, of wrong-doing and transgression (a sense of guilt) for not helping them, for letting them die, for "selfishly" remaining alive and strong; and "exposed" and "seen through" by the same eyes for these identical failings (a sense of shame).[11]

There were also many episodes of more focused guilt toward specific family members whom one was unable to help, and for whose death one felt responsible. For instance, the shopkeeper's assistant mentioned earlier was finally rescued from the debris of his destroyed house by his mother, but she was too weakened by her own injuries to be able to walk very far with him. Soon they were

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surrounded by fire, and he (a boy of thirteen) did not feel he had the strength to sustain her weight, and became convinced that they would both die unless he took some other action. So he put her down and ran for help, but the neighbor he summoned could not get through to the woman because of the flames, and the boy learned shortly afterward that his mother died in precisely the place he had left her. His lasting sense of guilt was reflected in his frequent experience, from that time onward, of hearing his mother's voice ringing in his ears calling for help.

A middle-aged businessman related a similarly guilt-stimulating sequence. His work had taken him briefly to the south of Japan and he had returned to Hiroshima during the early morning hours of August 6. Having been up all night, he was not too responsive when his twelve-year-old son came into his room to ask his father to remove a nail from his shoe so that he could put it on and go off to school. The father, wishing to get the job quickly over, placed a piece of leather above the tip of the nail and promised he would take the whole nail out when the boy returned in the afternoon. As in the case of many youngsters who were sent to factories to do "voluntary labor" as a substitute for their school work, the boy's body was never found—and the father, after a desperately fruitless search for his son throughout the city, was left with the lingering self-accusation that the nail he had failed to remove might have impeded the boy's escape from the fire.

Most survivors focus upon one incident, one sight, or one particular *ultimate horror* with which they strongly identify themselves, and which left them with a profound sense of pity, guilt, and shame. Thus the social worker describes an event which he feels affected him even more than his crematory activities:

> On the evening of August 6, the city was so hot from the fire that I could not easily enter it, but I finally managed to do so by taking a path along the river. As I walked along the bank near the present Yokogawa Bridge, I saw the bodies of a mother and her child. . . . That is, I thought I saw dead bodies, but the child was still alive—still breathing, though with difficulty. . . . I filled the cover of my lunch box with water and gave it to the child but it was so weak it could not drink. I knew that people were frequently passing that spot . . . and I hoped that one of these people would take the child, as I had to go back to my own unit. Of course I helped many people all through that day . . . but the image of this child stayed on my mind and remains as a strong impression even now. . . . Later when I was again in that same area I hoped that I might be able to find the child . . . and I looked for it among all the dead children collected at a place nearby. . . . Even before the war I had planned

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to go into social work, but this experience led me to go into my present work with children—as the memory of that mother and child by Yokogawa Bridge has never left me, especially since the child was still alive when I saw it.

These expressions of ultimate horror can be related to direct personal experience of loss (for instance, the businessman who had failed to remove the nail from his son's shoe remained preoccupied with pathetic children staring imploringly at him), as well as to enduring individual emotional themes. Most of them involved women and children, universal symbols of purity and vulnerability, particularly in Japanese culture. And, inevitably, the ultimate horror was directly related to death or dying.

Contamination and Disease

Survivors told me of three rumors which circulated widely in Hiroshima just after the bomb. The first was that for a period of seventy-five years Hiroshima would be uninhabitable—no one would be able to live there. This rumor was a direct expression of the *fear of deadly and protracted contamination from a mysterious poison believed to have been emitted by the frightening new weapon.* (As one survivor put it, "The ordinary people spoke of poison; the intellectuals spoke of radiation.")

Even more frequently expressed, and I believe with greater emotion, was a second rumor: trees and grass would never again grow in Hiroshima; from that day on the city would be unable to sustain vegetation of any kind. This seemed to suggest *an ultimate form of desolation even beyond that of human death:* nature was drying up altogether, the ultimate source of life was being extinguished—a form of symbolism particularly powerful in Japanese culture with its focus upon natural aesthetics and its view of nature as both enveloping and energizing all of human life.

The third rumor, less frequently mentioned to me but one which also had wide currency in various versions, was that all those who had been exposed to the bomb in Hiroshima would be dead within three years. This more naked death symbolism was directly related to the appearance of frightening symptoms of toxic radiation effects. For almost immediately after the bomb and during the following days and weeks, people began to experience, and notice in others, symptoms of a strange form of illness: nausea, vomiting, and loss of appetite; diarrhea with large amounts of blood in the stools; fever

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and weakness; purple spots on various parts of the body from bleeding into the skin (purpura); inflamation and ulceration of the mouth, throat, and gums (oropharyngeal lesions and gingivitis); bleeding from the mouth, gums, nose, throat, rectum, and urinary tract (hemorrhagic manifestations); loss of hair from the scalp and other parts of the body (epilation); extremely low white blood cell counts when these were taken (leucopenia); and in many cases a progressive course until death.[12] These symptoms and fatalities aroused in the minds of the people of Hiroshima a special terror, *an image of a weapon which not only kills and destroys on a colossal scale but also leaves behind in the bodies of those exposed to it deadly influences which may emerge at any time and strike down their victims.* This image was made particularly vivid by the delayed appearance of these radiation effects, two to four weeks after the bomb fell, sometimes in people who had previously seemed to be in perfect health.

The shopkeeper's assistant, both of whose parents were killed by the bomb, describes his reactions to the death of two additional close family members from these toxic radiation effects:

My grandmother was taking care of my younger brother on the 14th of August when I left, and when I returned on the 15th she had many spots all over her body. Two or three days later she died. . . . My younger brother, who . . . was just a [five-month-old] baby, was without breast milk—so we fed him thin rice gruel. . . . But on the 10th of October he suddenly began to look very ill, though I had not then noticed any spots on his body. . . . Then on the next day he began to look a little better, and I thought he was going to survive. I was very pleased, as he was the only family member I had left, and I took him to a doctor—but on the way to the doctor he died. And at that time we found that there were two large spots on his bottom. . . . I heard it said that all these people would die within three years . . . so I thought, "sooner or later I too will die." . . . I felt very weak and very lonely—with no hope at all . . . and since I had seen so many people's eyebrows falling out, their hair falling out, bleeding from their teeth—I found myself always nervously touching my hair like this [he demonstrated by rubbing his head]. . . . I never knew when some sign of the disease would show itself. . . . And living in the countryside then with my relatives, people who came to visit would tell us these things, and then the villagers also talked about them—telling stories of this man or that man who visited us a few days ago, returned to Hiroshima, and died within a week. . . . I couldn't tell whether these stories were true or not, but I believed them then. And I also heard that when the *hibakusha* came to evacuate to the village where I was, they died there one by one. . . . This loneliness, and the fear. . . . The physical fear . . . has been with me always. . . . It is not something temporary, as I still have it now. . . .

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Here we find a link between this early sense of ubiquitous death from radiation effects, and later anxieties about death and illness.

In a similar tone, a middle-aged writer describes his daughter's sudden illness and death:

> My daughter was working with her classmates at a place 1000 meters from the hypocenter. . . . I was able to meet her the next day at a friend's house. She had no burns and only minor external wounds, so I took her with me to my country house. She was quite all right for awhile but on the 4th of September she suddenly became sick. . . . The symptoms of her disease were different from those of a normal disease. . . . She had spots all over her body. . . . Her hair began to fall out. She vomited small clumps of blood many times. Finally she began to bleed all over her mouth. And at times her fever was very high. I felt this was a very strange and horrible disease. . . . We didn't know what it was. I thought it was a kind of epidemic—something like cholera. So I told the rest of my family not to touch her and to disinfect all utensils and everything she used. . . . We were all afraid of it and even the doctor didn't know what it was. . . . After ten days of agony and torture she died on September 14. . . . I thought it was very cruel that my daughter, who had nothing to do with the war, had to be killed in this way. . . .

Survivors were thus affected not only by the fact of people dying around them but by the way in which they died: a gruesome form of rapid bodily deterioration which seemed unrelated to more usual and "decent" forms of death.

We have seen how these initial physical fears could readily turn into lifetime bodily concerns. And during the years that followed, these fears and concerns became greatly magnified by another development: the growing awareness among the people of Hiroshima that medical studies were demonstrating an abnormally high rate of leukemia among survivors of the atomic bomb. The increased incidence was first noted in 1948, and reached a peak between 1950 and 1952; it has been greatest in those exposed closest to the hypocenter so that for those within 1000 meters the increase of leukemia has been between ten and fifty times the normal. Since 1952 the rate has diminished, but it is still higher than in nonexposed populations, and fears which have been aroused remain strong. While symptoms of leukemia are not exactly the same as those of acute radiation effects, the two conditions share enough in common—the dreaded "purple spots" and other forms of hemorrhage, laboratory findings of abnormalities of the blood, progressive weakness and fever and (inevitably in leukemia, and often enough in acute irradiation) ulti-

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mate death—that these tend to merge, psychologically speaking, into a diffuse fear of bodily annihilation and death.[13]

Moreover, Hiroshima survivors are aware of the general concern and controversy about genetic effects of the atomic bomb, and most express fear about possible harmful effects upon subsequent generations—a very serious emotional concern anywhere, but particularly so in an East Asian culture which stresses family lineage and the continuity of generations as man's central purpose in life and (at least symbolically) his means of achieving immortality. The Hiroshima people know that radiation *can* produce congenital abnormalities (as has been widely demonstrated in laboratory animals); and abnormalities have frequently been reported among the offspring of survivors—sometimes in very lurid journalistic terms, sometimes in more restrained medical reports. Actually, systematic studies of the problem have so far revealed no higher incidence of abnormalities in survivors' offspring than in those of control populations, so that scientific findings regarding genetic effects have been essentially negative. However, there has been one uncomfortably positive genetic finding, that of disturbances in sex ratio of offspring: men exposed to a significant degree of radiation tend to have relatively fewer daughters, while exposed women tend to have fewer sons, because, it is believed, of sex-linked lethal mutations involving the X chromosome—a finding whose significance is difficult to evaluate. Moreover, there are Japanese physicans who believe that there has been an increase in various forms of internal (and therefore invisible) congenital abnormalities in children of survivors, despite the absence so far of convincing scientific evidence.[14]

Another factor here is the definite damage from radiation experienced by children exposed *in utero*, including many stillbirths and abortions as well as a high incidence of microcephaly with and without mental retardation (occurring almost exclusively in pregnancies which had not advanced beyond four months). This is, of course, a direct effect of radiation upon sensitive, rapidly growing fetal tissues, and, scientifically speaking, has nothing to do with genetic problems. But ordinary people often fail to make this distinction; to them the birth of children with abnormally small heads and retarded minds was often looked upon as still another example of the bomb's awesome capacity to inflict a physical curse upon its victims and their offspring.

There are also other areas of concern regarding delayed radiation effects. There has been a definite increase in cataracts and re-

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lated eye conditions, which was not stressed to me by survivors as so great a source of emotional concern as the other problems mentioned, but has been nonetheless far from negligible. There has been evidence, though not yet decisive, that the incidence of various forms of cancer has increased among survivors; if confirmed, this could be an extremely serious problem, since it involves fatal disease entities much more frequent in their normal occurrence than leukemia. There has also been evidence of impairment in the growth and development of children, though contested by some on the grounds of inadequately accounting for social and economic factors. And there is a large group of divergent conditions—including anemias and liver and blood diseases, endocrine and skin disorders, impairment of central nervous system (particularly midbrain) function, and premature aging—which have been attributed by various investigators to radiation effects, but have not shown increased incidence in large-scale studies involving control populations. Even more difficult to evaluate is a frequently reported borderline condition of general weakness and debilitation also believed—by a very large number of survivors and by some physicians as well—to be caused by delayed radiation effects.

These fears about general health and genetic effects have inevitably affected marriage arrangements (which are usually made in Japan by families with the help of a go-between), in which survivors are frequently thought to encounter discrimination, particularly when involved in arrangements with families outside of Hiroshima.

A company employee in his thirties, who was 2000 meters from the bomb's hypocenter when it fell, described to me virtually all of these bodily and genetic concerns in a voice that betrayed considerable anxiety:

> Even when I have an illness which is not at all serious—as for instance when I had very mild liver trouble—I have fears about its cause. Of course if it is just an ordinary condition there is nothing to worry about, but if it has a direct connection to radioactivity, then I might not be able to expect to recover. At such times I feel myself very delicate. . . . This happened two or three years ago. I was working very hard and drinking a great deal of *sake* at night in connection with business appointments and I also had to make many strenuous trips. So my condition might have been partly related to my using up so much energy in all of these things. . . . The whole thing is not fully clear to me. . . . But the results of statistical study show that those who were exposed to the bomb are more likely to have illnesses—not only of the liver, but

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various kinds of new growths, such as cancer or blood diseases. My blood was examined several times but no special changes were discovered. . . . When my marriage arrangements were made we discussed all these things in a direct fashion. Everyone knows that there are some effects, but in my case it was the eleventh year after the bomb, and I discussed my physical condition during all of that time. From that, and also from the fact that I was exposed to the bomb while inside of a building and taken immediately to the suburbs, and then remained quite a while outside of the city—judging from all of these facts, it was concluded that there was very little to fear concerning my condition. . . . But in general, there is a great concern that people who were exposed to the bomb might become ill five or ten years later or at any time in the future. . . . Also when my children were born, I found myself worrying about things that ordinary people don't worry about, such as the possibility that they might inherit some terrible disease from me. . . . I heard that the likelihood of our giving birth to deformed children is greater than in the case of ordinary people . . . and at that time my white blood cell count was rather low. . . . I felt fatigue in the summertime and had a blood count done three or four times. . . . I was afraid it could be related to the bomb, and was greatly worried. . . . Then after the child was born, even though he wasn't a deformed child, I still worried that something might happen to him afterwards. . . . With the second child too I was not entirely free of such worries. . . . I am still not sure what might happen and I worry that the effects of radioactivity might be lingering in some way. . . .

Here we see a young man carrying on effectively in his life, essentially healthy, with normal children, and yet continually plagued by underlying anxieties—about his general health, then about marriage arrangements, and then in relationship to the birth of each of his children. Each hurdle is passed, but there is little relief; like many survivors, he experiences an inner sense of being doomed for posterity.

And a young clerk, also exposed about 2000 meters from the hypocenter, but having the additional disadvantage of retaining a keloid scar resulting from facial burns, expresses similar emotions in still stronger fashion:

Frankly speaking, even now I have fear. . . . Even today people die in the hospitals from A-bomb disease, and when I hear about this I worry that I too might sooner or later have the same thing happen to me. . . . I have a special feeling that I am different from ordinary people . . . that I have the mark of wounds—as if I were a cripple. . . . I imagine a person who has an arm or a leg missing might feel the same way. . . . It is not a matter of lacking something externally, but rather something like a handicap—something mental which does not show—the feeling that I am mentally different from ordinary people . . . so when I hear about people who die from A-bomb disease or who have operations because of this illness, then I feel that I am the same kind of person as they. . . .

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The survivor's identification with the dead and the maimed initiates a vicious circle on the psychosomatic plane of existence: he is likely to associate the mildest everyday injury or sickness with possible radiation effects; and anything he relates to radiation effects becomes associated with death. The process is accentuated by the strong Japanese cultural focus upon bodily symptoms as expressions of anxiety and conflict. Thus the all-encompassing term "A-bomb sickness" or "A-bomb disease" (*genbakushō*) has evolved, referring on the one hand to such fatal conditions as the early acute radiation effects and later cases of leukemia; and on the other hand to the vague borderline area of fatigue, general weakness, sensitivity to hot weather, suspected anemia, susceptibility to colds or stomach trouble, and general nervousness—all of which are frequent complaints of survivors, and which many associate with radiation effects.[15] Not only does the expression "A-bomb disease" have wide popular currency, but it has frequently been used by local physicans as a convenient category for a condition otherwise hard to classify, and at the same time as a means of making it possible for the patient to derive certain medical and economic benefits.

These benefits also loom large in the picture.[16] Doctors and survivors—as well as politicians and city officials—are caught in a conflict between humanitarian provision for medical need, and the dangers (expressed to me particularly by Japanese physicians) of encouraging the development in survivors of hypochondriasis, general weakness and dependency—or what is sometimes called "A-bomb neurosis." During the years immediately after the war, when medical care was most needed, very little adequate treatment was available, as the national medical law providing for survivors was not enacted until 1957. But since that time a series of laws and amendments have been passed with increasingly comprehensive medical coverage, particularly for those in the "special survivors" group (those nearest the hypocenter at the time of the bomb and those who have shown evidence of medical conditions considered to be related to A-bomb effects). In the last few years the category of "special survivors" has been steadily enlarged: distance from the hypocenter, as a criterion for eligibility, has been extended from 2000 to 3000 meters; and qualifying illnesses—originally limited to such conditions as leukemia, ophthalmic diseases, and various blood and liver disorders, all of which were considered to be related to radiation effects—have been extended to include illnesses not considered to be necessarily directly caused by radiation but possibly

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aggravated by the overall atomic bomb experience, such as cancer, heart disease, endocrine and kidney disorders, arteriosclerosis, hypertension, and others.

Maximum medical and economic benefits, however, can be obtained only by those "certified" (through a special medical procedure) to have illnesses specifically related to the atomic bomb; but some physicians believe that this "certification"—which can be sometimes given for such minor conditions as ordinary anemia (as well as for more serious illnesses)—tends to stamp one psychologically as a lifetime A-bomb patient. The rationale of these laws is to provide maximum help for survivors and to give them the benefit of the doubt about matters which are not entirely scientifically resolved. But there remains a great deal of controversy over them. In addition to those who feel that the laws foster an exaggerated preoccupation with atomic bomb effects (not only among doctors, but also among city officials, ordinary people, and even survivors themselves), there are other survivors who criticize them as being still insufficiently comprehensive, as having overly complicated categories and sub-categories which in the end deny full care for certain conditions.

My own impression in studying this problem is that, since "A-bomb disease" is at this historical juncture as much a spiritual as a physical condition (as our young clerk made so clear)—and one which touches at every point upon the problem of death—it is difficult for any law or medical program to provide a cure.

The general psychological atmosphere in Hiroshima—and particularly that generated by the effects of the mass media—also has great bearing upon these psychosomatic problems. As one would expect, the whole subject of the atomic bomb and its delayed radiation effects has been continuous front-page news—from 1945-1952 within the limits of the restrictions upon publicizing these matters imposed by the American Occupation,[17] and without such restrictions thereafter. Confronted with a subject so emotionally charged for the people of Hiroshima—its intensity constantly reinforced by world events and particularly by nuclear weapons testing—newspapers in Hiroshima and elsewhere in Japan have dealt with it dramatically, particularly in circulating the concept of "A-bomb disease." Mass media are caught in a moral dilemma in some ways similar to that I have already described for physicians, city officials, and survivors themselves: there is on the one hand the urge to give full publicity to the horrors of nuclear weapons through vivid de-

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scription of effects and suspected effects of atomic bomb radiation —thereby serving warning to the world and also expressing a form of sympathy to survivors through recognition of their plight—and on the other hand the growing awareness that lurid reports of illness and death have a profoundly disturbing effect upon survivors. Responsible media have struggled to reconcile these conflicting moral pressures and achieve balanced treatment of an unprecedentedly difficult problem; others have been guided mainly by commercial considerations. In any case, the people of Hiroshima have been constantly confronted with frightening descriptions of patients dying in the "A-bomb Hospital" (a medical center built specifically for the treatment of conditions related to the bomb) of "A-bomb disease." In the majority of cases the relationship of the fatal condition to delayed radiation effects is equivocal, but this is usually not made clear, nor does it in any way lessen the enormous impact of these reports upon individual survivors.[18] Also furthering this impact have been the activities of peace movements and various ideological and political groups—ranging from those whose universalistic dedication to peace and opposition to nuclear weapons testing lead them to circulate the effects of the bomb on a humanistic basis, to others who seek narrower political goals from the unique Hiroshima atmosphere.

What I wish to stress is the manner in which these diverse passions—compounded of moral concern, sympathetic identification, various forms of fear, hostility, political conviction, personal ambition, and journalistic sensationalism—interact with the psychosomatic preoccupations of survivors. But I would also emphasize that these passions are by no means simply manufactured ones; they are the inevitable expression of the impact of a disaster of this magnitude upon basic human conflicts and anxieties. And whatever the medical exaggerations, they are built upon an underlying lethal reality of acute and delayed radiation effects, and upon the genuine possibility of still-undiscovered forms of bodily harm.

Yet, in bodily terms or otherwise, human beings vary greatly in their capacity to absorb an experience of this kind. And one's feelings of health or invalidism—as well as one's symbolic attitude toward the bomb—have much to do with individual emotions and life-patterns. This is made clear by a middle-aged female artist who experienced the bomb just 1500 meters from the hypocenter, and during subsequent years suffered continuously from a variety of

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bodily symptoms of indefinite origin, as well as from general unhappiness in marital and family relationships:

> It looks as though marriage and the normal life one leads with marriage is good for the health. . . . Among A-bomb victims, those that are married and well established with their families have fewer complaints. Of course, even those who are settled in their families remember the incident. But on the whole they are much better off and feel better . . . their attitude is, "*shōganai*" (it can't be helped). "It is useless to look back on old memories," they keep saying. They are simply interested in their immediate problems of marriage and everyday life. They look forward rather than backward. . . . Those without families on the other hand keep remembering everything. Clinging to their memories, they keep repeating the experience. . . . They curse the whole world—including what happened in the past and what is happening now. Some of them even say, "I hope that atomic bombs will be dropped again and then the whole world will suffer the same way I am suffering now."

This kind of hostility is likely to occur together with psychosomatic complaints, and particularly in those people who feel that their life has been blighted by the atomic bomb—those who lost close family members or who in one way or another feel themselves unable to recover from the experience. The cosmic nature of the emotion—its curse upon (and in some cases wish for total annihilation of) the whole world resembles in some ways the retaliatory emotions of hurt children. But it contains additional elements of personal recollection: the experience of "world-destruction" at the time of the bomb. And it is a projection into the future: the even greater world-destruction one can envisage as a consequence of a repetition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Unwanted Identity

It is clear by now that exposure to the atomic bomb changed the survivor's status as a human being, in his own eyes as well as in others'. Both through his immediate experience and its consequences over the years, he became a member of a new group; he assumed the identity of the *hibakusha,* of one who has undergone the atomic bomb. When I asked survivors to associate freely to the word *hibakusha,* and to explain their feelings about it, they invariably conveyed to me the sense of having been compelled to take on this special category of existence, by which they felt permanently bound, however they might wish to free themselves from it. The shop-

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keeper's assistant expresses this in simple terms characteristic for many:

> Well . . . because I am a *hibakusha* . . . how shall I say it—I wish others would not look at me with special eyes . . . perhaps *hibakusha* are mentally—or both physically and mentally—different from others . . . but I myself do not want to be treated in any special way because I am a *hibakusha*. . . .

To be a *hibakusha* thus separates one from the rest of humankind. It means, as expressed by a young female clerical worker left with a keloid from her atomic bomb exposure at 1600 meters, a sense of having been forsaken.

> I don't like people to use that word [*hibakusha*]. . . . Of course there are some who, through being considered *hibakusha* want to receive special coddling *(amaeru)*. . . . But I like to stand up as an individual. When I was younger they used to call us "atomic bomb maidens." . . . More recently they call us *hibakusha*. . . . I don't like this special view of us. . . . Usually when people refer to young girls, they will say girls or daughters, or some person's daughter . . . but to refer to us as atomic bomb maidens is a way of discrimination. . . . It is a way of abandoning us. . . .

What she is saying, and what many said to me in different ways, is that the experience, with all of its consequences, is so profound that it can virtually become the person; others then see one *only* as a *hibakusha* bearing the taint of death, and therefore, in the deepest sense, turn away. And even the special attentions—the various forms of emotional succor—which the survivor may be tempted to seek, cannot be satisfying because such succor is ultimately perceived as unauthentic.

A European priest, one of the relatively few non-Japanese *hibakusha*, expresses these sentiments gently but sardonically:

> I always say—if everyone looks at me because I received the Nobel Prize, that's O.K., but if my only virtue is that I was 1000 meters from the atomic bomb center and I'm still alive—I don't want to be famous for that.

Hibakusha look upon themselves as under-privileged in other ways too. Not only are they literally a minority group (one-fifth of the city's population), but they are generally considered to be at the lower socioeconomic levels of society, and have even at times been compared to the *burakumin*, or outcast group.[19] For once it was realized that Hiroshima was not permanently contaminated after all, not only did the survivors attempt to rebuild their homes, but hordes of outsiders—some from overseas areas, some from the industrial

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Osaka region, some of them black marketeers and members of gangs who saw special opportunity beckoning: all of them both physically and culturally more vigorous than the atomic-bombed, traditionalistic Hiroshima population—poured into the city, and became perhaps the main beneficiaries of the economic boom which later developed. Survivors have encountered discrimination not only in marriage but also in employment, as it was felt that they could not work as hard as ordinary people and tended to need more time off because of illness and fatigue. Of course, survivors nonetheless regularly work and marry; but they often do so with a sense of having, as *hibakusha,* impaired capacity for both. They strongly resent the popular image of the *hibakusha* which accentuates their limitations, but at the same time accept much of it as their own self-image. Thus, concerning occupational competition, older survivors often feel that they have lacked the over-all energy to assimilate their economic, spiritual, and possibly physical blows sufficiently to be the equal of ordinary people; and young survivors, even if they feel themselves to possess normal energy, often fear that being identified by others as a *hibakusha* might similarly interfere with their occupational standing. Concerning marriage, the sense of impairment can include the need to have one's A-bomb experience more or less "cleared" by a go-between (as we have seen); fears about having abnormal children, or sometimes about the ability to have children at all;[20] and occasionally, in males, diminished sexual potency (thought of as organic but probably psychogenic in origin).

However well or poorly a survivor is functioning in his life, the word *hibakusha* evokes an image of the dead and the dying. The young clerk, for instance, when he hears the word, thinks either of the experience itself (". . . Although I wasn't myself too badly injured I saw many people who were . . . and I think . . . of the look on their faces . . . camps full of these people, their breasts burned and red . . .") or, as we have already heard him describe, of the after-effects: "when I hear about people who die from A-bomb disease or who have operations because of this illness, then I feel that I am the same kind of person as they. . . ."

We are again confronted with the survivor's intimate identification with the dead; we find, in fact, that it tends to pervade the entire *hibakusha* identity. *For survivors seem not only to have experienced the atomic disaster, but to have imbibed it and incorporated it into their beings, including all of its elements of horror, evil, and particularly of death.* They feel compelled virtually to merge

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with those who died, not only with close family members but with a more anonymous group of "the dead." And they judge, and indeed judge harshly, their own behavior and that of other survivors on the basis of the degree of respect it demonstrates toward the dead. They condemn, for instance, the widespread tendency (which, as Japanese, they are at the same time attracted to) of making the anniversary of the bomb an occasion for a gay festival—because they see this as an insult to the dead. Similarly they are extraordinarily suspicious of all individual and group attempts to take any form of action in relationship to the atomic bomb experience, even when done for the apparent purpose of helping survivors or furthering international peace. And they are, if anything, more critical of a survivor prominent in such programs than they are of "outsiders," constantly accusing such a person of "selling his name," "selling the bomb," or "selling Hiroshima." The causes for their suspiciousness are many, including a pervasive Japanese cultural tendency to be critical of the man who shows unconventional initiative (as expressed in the popular saying, "A nail which sticks out will be hammered down"), as well as an awareness of how readily the Hiroshima situation can be "used" by ambitious leaders. But there is an ultimate inner feeling that any such activities and programs are "impure," that they violate the sanctity of the dead. For in relationship to the atomic bomb disaster, it is only the dead who, in the eyes of survivors, remain pure; and any self- or group-assertion can readily be seen as an insult to the dead.

The *hibakusha* identity, then, in a significant symbolic sense, becomes an identity of the dead. Created partly by the particularly intense Japanese capacity for identification, and partly by the special quality of guilt over surviving, it takes shape through the following inner sequence: I almost died; I should have died; I did die, or at least am not really alive; or if I am alive it is impure of me to be so; and anything I do which affirms life is also impure and an insult to the dead, who alone are pure.[21]

Finally, this imposed identity of the atomic bomb survivor is greatly affected by his historical perceptions (whether clear or fragmentary) of the original experience, including its bearing upon the present world situation. The dominant emotion here is the sense of having been made into "guinea pigs," not only because of being studied by research groups (particularly American research groups) interested in determining the effects of delayed radiation, but more fundamentally because of having been victimized by the first "ex-

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periment" (a word many of them use in referring to the event) with nuclear weapons. They are affected by a realization, articulated in various ways, that they have experienced something ultimate in man-made disasters; and at the same time by the feeling that the world's continuing development and testing of the offending weapons deprives their experience of meaning. Thus, while frequently suspicious of organized campaigns against nuclear testing, they almost invariably experience anxiety and rage when such testing is conducted, recall the horrors they have been through, and express bitter frustration at the world's unwillingness to heed their warnings. And we have seen how this anger can at times be converted into thoughts of cosmic retaliation. There remains, of course, a residuum of hostility toward America and Americans for having dropped the bomb, but such hostility has been tempered over the years and softened by Japanese cultural restraints—except, as we have also seen, in individuals who experienced personal losses and blows to self-esteem from which they have been unable to recover. More than in relation to the dropping of the bomb itself (which many said they could understand as a product, however horrible, of war), survivors tend to express hostility in response to what they feel to be callousness toward their plight, or toward those who died, and also toward nuclear weapons testing. Thus, in singling out President Truman as an object of hatred, as some do, it is not only for his having ordered that the bomb be used but also for being assertively unapologetic about having done so.[22]

Survivors tend to be strongly ambivalent about serving as symbols for the rest of the world, and this ambivalence is expressed in Hiroshima's excruciating conflict about whether or not to tear down the so-called "A-bomb dome" (or "peace dome")—the prominent ruins of a dome-shaped exhibition hall located almost directly at the hypocenter. The dome has so far been permitted to stand as a reminder of the experience, and its picture has been featured in countless books and pamphlets dealing, from every point of view, with the A-bomb problem. Three different sets of attitudes on the question were expressed to me. The first: Let it remain permanently so that people (especially outsiders) will remember what we have been through and take steps to prevent repetitions of such disasters. The second: Tear it down for any of the following reasons: it does no good, as no one pays any attention to it; we should adopt the Buddhist attitude of resignation toward the experience; the dome is unauthentic, does not adequately convey what we really experienced,

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and is not in fact directly at the hypocenter; it is too painful a reminder for *us (hibakusha)* to have to look at every day (perhaps the most strongly felt objection); and, we should look ahead to the future rather than back to the unpleasant past. And the third: Let it neither be permitted to stand indefinitely nor torn down, but instead left as it is until it begins to crumble of its own, and then simply removed—a rather ingenious (and perhaps characteristically Japanese) compromise solution to the dilemma, which the city administration has proposed. Most survivors simultaneously feel various conflicting elements of the first and second sets of attitudes, and sometimes of all three. The inner conflict is something like this: For the sake of the dead and of our own sense of worth, we must give our experience significance by enabling it to serve wider moral purposes; but to do so—to be living symbols of massive death—is not only unbearably painful but also tends ultimately to be insincere and to insult, rather than comfort, the dead.

Beyond Hiroshima

We return to the question we raised at the beginning: Does Hiroshima follow the standard patterns delineated for other disasters, or is it—in an experiential sense—a new order of event? We must say first that the usual emotional patterns of disaster [23] are very much present in what I have already described. One can break down the experience into the usual sequence of anticipation, impact, and aftermath; one can recognize such standard individual psychological features as various forms of denial, the "illusion of centrality" (or feeling of each that he was at the very center of the disaster's path),[24] the apathy of the "disaster syndrome" resulting from the sudden loss of the sense of safety and even omnipotence with which we usually conduct our lives, and the conflict between self-preservation and wider human responsibility which culminates in feelings of guilt and shame; even some of the later social and psychological conflicts in the affected population are familiar.[25] Yet we have also seen convincing evidence that the Hiroshima experience,[26] no less in the psychological than in the physical sphere, transcends in many important ways that of the ordinary disaster. I shall try to suggest what I think are some of the important ways in which this is true. And when these special psychological qualities of the experience of the atomic bomb have been more fully elaborated—beyond the preliminary outlines of this paper—I believe that they will, in turn,

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shed light on general disaster patterns, and, of greater importance, on human nature and its vicissitudes at our present historical juncture. We may then come to see Hiroshima for what it was and is: both a direct continuation of the long and checkered history of human struggle, and at the same time a plunge into a new and tragic dimension.

The first of these psychological elements is one we have already referred to, the continuous encounter with death. When we consider the sequence of this encounter—its turbulent onset at the moment the bomb fell, its shocking reappearance in association with delayed radiation effects, and its prolonged expression in the group identity of the doomed and near-dead—we are struck by the fact that it is an interminable encounter. There is, psychologically speaking, no end point, no resolution. This continuous and unresolvable encounter with death, then, is a unique feature of the atomic bomb disaster. Its significance for the individual survivor varies greatly, according to such factors as previous character traits, distance from the hypocenter at the time the bomb fell, fatalities in his immediate family, and many other features of his bomb experience and subsequent life pattern. There is little doubt that most survivors lead reasonably effective personal, family, and occupational lives. But each retains, in greater or lesser degree, emotional elements of this special relationship to death.

In the light of the Hiroshima experience we should also consider the possibility that in other disasters or extreme situations there may also be more significant inner encounters with death, immediate or longer-term, than we have heretofore supposed. Psychiatrists and social scientists investigating these matters are hampered by the same factors which interfere with everyone else's approach to the subject: first, by our inability to imagine death, which deprives us, as psychiatrists, of our usual reliance upon empathy and leaves us always at several psychological removes from experiential understanding; and second, by the elaborate circle of denial—the profound inner need of human beings to make believe that they will never die—in which we too are enclosed. But these universal psychological barriers to thought about death become much greater in relation to a nuclear disaster, where the enormity of the scale of killing and the impersonal nature of the technology are still further impediments to comprehension. No wonder then that the world resists full knowledge of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, and expends relatively little energy in comprehending their full

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significance. And beyond Hiroshima, these same impediments tragically block and distort our perceptions of the general consequences of nuclear weapons. They also raise an important question relevant for the continuous debate about the desirability of preparedness for possible nuclear attacks: If the human imagination is so limited in its capacity to deal with death, and particularly death on a vast scale, can individuals ever be significantly "prepared" for a nuclear disaster?

The Hiroshima experience thus compels us, particularly as psychiatrists, to give more thought to psychic perceptions of death and dying.[27] Here I would particularly stress the psychological importance of identification with the dead—not merely the identification with a particular loved one, as in the case of an ordinary mourning experience, but rather, as we have observed in atomic bomb survivors, a lasting sense of affiliation with death itself. This affiliation creates in turn an enduring element, both within, and standing in judgment of, the self—a process closely related to the experience of shame.[28] Also of great importance is the *style of dying*, real or symbolic, the way in which one anticipates death and the significance with which one can relate oneself to this anticipation. Among those I interviewed in Hiroshima, many found solace in the characteristically Japanese (partially Buddhist) attitude of resignation, but virtually none were able to build a framework of meaning around their overwhelming immersion in death. However philosophically they might accept the horrors of war, they had an underlying sense of having been victimized and experimented upon by a horrible device, all to no avail in a world which has derived no profit from their sufferings.

And this sense of purposeless death suggests the second special feature of the atomic disaster: *a vast breakdown of faith in the larger human matrix supporting each individual life, and therefore a loss of faith (or trust) in the structure of existence.* This is partly due to the original exposure to death and destruction on such an extraordinary scale, an "end-of-the-world" experience resembling the actualization of the wildest psychotic delusion; partly due to the shame and guilt patterns which, initiated during the experience itself, turned into longer-lasting preoccupations with human selfishness (preoccupations expressed to me by a large number of survivors); and partly due to the persisting sense of having encountered an ultimate form of *man-made* destruction. Phrased in another way, the atomic bomb destroyed the complex equilibrium which ordi-

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narily mediates and integrates the great variety of cultural patterns and individual emotions which maintain any society, large or small. One must, of course, take into account here the disruption accompanying the extensive social change which has occurred all over Japan immediately following World War II; and one must also recognize the impressive re-emergence of Hiroshima as an actively functioning city. Nonetheless, this profound loss of confidence in human social ties remains within survivors as a derivative of the atomic bomb experience.

A third psychological feature of particular importance in the Hiroshima disaster is that which I have called *psychological closure.* Resembling the psychological defense of denial, and the behavioral state of apathy, psychological closure is nonetheless a distinctive pattern of response to overwhelmingly threatening stimuli. Within a matter of moments, as we have seen in the examples cited, a person may not only cease to react to these threatening stimuli but in so doing, equally suddenly, violate the most profound values and taboos of his culture and his personal life. Though a highly adaptive response—and indeed very often a means of emotional self-preservation—it can vary in its proportions to the extent at times of almost resembling a psychotic mechanism. Since psychological closure, at least in the form it took in Hiroshima, is specifically related to the problem of death, it raises the question of the degree to which various forms of psychosis might also be responses to the symbolic fear of death or bodily annihilation.

The psychological closure created by the Hiroshima disaster is not limited to the victims themselves, but extends to those who, like myself, attempt to study the event. Thus, although I had had previous research experience with people who had been exposed to extreme situations, I found that at the beginning of my work in Hiroshima the completion of each interview would leave me profoundly shocked and emotionally spent. But as the work progressed and I heard more and more of these accounts, their effects upon me greatly lessened. My awareness of my scientific function—my listening carefully for specific kinds of information and constantly formulating categories of response—enhanced the psychological closure necessary to me for the task of conducting the research (necessary also for a wide variety of human efforts which deal with problems in which death is a factor). It is the vast ramification of psychological closure, rather than the phenomenon itself, that is unique to nuclear disaster, so much so that all who become in any way involved in the

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problem find themselves facing a near-automatic tendency to close themselves off from what is most disturbing in the evidence at hand.

Finally, there is the question of *psychological mastery of the nuclear disaster experience.* Central to this problem is the task of dealing with feelings of shame and guilt of the most profound nature: the sense that one has, however unwittingly, participated in this total human breakdown in which, in Martin Buber's words "the human order of being is injured."[29] That such feelings of self-condemnation—much like those usually termed "existential guilt"—should be experienced by the *victims* of a nuclear disaster is perhaps the most extreme of its many tragic ironies. Faced with the task of dealing with this form of guilt, with the problem of re-establishing trust in the human order, and with the continuing sense of encounter with death, the survivor of a nuclear disaster needs nothing less than a new identity in order to come to terms with his post-disaster world. And once more extending the principle beyond the victim's experience, it may not be too much to say that those who permit themselves to confront the consequences of such a disaster, past or future, are also significantly changed in the process. Since these consequences now inhabit our world, more effective approaches to the problem of human survival may well depend upon our ability to grasp the nature of the fundamentally new relationship to existence which we all share.

References

1. Portions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Philadelphia, December, 1962. The work it describes was done in Hiroshima from April to September of 1962, 17 years after the dropping of the atomic bomb. I am profoundly grateful to a large number of friends and colleagues from the various divisions of Hiroshima University (particularly the Research Institute for Nuclear Medicine and Biology), the Hiroshima City Office, and many other groups for their generous assistance in the extensive arrangements necessary for the work; to Mr. Kaoru Ogura and Miss Kyoko Komatsu for their dedicated and skillful research assistance during all of its phases; and to Dr. L. Takeo Doi for stimulating suggestions later on concerning psychological formulations. Responsibility for conclusions is, of course, entirely my own.

2. Studies of the effects of ionizing radiation were instituted by Japanese medical and civilian teams within days after the bomb was dropped, with Dr. Masao Tsuzuki of Tokyo Imperial University, playing a leading role.

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American medical groups began their work in early September of 1945, and became consolidated in the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan. Studies of longer-term effects of radiation have been conducted at the medical departments and research institutes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Universities. The largest research program on delayed radiation effects is being carried out at the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an affiliate of the United States National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, under a grant from the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, administered with the cooperation of the Japanese National Institute of Health of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Much of the extensive literature on radiation effects has been summarized in the following: Ashley W. Oughterson and Shields Warren, *Medical Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956); J. W. Hollingsworth, "Delayed Radiation Effects in Survivors of the Atomic Bombings," *New England Journal of Medicine,* Vol. 263 (September 8, 1960), pp. 381-487; "Bibliography of Publications Concerning the Effects of Nuclear Explosions," *Journal of the Hiroshima Medical Association,* Vol. 14, No. 10 (1961); and in the series of Technical Reports of the ABCC and the various issues of the *Proceedings of the Research Institute for Medicine and Biology* of Hiroshima University, and of the *Hiroshima Journal of Medical Sciences.*

3. There has, however, been some preliminary sociological and psychological research in these areas. See S. Nakano, "Genbaku Eikyo no Shakaigakuteki Chōsa" (Sociological Study of Atomic Bomb Effects), *Daigakujinkai Kenkyuronshu I, Betsuzuri* (April, 1954), and "Genbaku to Hiroshima," (The Atomic Bomb and Hiroshima), in *Shinshu Hiroshima Shi-shi* (*Newly Revised History of Hiroshima City*) Hiroshima Shiyakusho, 1951; Y. Kubo, "Data about the Suffering and Opinion of the A-bomb Sufferers," *Psychologia,* Vol. 4 (March, 1961), pp. 56-59 (in English); and "A Study of A-bomb Sufferers' Behavior in Hiroshima: A Socio-psychological Research on A-bomb and A-energy," *Japanese Journal of Psychology,* Vol. 22 (1952), pp. 103-110 (English abstract); T. Misao, "Characteristics in Abnormalities Observed in Atom-bombed Survivors," *Journal of Radiation Research,* Vol. 2 (September, 1961), pp. 85-97 (in English), in which various psychosomatic factors are dealt with; Irving L. Janis, *Air War and Emotional Stress* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), particularly chapters 1-3. Additional studies of social aspects of the atomic bomb problem, under the direction of K. Shimizu, are now under way at the Hiroshima University Research Institute for Nuclear Medicine and Biology.

4. Robert J. Lifton, "Youth and History: Individual Change in Postwar Japan," *Dædalus,* Vol. 91 (1962), pp. 172-197; and "Individual Patterns in Historical Change: Imagery of Japanese Youth," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, New York, December 8, 1962.

5. Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961).

6. *Hibakusha* is a coined word which has no exact English equivalent but

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means: one (or those) who has (have) experienced, sustained, or undergone the (atomic) bomb. It conveys a little bit more than merely having encountered the bomb, and a little bit less than having experienced definite physical injury from it. *Higaisha,* another word frequently used, means "one who has sustained injury" or simply "victim." But the words are frequently used more or less interchangeably, and both in translation are sometimes rendered as "victim(s)" or "sufferer(s)" from the atomic bomb. Thus, the English word "survivors" is in no sense an exact translation of either *hibakusha* or *higaisha,* but rather a means of designating in a single word persons who fit into the category of *hibakusha.* While *hibakusha* has come to convey many things in popular usage, it also is employed to represent the four groups of people covered by the official legislation on medical benefits for those exposed to the effects of the bomb: those who at the time of the bomb were within the city limits then existing for Hiroshima, an area extending from the bomb's hypocenter to a distance of 4000 (and in some places up to 5000) meters; those who were not in the city at the time, but within 14 days entered a designated area extending to about 2000 meters from the hypocenter; those who were engaged in some form of aid to, or disposal of, bomb victims at various stations then set up; and those who were *in utero,* and whose mothers fit into any of the first three categories. (See "Genbaku Iryōhō no Kaise Jishi ni tsuite" [Concerning the Enforcement of the Revision of the Atomic Bomb Medical Treatment Law of August 1, 1960], published by the Hiroshima City Office). For studying physical aspects of delayed radiation effects, such factors as distance from the hypocenter and degree of protection from radiation (by buildings, clothing, etc.) are crucial, and from this standpoint a large number of those designated as *hibakusha* had little or no exposure to significant amounts of radiation. For psychological and social effects, these factors—and particularly that of distance from the hypocenter—are also of great importance, but one cannot make the same relatively sharp correlations regarding what is, or is not, significant exposure. I shall deal more with this problem in subsequent publications, and also with some of the special responses of the selected group of survivors; but in this paper I shall emphasize general psychological themes which apply, in greater or lesser degree, to virtually all *hibakusha.*

7. The one exception was an interview with a European priest who had been in Hiroshima at the time of the bomb, my only non-Japanese research subject.

8. It was, of course, inevitable that, after 17 years, elements of selectivity and distortion would enter into these recollections. But I was impressed with the vividness of recall, with the willingness of people, once a reasonable degree of rapport had been established, to express themselves quite freely about painful, and often humiliating, details; and with the over-all agreement contained in these descriptions, with each other and with various published accounts, concerning what took place generally and how people behaved. For corroborating published accounts, see, for instance: M. Hachiya (Warner Wells, ed., trans.), *Hiroshima Diary* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955); T. Nagai, *We of Nagasaki* (New York: Duell,

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Sloan and Pearce, 1951); H. Agawa, *Devil's Heritage,* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1957); A. Osada (compiler), *Children of the A-Bomb* (New York: Putnam, 1963); Robert Yungk, *Children of the Ashes* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (New York: Bantam Books, 1959); Robert Trumbull, *Nine Who Survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1957); S. Imahori, *Gensuibaku Jidai* (The Age of the A- and H-bomb) (Hiroshima: 1959); Y. Matsuzaka, ed. *Hiroshima Genbaku Iryō-shi* (*Medical History of the Hiroshima A-Bomb*), (Hiroshima, 1961); Y. Ota, *Shikabane no Machi* (Town of Corpses) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1955); and the large number of back issues of the *Chugoku Shimbun,* Hiroshima's leading newspaper, which include accounts of personal A-bomb experiences.

9. For estimates of damage, casualties, and mortality, see Oughterson and Warren, *op. cit., Hiroshima Genbaku Iryō-shi, op. cit.,* M. Ishida and I. Matsubayashi, "An Analysis of Early Mortality Rates Following the Atomic Bomb—Hiroshima," ABCC Technical Report 20-61, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (undated); S. Nagaoka, *Hiroshima Under Atomic Bomb Attack* (Peace Memorial Museum, Hiroshima, undated); and "Hiroshima: Official Brochure Produced by Hiroshima City Hall" (based largely upon previously mentioned sources). Concerning mortality, Oughterson and Warren estimate 64,000, believed to be accurate within ± 10 per cent; K. Shimizu (in *Hiroshima Genbaku Iryō-shi*) estimates "more than 200,000," the figure which is accepted by the City of Hiroshima; Nagaoka estimates "more than 240,000"; the official estimate is usually given as 78,150; and one frequently sees estimates of "more than 100,000." Contributing to this great divergence in figures are such things as varying techniques of calculation, differing estimates of the number of people in Hiroshima at the moment the bomb fell, the manner in which military fatalities are included, how long afterward (and after which census count) the estimate was made, and undoubtedly other human factors outside the realm of statistical science. The obvious conclusion is that no one really knows, nor, considering the degree of disorganization interfering with collection of accurate population data, is the problem ever likely to be fully solved.

10. These "fireballs" have no relationship to the fireball of the atomic bomb previously mentioned, and are here being compared with ordinary fires caused by the bomb.

11. In such profound emotional experiences, feelings of shame and guilt become intermixed and virtually indistinguishable. In cases like this one, the guilty inner fantasy is likely to be, "I am responsible for their (his, her) death," or even, "I killed them." The shameful fantasy is likely to be, "I should have saved them, or at least done more for them." But these are closely related, and in mentioning either shame or guilt in the remainder of the paper, I assume that the other is present as well. See reference 28.

12. See Oughterson and Warren, as well as other sources mentioned in reference 2. Oughterson and Warren demonstrate statistically the relationship between incidence of radiation effects and distance from the hypocenter—the great majority of cases occurring within the 2000 meter radius—but

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these scientific distinctions were, of course, completely unknown at the time, and even after becoming known they have not eliminated survivors' fears of later effects.

13. See Hollingsworth, *op. cit.*, and other sources mentioned in reference 2 for discussions of delayed radiation effects and bibliographies of work done on the subject. Concerning the problem of leukemia, see also A. B. Brill, M. Tomonaga, and R. M. Heyssel, "Leukemia in Man Following Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," *Annals of Internal Medicine,* Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 590-609, and S. Watanabe, "On the Incidence of Leukemias in Hiroshima During the Past Fifteen Years From 1946-1960," *Journal of Radiation Research,* Vol. 2 (1961), pp. 131-140 (in English).

14. The most extensive work on these genetic problems has been done by James V. Neel and W. O. Schull. See their "Radiation and Sex Ratio in Man: Sex Ratio among Children of Atomic Bombings Suggests Induced Sex-Linked Lethal Mutations," *Science,* Vol. 128 (1958), pp. 343-348; and *The Effect of Exposure to the Atomic Bomb on Pregnancy Termination in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,* Washington, D. C., National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council (Government Printing Office, 1956). Belief in the possibility of an increase in various forms of congenital malformations in offspring of survivors has been stimulated by the work of I. Hayashi at Nagasaki University, reported in his paper: "Pathological Research on Influences of Atomic Bomb Exposure upon Fetal Development," *Research in the Effects and Influences of the Nuclear Bomb Test Explosions* (in English, undated), though Dr. Hayashi, in summarizing his material, cautions that "one hesitates to give any concrete statement about the effect of the atomic bomb radiation [upon] the growth of fetal life, based on the data available in this paper."

15. These borderline complaints, as detected by the Cornell Medical Index (T. Misao, *op. cit.*) are consistently more frequent in *hibakusha* than in non-*hibakusha*. The cultural concern with bodily symptoms is no more than an intensifying influence, and generally similar psychosomatic anxieties would undoubtedly be manifest in other cultures under similar conditions.

16. The following discussion of the question of medical benefits is based upon regulations published by the Hiroshima City Office (especially "Genbaku Iryōhō no Kaise . . ." *op. cit.*), as well as upon extensive discussions of the problems involved with officials responsible for administering the law and physicians who deal with its every day medical and psychological ramifications. My concern here is to point up these problematic areas as reverberations of the atomic bomb experience, rather than to pass judgment on policies or programs.

17. Censorship on matters relating to the atomic bomb and its various effects was imposed almost immediately by the American Occupation; fears of retaliation were undoubtedly an important factor, though it is likely that over the years other concerns and influences affected this policy. Reviewing Japanese perceptions of the censorship (see the later [October 6 to December 7, 1959] series of articles in the *Chugoku Shimbun* on the history of

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postwar Hiroshima literature; S. Imahori, *Gensuibaku Jidai, op. cit.;* and Robert Jungk, *Children of the Ashes, op. cit.*) one gains the impression that its implementation was often inconsistent but sufficient to be felt keenly by writers, and even to interfere with adequate dissemination of much needed medical knowledge about the A-bomb; that descriptions of the A-bomb experience—reportorial, literary, and ideological—nonetheless made their appearance during the early postwar years; that restrictions diminished sufficiently during the last two years of the Occupation for writers to deal freely with the subject; but that the full revelation of the horrors associated with the atomic bomb did not occur for the majority of Japanese until the end of the Occupation in 1952 with the circulation of a now famous issue of the *Asahi Graphic* (a weekly pictorial of Japan's leading newspaper) in which these horrors were vividly depicted.

18. Leukemia, despite its disturbing increase in incidence, remains an infrequent cause of death (Hollingsworth, quoting Heyssel, reports that, up to 1960, 122 cases of leukemia had been discovered in Hiroshima residents); and where death is caused by other conditions it is extremely difficult to assess the influence of radiation effects. But the individual survivor will often automatically associate the A-bomb Hospital with radiation effects, and the situation is further complicated by the medical and legal complexities already mentioned, and by the generally sensitive psychological atmosphere of Hiroshima.

19. Nakano, "Genbaku to Hiroshima," *op. cit.*, gives evidence for the lower socioeconomic position of *hibakusha,* and discusses other social and psychological problems they face. See also Imahori, *op. cit.*, and Jungk, *op. cit.*

20. Survivors often marry each other, and frequently feel that by doing so they are likely to be best understood. But some express a strong preference to marry a non-*hibakusha,* and claim that by marrying one another they increase their possibilities for giving birth to abnormal children; they also here reflect an urge to transcend through marriage, rather than intensify, the *hibakusha* identity.

21. I have in this section barely suggested the Japanese cultural influences—particularly the tendency toward a sense of continuity with the dead—which affect survivors' reactions. These cultural influences are important and I shall attempt to say more about them in later publications. But I believe that the close identification with the dead which I have described, like the psychosomatic patterns discussed in the previous section, should not be thought of as exclusively "Japanese"; rather I would claim that it is also related to the nature of the disaster, although expressed in a particular (Japanese) cultural style. For Japanese attitudes about purity, see Lifton, *Youth and History, op. cit.*, and for relationship of attitudes toward death and purity, see Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

22. These attitudes are related to Japanese cultural tendencies to stress human considerations, including apologetic sympathy where this is felt indicated, rather than more abstract determinations of right and wrong or matters of

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individual conscience. But again it is by no means certain that in similar circumstances, even in cultures with a reverse emphasis, similar hostilities might not occur.

23. Compilations of the general literature on disaster are to be found in: George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapmen, *Man and Society in Disaster* (New York: Basic Books, 1962); Martha Wolfenstein, *Disaster* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957); "Human Behavior in Disaster: A New Field of Social Research," *The Journal of Social Issues,* Volume 10, No. 3 (entire issue); *Field Studies of Disaster Behavior, An Inventory* (Disaster Research Group, National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Washington, 1961); and L. Bates, C. W. Fogleman and Vernon J. Parenton, *The Social and Psychological Consequences of a National Disaster: A Longitudinal Study of Hurricane Audrey* (National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Washington, D. C., 1963).

24. It is to those who were several thousand meters from the hypocenter, including many beyond the outskirts of the city, that the term "illusion of centrality" and its psychological mechanisms (as described in the literature on disaster) apply. Those who were closer, in terms of effects experienced, were sufficiently central to the disaster for the term "illusion" to be inappropriate.

25. As in other recent disaster studies (see, for instance, Bates et al., *op. cit.*) I did not (from discussions with medical, psychiatric, and other authorities) have the impression of a large increase of severe mental illness, such as psychosis, at the time of the disaster or immediately afterwards; in view of the limited available statistical data it would be extremely difficult to study this problem, and I did not attempt to do so. My findings differ, however, from those of other disaster studies in the extent of the psychosocial consequences I encountered which, although emotionally profound, are not of a variety classifiable as "mental illness." This important difference stems mainly, I believe, from special features of the atomic bomb experience, but may also be related to variations in approach and method.

26. I have in this paper dealt only with Hiroshima as it was there that I conducted the research, although I did have the opportunity to make briefer observations in Nagasaki as well. In both cities there is a widely held impression that general reactions to the atomic bomb—mass media dissemination of its effects, peace movements, and even fears and concerns of *hibakusha*—are considerably more intense in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki. I believe this is true, but only in degree, and not in the more or less absolute sense in which it is sometimes depicted. There are a number of factors which have contributed to this difference in intensity, and to Hiroshima's assuming more of a symbolic role for both *hibakusha* and outsiders: Hiroshima was the first to be struck by the new weapon; the bomb fell in the center of Hiroshima, a flat city made up almost entirely of flimsy structures, so that the entire city was virtually devastated, while in Nagasaki the bomb fell at some distance from the center and destruction was limited by the hilly terrain so that the greater part of the city (including a somewhat larger number of concrete structures) was left standing, and casualties and

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general effects were not so great despite the fact that the Nagasaki bomb was of greater explosive power; Nagasaki could therefore more readily resume some of its previous identity as a city—which included a unique history of having served for several centuries as Japan's main contact with the Western world—while Hiroshima had to recreate itself almost entirely, and without the benefit of a comparable tradition; and Hiroshima is closer to Tokyo and more sensitive to intellectual and ideological currents stemming from Japan's dominant city.

27. The psychiatric and psychological literature leaves much to be desired in its treatment of the subject of death, but recent studies which have made significant contributions to this most difficult of areas include: Herman Feifel, *The Meaning of Death* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); K. R. Eissler, *The Psychiatrist and the Dying Patient* (New York: International Universities Press, 1955); and Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959). Two interesting reports of work in progress are: Thomas P. Hackett and Avery D. Weisman, "Human Reactions to the Imminence of Death"; and Claus B. Bahnson, "Emotional Reactions to Internally and Externally Derived Threat of Annihilation"—both of which were presented at the Symposium on Human Reactions to the Threat of Impending Disaster at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Philadelphia. There has also been an expanding literature on the psychological barriers, mostly concerned with death, which impair approaches to nuclear problems. See, for instance: *Socio-Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War,* forthcoming report of the Committee on Social Issues of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry; Jerome D. Frank, "Breaking the Thought Barrier: Psychological Challenges of the Nuclear Age," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 23 (1960), pp. 245-266; and Lester Grinspoon, "The Unacceptability of Disquieting Facts," presented at the AAAS Symposium on Human Reactions, etc., Philadelphia, 1962.

28. For discussions of symbolization of the self see Robert E. Nixon, "An Approach to the Dynamics of Growth in Adolescence," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 24 (1961), pp. 18-31; and Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: Mentor Books, 1948), p. 111. For the relevance of shame to this kind of process, see Helen M. Lynd, *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958).

29. "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 20 (1957), p. 120. In attributing guilt feelings to Japanese, here and elsewhere in this article, I am following recent critiques of the concept of "shame cultures" and "guilt cultures": Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, *Shame and Guilt* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1953); and more specifically in relationship to Japan, George DeVos, "The Relation of Guilt Toward Parents to Achievement and Arranged Marriage Among Japanese," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 23 (1960), pp. 287-301. See also Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (W. W. Norton: New York, 1950), pp. 222-226. Feelings of shame and guilt, at their most profound level—their psychological meeting ground—as I suggest below (following Buber, Lynd, Erikson, and my own previous

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work) can be overcome only through a change in one's relationship to the world, and can be under certain conditions creatively utilized on behalf of achieving such a change. But my impression regarding the atomic bomb experience was that this constructive utilization was the exception rather than the rule, since there was so much that tended to block it and to cause feelings of shame and guilt to be retained in their negative, unresolved form.

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AMITAI ETZIONI

European Unification and Perspectives on Sovereignty

THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES of European unification since World War II lend new substance to time-worn debates: Will nations ever willingly relinquish national sovereignty and allow it to be pooled? How can such pooling be accelerated? Which is the more effective approach to unification, the formation of new institutions or reliance on the gradual transformation of old sociopolitical processes? Who will initiate unification, people or governments? In what molds will unification be best advanced—international or supranational? Finally, is unification destined to be regional or global? To each of these queries the European Economic Community posits its own answers, some new, some merely adaptations of tried schemes.[1]

One might question the value of studying this single case of a still-evolving experiment in unification. Membership in the Community remains unsettled and its future uncertain. Will it be merged into the larger union of the Atlantic Community, or will it become a third force, a bloc unto itself? Will European unification continue to grow, or will the movement stagnate or regress? If the unification proceeds, what final form will it take, that of a federal United States of Europe or a more loosely bound *Europe des Patries*?

We must set aside these unresolved issues and focus attention on the developments of the past five years, for much can be learned from the experiences of the European Community. It has found new avenues of approach, and its success reveals gaps in previously accepted analytical schemes.

Can Sovereignty Be Pooled?

There is little disagreement among political scientists that the nation-state *per se* is obsolescent.[2] The Depression of the thirties cruelly showed the consequences of each nation's trying to solve its

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economic problems on its own. More recently, the creation of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear weapons has undermined the confidence in national security. Many remedies have been proposed to restore the sense of security and to safeguard the prosperity of the populace. Some plans have been tried, including military alliances such as NATO and international organizations with objectives ranging from the specific functions of the International Monetary Fund to the broad aims of collective security under the United Nations. Other much discussed proposals such as inter-bloc arms control, general and complete disarmament, and world government remain untested.

Two contrasting theories underlie these varying approaches. One contends that the nation-state cannot or should not be replaced, that national security and prosperity can be provided by augmenting the nation-state. While one nation alone cannot defend itself, fifteen nations joined in NATO may be able to provide a common defense. If Britain can no longer maintain banking services for the international community, eighty-two nations cooperating in the International Monetary Fund may succeed. Ultimate sovereignty rests with the nation-state. The staff of these international organizations is not empowered to make decisions without the consent of the member-nations. National sovereignty is safeguarded by two major provisions. One is the veto, the requirement of unanimity on all major decisions. The other is that most programs of these international organizations are presented in the form of recommendations; they are not binding and cannot be enforced when disregarded by the members. International organizations established on these lines serve primarily to coordinate the efforts of those members who prove willing to cooperate; and to the extent they wish to do so.

Opponents of this view hold that such inter-nation cooperation is inadequate to the task of maintaining peace. War, they suggest, is inherent in the very nature of the nation-state. World order will not be assured until the nation-state is replaced by a world-state with a world court for peaceful settlement of conflicts, a world police to enforce order, a world legislature to establish law, and a world executive to order the police.[3]

The arguments between these opposing views focus on the question of which is more feasible. One approach requires pooling national sovereignty, the other does not. Hence, we must first determine whether sovereignty can be pooled, to what degree and at

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what pace. Until recently the facts of history upheld the view that schemes for pooling were futile Utopian dreams. The modern-day citizen views his identity in terms of his nation, be he American, French, or Ghanian. National allegiance marks *the* dividing line between "we" and "they." It is for our country that we willingly kill and agree to die. The nation is the final arbiter of all conflicts between individual citizens, social groups, and regions. History has seen many attempts to establish "universal" states, but the polities which were successfully merged largely preceded the ascension of nationalism and sanctification of the state by it. At first, unification itself was often an expression of nationalist sentiment and did not seek to submerge the nationalist wave. But *once transfixed by nationalism, no two polities were conjoined as one.* Federalists and one-worlders who hold that mankind needs a world-state, that augmenting nation-states will not suffice, cannot point to one instance in which *national* sovereignty was pooled. Pre-World War II history was unkind to the Federalists and ignored the one-worlders.

Since World War II, however, there have been several attempts to pool sovereignty in Europe. Different modes were tried with varying success, but it was not until the European Community was formed that pooling of national sovereignty actually seemed feasible and reawakened hopes of eventual unification. In 1951 NATO extended the bounds of its traditional alliance and organized SHAPE, an integrated coalition army under joint command. Each nation assigned military units to the alliance and consented to place them under a single, international command, free to issue orders directly for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.[4] The same year saw the birth of a broader plan, the European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC, or the Schuman Plan, provided that a supranational organ, the High Authority, would reach decisions through weighted majority vote and its resolutions would be binding on all member states.[5] The High Authority was given the power to issue instructions directly to corporations in member states. The ECSC's Court of Justice could hear suits of one member state against another, of a corporation in one state against a corporation in another, of the High Authority itself against any one state. They were to be treated as if all member states were units in a single federation. Moreover, the court could force compliance by levying fines and by enforcing payment through the local police if a fine were not voluntarily paid. The national government concerned did not have to be consulted.

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The Economic Commission of the European Economic Community (the Executive Commission of the European Community) is patterned after the High Authority, but its power is much more encompassing. The High Authority of the ECSC had to confine its activities to the steel and coal industries; the EEC's Commission is empowered to affect whole economies. It can not only arrange removal of barriers between its members (France, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries), but is also able to coordinate their economic policies to meet problems of recession, inflation, economic growth and balance of payments in trade with nonmember countries. The Commission draws plans for foreign aid in the name of the European Community and represents its members in international trade negotiations. Like the High Authority, it can deal directly with corporations within member states, and its fines can be collected by the local police. By taxing imports from nonmember countries, the EEC is able to finance subsidies to farmers within the Community, gradually replacing national subsidy programs.

The European Community has commanded more attention than NATO or the ECSC as a method of pooling national sovereignty, for its scope and prospects are more encouraging. NATO's sphere of action is limited. The military units committed to SHAPE (excepting those of West Germany) represent but a fraction of each member-nation's national security force. The United States provides more than 97 per cent of NATO's nuclear striking force, and control of this vast power remains largely in the hands of this one nation. Other states have failed to provide the divisions they pledged, and Britain and France even withdrew some forces. Similarly, the ECSC's activities are circumscribed by its commitment to two single industries, however important they may be. Moreover, the High Authority has proved weak in forcing compliance by member-nations. In 1958 a coal glut in Europe tested its supranational power when Belgium, for one, ignored the High Authority's resolution and neither closed its inefficient coal mines nor removed protective tariffs.[6] The European Community, on the other hand, has proved quite effective. In its first four years it concerned itself principally with industrial products. But by 1962 the Community had also formulated a common agricultural policy. The EEC, unlike NATO and the ECSC, once initiated has moved steadily forward from success to success: increasing trade among the countries, per capita income, and productivity. Moreover, the Economic Commission con-

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tinues to expand its supranational power, while that of the High Authority of the ECSC has been weakened by its growing dependence on national governments. It is the success of the dynamic European Community in pooling national sovereignty which excites the imagination. Its enthusiastic supporters now proffer real hopes of a United States of Europe.

The federation of Europe is, however, a distant goal. The continued growth and success of the Economic Community is, in fact, not assured. It faces the economic difficulties of a declining rate of growth, increasing resistance of interest groups (farmers, miners, small businessmen, and national bureaucrats), political conflicts over the proposed entry of Britain, and sharp divisions over the final form of the Community's political institutions. But while the future of the Community lies hidden, due note must be taken of the fact that between 1958 and 1963, for the very first time since the advent of nationalism, an attempt at pooling has proved successful. The question remains: How far will it proceed and at what pace will the advance continue? But no longer can it be said that pooling of sovereignty is impossible and that supranational union is an unrealizable goal. It is true that political observers may have reversed their stance too abruptly and completely. The stocks of federalism may have soared too high, those of "mere" multi-national cooperation suffered too sharp a decline. But the need for reconsideration of both views cannot be denied. They must be reviewed in the light of the experience of the European Economic Community.

To Climb or to Jump?

Even among those who favor pooling sovereignty, there is sharp disagreement about how it may best be effected. Unifiers-in-a-hurry propose multiform plans; the most popular short cut is via constitutional assembly. Representatives of nations are expected to hold lengthy sessions to draft a political scheme.

The gradualists also offer numerous proposals, all of which hold it utterly unrealistic to expect nations to relinquish their sovereignty entirely. Pooling of sovereignty, they insist, can be realized only gradually as world community evolves, though steps can be taken to encourage its growth. Each advance can be matched by establishment of appropriate political institutions. The first forward paces will be most difficult. The supranational unification of each sector will spur integration of yet untapped areas. If, for example,

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the armies of two nations are joined, a need will arise for standardization of ammunition, the signal system, combat plans, and supply provisions. This, in turn, will demand coordinated planning on such a large scale that the creation of a joint staff will be inevitable. Such a chain of events is referred to as the *spill-over* effect.[7] It holds that, since nations are socio-political *systems*, unification of any one sector of national life will affect many others and can trigger unification on a broader scale. Conversely, the gradualists maintain, if one tries to transform all sectors simultaneously one cannot benefit from the spill-over effect. There is, instead, greater likelihood of joint resistance from all sectors. In short, it may prove easier to climb than to jump.

The experience of European unification is particularly illuminating, for both approaches were tried. The most ambitious goal, a United States of Europe or "Federation Now," was the avowed aim of the 1947 International Committee for a United Europe, of the 1948 Hague Congress, and of the European Movement that emerged from the Congress. The Hague Congress proposed a European Assembly empowered to act as Europe's parliament and to present "other measures designed to unite Western Europe." The conferees hoped to establish a European federation soon. Their approach yielded the Council of Europe, probably the most anemic of all postwar European organizations. It was "little more than an experiment" and "a hybrid between a very loose-unit international parliament with purely advisory powers and a dignified international forum." [8]

A similarly ambitious plan of the early fifties for military and political union of six countries under the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) never got off the ground. Other less ambitious military organizations, such as the Western European Union and NATO, failed to generate significant political or economic spill-over, or even to initiate extensive military integration, even in periods of intense Cold War.

A customs union posits much less ambitious goals than military or political unification. It does not demand revision of the institutional and ideological core of the nation-state or of its constitution, government, and parliament. While it may ultimately lead to comprehensive unification, the illusion of sovereignty can rest unharmed until spill-over has triggered change in many other spheres and each economy has adapted to unification. We can see how this happened

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as the European Economic Community developed, and in the realm of ideology, "European" sentiments gradually emerged. In the institutional sphere there was an increase in the power of the Economic Commission, while in the political sector, supranational interest groups were formed.

The first postwar attempt at economic unification was not through the EEC but through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The program of the OEEC was less ambitious than that of the political unions, but it still aimed too high in terms of tasks and membership. It proposed economic cooperation and integration among sixteen countries: some nations partially devastated by war (the Netherlands and Norway), some that had suffered less damage (Denmark and Belgium), and some that remained unharmed (Sweden and Switzerland). The OEEC, which had power over all major economic sectors involved in trade among member countries, hoped to forge sweeping economic coordination. While the organization did not lead directly to European unification, it did achieve some limited economic unification in liberalizing intercountry trade and in ordering monetary affairs through the European Payments Union that it formed. But it did not lead to broad unification.

The first unification plan that succeeded in triggering spill-over processes was the ECSC. It grew from the more limited ambition to free the trade of two industries, coal and steel, rather than to regulate that of whole economies. It differed from the OEEC not only in narrowing its aims, but also in offering membership to fewer countries. Moreover, the ECSC was a native European child, while the OEEC was conceived in the U. S.; participation was a condition for receiving funds under the Marshall Plan. Proponents of the Schuman Plan did not talk about a grand transformation in international affairs; yet they laid the groundwork for the more comprehensive programs of the European Economic Community. The ECSC's success supports our contention that there is a negative relationship between the ambitiousness of aim and the success of programs for supranational unification.

Six years after the formation of the ECSC, the founders of the EEC set their sights beyond the ECSC's achievement, for the international picture had changed and the time was ripe for a more comprehensive scheme. The EEC's strategists still adhered to the gradualist line and began by partitioning their goals. At closest range were the immediate, visible aims that could be reached with

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relative ease. Beyond, less emphasized, were more remote, less accessible aims. We cannot replay history to prove that, had the long-range goals of the EEC been clear to the Six when the Treaty of Rome was ratified, several of the parliaments might never have ratified it. But we can point out that those who consciously devised the EEC were keenly aware of the need to aim lower in order to score higher. Their efforts to form the more ambitious European Defense Community and European Political Community had just failed, and they realized that the movement for European integration could not withstand many more failures. This time they aimed at goals within range and hoped the spill-over process would bring about wide-scale unification. They began with a customs union and worked toward integration of economic policy, hoping for eventual political unification.[9]

Thus, the European postwar unification efforts suggest that attempts to "jump" into federation are likely to fail and that the gradualist approach is more successful. It does not follow that the gradualist way will inevitably succeed in bringing about a federal union in Europe or that it can be effectively applied in other regions, under different circumstances. But the facts of history demonstrate that at least in Europe, under the given conditions, what seemed like a short-cut was in reality a dead end and what seemed at first glance to be the long way around, turned out to be the shorter route.

Institutional or Social Development?

The variance in pace of approach between gradualist and institutionalists is paralleled by divergent views of the means of achieving unification. The institutional approach expects that unification be framed by Constitutional Assemblies making charter revisions and erecting such new institutions as a supranational legislature. These institutions would serve as levers for larger-scale socio-political change. A supranational legislature, for instance, is expected to call attention to the world or regional community and to break the nationalist spell. The opponents of this view favor relying on and helping along socio-political processes and assert that institutions cannot exist in a vacuum and that they must rest on a framework of shared values, social bonds, and common interests. When this foundation is lacking, nations will be unwilling to form joint institutions, and those that are created will be ineffectual. The ful-

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crum of change, they maintain, must be socio-political process, not institutional inventiveness.

These two approaches were recently illustrated in regard to the United Nations. The United World Federalists stress the need for charter revision. They wish to abolish the veto in the Security Council and grant each country a weighted vote determined by the size of its population. These changes, they suggest, would strengthen each nation's commitment to the U.N. The removal of the veto would end the sense of futility created by persistent blocking of vital resolutions by a single negative vote. Weighted representation would assure the citizens of larger countries that they would not be ruled by the smaller nations. On the other hand, the American Association for the United Nations stresses the need to strengthen existing commitments to the U.N. before charter changes can be introduced. It believes the U.N. is only as strong as its member-states allow it to be and that institutional change will not be effective until its members are more deeply committed to the U.N.

The European Parliamentary Assembly is another stage for this same debate. The Assembly, comprising members of the parliaments of each of the six EEC countries, is a multi-nation forum where issues before the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC are regularly examined. The Assembly does not enact specific legislation, but it has the power to dismiss the Executive Commission of the EEC should it deem necessary. The institutionalists ask that the Assembly be elected directly by the people of the member nations, thus changing the present system by which each national government appoints members of its parliament to the Assembly. Such a change, they maintain, would focus interest and attention on the European Community, which in turn would increase the importance of its institutions, which serve as the levers of progress toward larger-scale unification. The anti-institutionalist school proclaims such a change premature since Europe at its present stage of sociopolitical evolution, cannot yet carry a federal institutional structure.

History seems to confirm the fears of the socio-political theorists. The limited success of the League of Nations, the U.N., the Council of Europe, of democratic constitutions in Latin America and British institutions in Africa and Asia lends weight to the anti-institutional arguments. The failure of the Federation of the West Indies and of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, testify further against institutional change. One case in contrast to these—the federal framework of the United

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States—was in existence for one hundred years before it was matched by socio-political unification.

The European Economic Community supports the approach that institutions can encourage socio-political change as long as they are not giant steps ahead of the evolving process. A cardinal example is the formulation of a community-wide agricultural policy for the European Community. When the Treaty of Rome, the legal foundation of the EEC, was negotiated, the six members could not agree on an agricultural policy and so decided to leave the question open until the end of the first stage in the implementation of the Treaty. At that time the members would have to reach a common policy, or implementation of the Treaty could not continue. By the end of 1961, as the termination of the first stage approached, agreement on agricultural policy had not been reached. The German government was still reluctant to include agricultural products in the common market, for German farmers, working on small plots, could not compete effectively with other common market farmers. France, on the other hand, was very anxious to open new markets to its farm produce. After long and difficult negotiation, the sides remained deadlocked. In order to avoid violation of the Treaty, the deadline day of December 31, 1961, had to be fictitiously stretched to fourteen days so that negotiations could be completed.[10] Significantly, the final solution was not proposed by any member state, but was suggested by the supranational Commission and its neutral staff pledged to serve the Community, not its individual members.

The achievement of a viable solution to the agricultural quandary lends dramatic support to arguments in favor of Community institutions such as the Commission, to harmonize varying interests. It demonstrates how a new program may further the accumulation of power by the institution. In the process of finding a solution to the agricultural problem, the Commission extended its duties to the collection of imposts and the administration of subsidies. It might be argued that the Commission could not have "sold" its compromise if the disputants had not been firmly committed to the Community and were not determined to reach policy agreement. No doubt the Commission could not have forced a resolution that would violate each country's interests, just as the High Authority of the ECSC could not enforce a policy that ran counter to the basic interest of the Belgian coal industry in the 1958 crisis.[11] But these assertions support, rather than invalidate the thesis that an institutional organ, such as the Commission, cannot create social and political ties where

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there are none. But, by serving as a neutral source of proposals and as an arbiter of disputes, it can find grounds for agreement that might have been masked by the din of controversy. The Commission thus played an effective, though not a revolutionary, role in forwarding unification.

In short, it seems that the dispute between the institutionalists and those who rely on socio-political change can be resolved by finding a middle path—a combination of both institutional and political approaches. Institutions, one step ahead of the community, can set the latter on the path of unification. As the community catches up both socially and politically, institutions can take another forward step, thus achieving synchronization between institutional development and socio-political change. It is only when institutions are far out of step with the community that a whole unification effort is likely to fail.

Governments or the People?

Those who seek the establishment of world government and global community, whether through institutional revision or socio-political evolution, believe education can best illumine the pathway of progress. The Federalists, in particular, enraged by the resistance of national governments to sweeping unification moves, assert that the people would accept reorganization, but that their voice is muffled by the cries of vested interests and the myopia of statesmen who seek to perpetuate political folly.[12] The Federalists wish to speak directly to the people through a large-scale adult education program. They hope to awaken their desire for world union and, ignoring the protests of national leaders, unite all people under world government. In a literal interpretation of social contract theory, the Federalists assert that the people originally gave national governments their sovereignty, their right to rule. Therefore the people themselves can revoke that power and reassign it to a global sovereign body. This argument is specious. It is a morally dubious democracy that elevates the people above their duly elected government. It is politically unrealistic to expect the people to form a supranational polity against the will of their government. Recent studies have shown that people are more nationalistic than their political leaders.[13]

But what does the experience of the European Community teach us of the effect of education on unity movements? How was the

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EEC initiated, by the people or by their leaders, by popular education or by diplomatic maneuver? Does its success rest on abiding supranational sentiment awakened by education or on a deep national interest seeking fulfillment through unification?

Education campaigns by world federalists have been waged in many countries, including the United States and Britain. Thus far they have obviously failed to bring the people together, to overcome the resistance of national governments, and to form a world state. In postwar Europe, where conditions were ripe for unification, however limited in scope, the Federalist program of education did play a role. But its part was far more limited than that assigned it in Federalist writings. Education did not cause the people to join in a European federation. It accomplished the more limited task of paving the way for the European Economic Community. It did this, not by taking the place of national leadership, but rather by assisting the statesmen in their efforts to form the ECSC.

In the early postwar years, Federalists vigorously propounded immediate federation. Though the campaigns they led served to spread the idea of a united Europe, they gave birth only to a lame Council of Europe and a stillborn European Defense Community. The mid-fifties, the years following the failure of the EDC and preceding the success of the ECSC, marked the nadir of European Federalist activity. Ironically, at the very moment when the European Community was formed, the Federalist movement was weakest. Neither the ECSC nor the EEC relied on the Federalist movement; both were initiated by highly trained, elite political groups.

The Schuman Plan, which led to the formation of the ECSC, was designed in the secrecy of the French Planning Office by Jean Monnet and his staff. He reportedly discussed it neither with the German authorities nor with the leaders of any other country. When the draft of the plan was completed on May 3, 1950, it was brought before the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Monnet expected that Schuman would more willingly surrender some economic jurisdiction to a supranational body than would ministers in charge of economic affairs. On May 7 Schuman informed Dean Acheson, American Secretary of State, of the proceedings. The French Cabinet approved the plan on May 8. German consent was obtained on May 9. The plan was made public later that month.

The drafting of the Treaty of Rome, though not shrouded in such secrecy, proceeded on the same high level of governmental planning and negotiation. The public was not party to the planning but

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was informed of developments. Spokesmen of Europe, Monnet and Spaak, relied on their governmental positions and their contacts in various administrations and parliaments to make their influence felt. Monnet's influential Action Committee, which included forty political leaders of the six member countries of the ECSC, from time to time issued statements, but its major work was accomplished out of public view, in Foreign Office foyers and corridors of Parliaments. The founders of the ECSC and the EEC worked with governments rather than "the people." They focused on national legislation rather than on public education, and on the economic sector rather than on the political one.

It would be incorrect to say that the Federalist efforts at public enlightenment were totally unnecessary and ineffectual. In attempting to educate the people, they spread the idea of European unification and gained wider acceptance for the ECSC and the EEC treaties, both of which required ratification by the parliaments of each member nation. Nonetheless, the Federalist teachings were but a supplement to governmental activity. The birth of the European Community in 1958 was achieved by tapping the deep national interests of each of the six countries, rather than by appealing directly to popular sentiment (see below). The Community grew on soil cultivated by the Federal movement, but it did not arise from the seeds that the Federalists had planted.

Government and people are not necessarily opposites with opposed motives. Governments represent the people, and leadership in turn affects public opinion. But the Federalist stance must be examined in terms of an assumed conflict between governments and people, for it is based on the premise that governments are closing their eyes to the readiness of the people to accept unification. The Economic Community testifies against this view. It is a child born of high-level government planning, supported by growing public sentiment, and not an offspring of popular demand, forced on unwilling governments.

National versus Supranational

Debate on the manner of unifying nations, by governments or by the people, has also assumed an opposition between national and supranational structures. One group wishes to build upon the foundation of the nation-state, while the other hopes to introduce a supranational unity building on shared interests. Those who advo-

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cate augmenting nation-states argue that national self-interest is the only viable foundation for international order, that supranational sentiments are too feeble to carry such a load. Opponents declare that national interests are incompatible with the need for world order and peace and must be superseded. We question whether these two viewpoints are necessarily irreconcilable. Is the division between national and supranational interest absolute? The European experience suggests that this assumed dichotomy is invalid. It suggests that supranational *institutions* might be grounded, at least initially, on deep national *interests*. For this reason their formation was tolerated and their growth encouraged. The intellectual avant-garde and a new generation may identify more strongly with *Europa* than with their own nations, but most Europeans support the Community because they believe it serves their national interests. If unification also gratifies supranational sentiments, this is a bonus. Should a conflict arise between the two, in contemporary Europe there is little doubt that national interests would prevail over supranational sentiment. The success of the initiation of the Community rested in its ability to avoid such a ruinous confrontation.

The EEC nations have many common interests. All six countries wish to prevent Communist expansion into Western Europe and to reduce American influence there. Each seeks full employment and price stability, a high standard of living and rapid economic growth. Such concurrent aims are better served by the Community than by unilateral action. At the same time the EEC answers particular needs of member nations. Italy, the only country of the Six with considerable unemployment in 1957, joined the Common Market, hoping that member nations would open their markets to her idle work force. France sought to win the German market for her farmers. German industrialists looked toward an expanded French market. Some motives lay still deeper. France desired control over resurrected Germany. Germany hoped to regain its status in the community of nations and to free itself from restrictions imposed during the Occupation.

In short, while the Community has some supranational elements, its initial *raison d'etre* was national. Its strength lies in the fact that at its inception it served vital national interests, although the realization of supranational sentiments is a by-product that contributes to its success. But the developing EEC continues to depend for support on national interests. That is not to say that a community of nations can *fully evolve* without generating intense

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supranational commitments which, in the event of a conflict, may prevail over national ones. In fact, such a test of strength seems imminent in Europe. It is noteworthy that the controversy does not turn on a contest between nation and Community, but revolves about the nature of the Community itself and the form and extent of its supranational control. The Commission and the Federalists wish to expand the supranational structure. Many government leaders and nationalist sympathizers do not concur. They would rather utilize less binding instruments. De Gaulle would like to curtail the Commission's activities and, instead, integrate defense, foreign policy, education and culture through intergovernmental bodies such as those envisioned by the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation signed in January 1963. Such multi-national arrangements, requiring regular meetings of heads of states and ministers, are designed to protect national independence of action while providing for international cooperation.

De Gaulle is not alone in his determination to limit the supranational power of the Community. Ludwig Erhard, heir-apparent of Chancellor Adenauer, favors a decrease rather than a build-up of supranational organs. He holds centralized regulation, whether on a national or multi-national scale, to be undesirable. The German economic miracle, Erhard feels, did not result from stringent economic planning. A freer play of market forces, he feels, would be best for the Community as a whole. The wide acceptance of Erhard's views in Germany is due to the continuing appeal of laissez-faire theories and to the fact that the weaker the supranational regulatory power of the Community, the stronger national authority will continue to be. Most Europeans still prefer national control to that of the Community's organs in Brussels. This contest within the Community may one day undermine its success as an organ of unification, but it did not prevent its initiation or initial growth.

The Take-Off Base

Political scientists have argued for years over where to begin effectively the process of unification. This is a problem those who expect to legislate federations into being do not face. As soon as the federal executive and legislative bodies are formed, the union is expected to assume regulatory powers formerly held by national governments. The gradualists, on the other hand, who break unification up into stages, must therefore agree on where to begin and

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how to progress. Their decision must be based on two central considerations: which sector will be easiest to integrate, that is which will not require highly favorable preexisting conditions and exhaustive effort; and secondly, which areas offer the greatest spill-over potential to unify other areas. It may not be easy to find one sector that meets both requirements, for the highest spill-over potential might rest in an area that is difficult to integrate.

The experience of the European Community suggests that the Federalists were focusing on the most arduous task, political integration. From the start they sought to establish a supranational parliament, if not a federal executive. These efforts, we have seen, met with little success.

Military integration has often been proposed as an effective take-off base for unification. It is widely believed that international unions are often formed to provide mutual defense against common enemies. Many Americans view European unification as an attempt to erect a massive shield against Communism. This belief is not, however, supported by fact. Studies by Karl Deutsch and his associates indicate that only about half of the unification movements studied were initiated in response to external threats. Those unions that were formed to meet a military challenge tended to disintegrate when the threat had passed.[14] The Communist threat was greatest in the late 1940's and early fifties; yet even at this time European unification made little headway. The most successful steps have been taken since 1958, when the focus of the Cold War had long shifted to the underdeveloped continents. The example of NATO also speaks against the use of military integration as a point of departure for unification. Specifically launched for defensive purposes, it did not develop a basis for broader union and did not provide an instrument for expanding military integration; spill-over into other social sectors remained negligible.[15]

It is commonly held that cultural exchange, increased tourism, mutual state visits—in general, increased contact among the people of various countries—serve to reduce differences and engender shared sentiments. Sociological findings do not fully support this belief. It is often difficult to increase communication significantly. Even when this is accomplished, it does not seem to have much effect on attitudes, and even less spill-over effect on other sectors. Moreover, in Europe improved communication was, it seems, a result rather than a harbinger of unification.

As we have seen, economic unification, spearheaded by a customs

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union, served as the basis for formation of the European Community. One is reminded of the role played by the *Zollverein* in the unification of Germany. In a similar way, the growth of the American nation was affected by freeing commerce and unifying the currency. The economic sector, however, is not necessarily the best launching base for all movements towards union. For example, it seems to be less successful in underdeveloped countries. Even where economic unification is effected, full-scale integration of all areas is not an inevitable result. In the particular case of Western Europe, economic unification has met with unprecedented success. Resistance was minimal and the movement has demonstrated significant spill-over effect. The economic success of the Community has, in turn, stimulated thoughts of some form of political unification.

Regional versus Global

The controversy between those who favor regional integration and those who seek nothing less than world government is laden with emotion. The regionalists stress the importance of cultural homogeneity and similarity of interests as a foundation for supranational community. These conditions, they say, can only be found within a limited geographical area. The universalists argue that regional integration is not easily achieved and that its programs are too limited to be effective. None but global institutions, universalists claim, can guide nations teetering on the brink of thermonuclear war. Regional states would be but nation-states writ large, likely to end by fighting each other with the added might of unified armed forces and economies. How can regional integration proceed, it has been asked, when it is impossible to determine the boundaries of a region. A region sounds like an objective, self-delineated area; but what, for example, are the limits of the Middle East? Is Egypt included? Is Afghanistan outside? Is the Nordic area part of Europe or a region unto itself? Similar questions can be asked about almost all regions. Regions lack clear boundaries and therefore do not offer a sense of identity, and without identity how can a community be formed?[16]

Again, a middle-road, gradualist stance, should not be excluded. Regional and global states need not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives, but might be seen as complementary forms of unification. Regional states might serve as both an intermediary step in the process of building up a global community and as a permanent

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middle plateau when the Community is firmly established.[17] This approach is supported by an analysis of consensus formation in nation-states. The multitude of opinions and interests that exist in one nation cannot be effectively harmonized in one large pool; they must be reconciled by stages. Subdivisions, such as political parties, must first organize the varying opinions and form a compromise. Then a national consensus can be worked out. Region-states might serve as such "subdivisions" of the global community. This third approach suggests that regional and global states are not only compatible, but are interdependent. There can be no global state without regional units. However, while some regional units might serve as stepping-stones, there always remains the possibility that others might serve a counterproductive function in achieving a global community.

The European Community as a regional organization casts an interesting light on this debate. It was scarcely bothered by lack of clearly defined boundaries. It did not hesitate to exclude those European countries under Communist domination. It might well admit non-European Turkey as an associate member as it accepted European Greece. Its boundaries were found, not through geographical formalism, but through trial and error. Unification was first attempted among the fifteen members of the Council of Europe and the sixteen European members of the OEEC. When these organizations failed in their efforts to form an effective union, three countries formed the Benelux group. Two others, France and Italy, talked of a similar plan but felt they might be too small a unit. A medium-sized union of six was tried and succeeded. Now plans are being made to re-extend the Community. Greece has been accepted as an associate member to become a full member at a later date. The applications of ten other neighboring countries are under consideration. The admission of some seems probable, while that of others is much in doubt. In this way a community frames its own regional identity and is not limited by obscurely defined geographical boundaries.

The historical course of European unification lends some weight to the view that regional and global union must go hand in hand. The European Community led to higher-level unification, triggered regional integration in other areas of the world, and initiated a new inter-regional mode of relationship.

The regional unification of Europe has created a new international situation and has forced reassessment of the role of blocs, a more inclusive form of international organization. The solidarity of

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the Western bloc, most particularly the American-European tier known as the Atlantic Alliance, is threatened by the rise of a third force led by de Gaulle's France which wishes to stand free of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Western bloc is attacking this problem on several planes. The United States hopes to discourage such centrifugal developments by offering its European partners equal status with the United States.[18] Cross Atlantic ties are to be strengthened by increased cooperation in matters of foreign aid, through the OECD; by tighter coordination of strategic plans through more frequent consultation in the Council of NATO; by preparing a multi-national nuclear deterrent; and by framing reciprocal tariff concessions drawing on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Even the formation of an Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly is being considered. Such concerted action was not attempted when Europe still spoke with thirteen dissonant voices. But as the nations of Europe grew united, vibrations were felt across the ocean, which made more apparent the need for strengthening the bonds of the more encompassing Atlantic Union. In this case regional unification did spur efforts toward tighter integration on the higher, bloc level. We cannot be sure that this process will continue, that bloc integration will eventually trigger still more encompassing integration, ending in global unification.

The influence of the European Community on other parts of the world was more unexpected. In unforeseen ways it encouraged, almost forced, unification of other regions. It was in the realm of international trade that the European Community played its most telling role. The EEC not only eliminated barriers to trade among its members, but also regulated the flow of trade between the Community and non-member nations. Between 1958 and 1962 trade among member countries increased three times more rapidly than trade with non-members. Tariffs on imports from non-member countries have not increased, but some members have tried to discourage such trade by levying an excise tax on commonly imported commodities. For example, Germany chose just this means for restricting the importation of coffee from Brazil. In the past five years industrial goods purchased from Community members have sold at higher prices, while the agricultural products, bought by the Community from outsiders, brought lower prices. The terms of trade for outsiders and particularly for underdeveloped countries have deteriorated by 10 to 20 per cent. These trends in the EEC trade policy have evoked counter measures by non-member nations. They have

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tried to compensate for loss of income from European markets by encouraging regional integration themselves. The most vigorous reaction has been seen in the countries of Communist East Europe which had previously been slow to integrate their economies. Now the Communists are working toward fuller economic union on the West European model. Similarly, the Latin American Free Trade Area was given a great deal of impetus by the European threat to the economic growth of the Latin countries. Negotiations for common markets in the Middle East and the Far East are also under way. The formation and acceleration of the European Free Trade Area, a group that competes with the EEC, is further evidence of changes the EEC has evoked. The facts thus support our contention that successful regional unification in one area may encourage similar programs all over the globe.

The external influence of regional unification does not end here. The EEC has unexpectedly given rise to new patterns of *inter*-regional relations. A most interesting relationship has developed between the European Community and eighteen "associated" African countries. Each of these countries was a former colony of European members of the EEC, mainly France. By 1962 they had won independence; however, all but Guinea chose to maintain their association with the European Community. Bilateral relations with a mother country are gradually being replaced by multilateral, inter-regional relations. The African nations cooperate under the Organization of African States and Madagascar for Economic Cooperation, a group closely associated with the European Community. This Eur-African association may eventually establish instruments for joint discussion of matters of mutual interest, particularly concerning the allocation and use of foreign aid. At present, relations between the European and African communities are not entirely free of colonial overtones. They do, however, seem to be working toward a new mode of cooperation between industrialized and underdeveloped regions. This inter-regional association stands as another example of how unification of a single region may lead to more comprehensive forms of union. The choice is not really between regional and global unification. We must learn to understand under what conditions regional integration will obstruct global community and, conversely, how it may foster world unification.

Conclusion

The future of European unification is uncertain. Conclusions

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based on its past success must be tentative. It is not clear how long pooling of national sovereignty will continue and how far it will progress. But there is no doubt that, at least to some degree, sovereignty can be pooled successfully. Even if nationalist regression were to erase the achievements of the European Community, the experience of the last five years would have taught this lesson: some sovereignty of nations *can* be transferred to superior polities.

The formation of a supranational community is a much more difficult task now that nationalism has sanctified the state. Unification can hardly be expected to be achieved by one step, however mighty. The gradualist program to integrate individual sectors before proceeding to full-scale unification seems to be the most feasible plan.

In the search for a route toward unification, we need no longer choose between institutional change and socio-political evolution. The two concepts are not in opposition but must, in fact, parallel each other. Institutions cannot function effectively if they are too far ahead of socio-political reality; they can, however, be a few steps ahead and may encourage political change. Progress is swiftest when institutional and socio-political programs are synchronized and advance together in rhythmic steps.

Economic integration has proved to be the most successful take-off base for European unification. It was not feasible to begin by unifying national legislatures and supplanting traditional symbols of national sovereignty. Military integration did not spur unification of other sectors. Public education and inter-country communication supported unification but could not initiate it or propel it. Drawn from the European experience, these conclusions may also prove valid for other highly developed areas. They may not, however, be equally relevant to problems of unification in underdeveloped regions.

In the struggle for unification, it must be realized that people will not form federations independently of their governments. European unification has been largely the work of the leaders of established national governments. Public opinion served to encourage and support the spokesmen of unification, but the people alone did not act, nor were they likely to, without the guidance of their governments. The major force behind European unification, including its supranational expressions, was deep-seated national interest. Supranational commitments tend to emerge during later phases of unification. If they fail to develop at this stage, national interests

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may not suffice to cement a union; the absence of supranational support can cause its collapse.

While European unification began as a regional movement, it might prove to be a stepping stone toward more encompassing and widespread unification. It has moved international blocs to strengthen their ties; it has accelerated unification in several regions on other continents; and it has given birth to a new pattern of inter-regional relations that may serve to stabilize the relations between industrial and underdeveloped nations.

The European Community, whatever its destiny, stands as the most significant and successful experiment in unification known to the world of nations. The atomic age has brought with it a gloom that permeates most analyses of historical trends. The European Community offers a rare, precious, somewhat precarious beam of hope.

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KRISTER STENDAHL

Religion in the University

ANY DISCUSSION about the place of religion in the American university is fraught with much confusion. Problems arising from the complex history of the teaching of religion and from the clash between educational philosophies, cultural models, and diverse theologies are not easy to disentangle when specific issues of curriculum and administration call for decisions. If we define the problem as an educational one, it would appear that the argument from history is greatly weakened. An *a priori* reference either to the United States as a nation within the Judeo-Christian tradition, or to the principle of separation between church and state helps little in a world where religious pluralism—including not only, e.g., Islam and Buddhism, but also agnostics and atheists—is increasing within the United States. We are also more and more aware of the common humanity of all the peoples of the world. Furthermore, the academic community is presently anxious to find a new cultural and educational model for its life and work so that the traditional but obsolete feud between the Humanities and the Sciences can be overcome in a new, more realistic and viable synthesis. In such a context it may prove useful to give thought to current possibilities for the study of religion within the university.

From an educational point of view, the basic issues are two: the comprehensiveness of the university, and the alleged or actual impossibility of treating religion as equal to other fields of inquiry.

It would be strange if the university abrogated its right and its duty to study religion, or if it were decided that religious phenomena could not be treated as a unified complex, but only as they intersected with other disciplines, such as philosophy, history, literature, or sociology.

When, however, the comprehensive duty of the university is overruled in the case of religion, such action is based on one and/or

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the other of two principles. There is the epistemological principle, which is stressed as often by "believers" as by "non-believers," to the effect that, since religion is a matter of faith and belief, it can only be dealt with within that faith, and its claims and its discourse are by definition incompatible with the canons of inquiry accepted by the secular university.

In most cases, but without inner necessity, this principle finds itself corroborated by the diversity of religious traditions, many of which make absolute claims to truth. Thus there is a strong interaction between the epistemological and the political principle, i.e., the principle of separation between church and state. Once welded together in the American culture, these two principles have led to an attitude which could be called "hands-off religion." Parallel to such a development, a mostly unchallenged professionalization of the study of religion took place.

In the present situation there are, however, signs which indicate new attempts to enable the university to assert its right and duty to make religion a field of study on equal footing with other fields of inquiry and teaching. While these tendencies are embedded in a confusing mixture of traditional and *ad hoc* structures, they appear, nevertheless, significant enough to warrant analysis in order to isolate the hard core of an academic study of religion.

The most striking examples of these tendencies can be seen in the increase of programs and departments of religion in state universities. While the schemes differ and are often of a delicate nature, the intention is clear. There is eagerness to find a framework within which religious traditions and phenomena can become a subject and an object for academic work. Parallel to this development, there are ever growing programs for Ph.D. studies in the field, often in conjunction with seminaries and divinity schools, but sometimes without such connections.

While the tendency is obvious, the motivations for such a development are often mixed and vague, especially as they bear on the college situation. There is often a general feeling that religion contributes to the strengthening of the values of Western culture. There is even the plain assessment that since Communism is atheistic, America had better foster religion. There is the obvious awareness that large parts of our cultural and literary heritage are almost unintelligible without some knowledge of the Bible—preferably in the King James Version—and some acquaintance with the history of Christian thought. In a shrinking world, there is also the obvious

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and refreshing need for some knowledge of the major world religions, and hence all new ventures in the field of religion give attention to these areas.

What is often lacking in this haze of motivations is a clear image of the aim of the study of religion as an academic discipline. Without such an image, the recent developments in this field may well disappear as they came, following the pragmatic mood of politicians, trustees and educational administrators. The educational issue must be defined as the university's duty not to dodge its *academic* responsibility in relation to religion.

It could be argued that the separation between church and state in the United States, as it bears on tax-supported education—the "hands-off religion" policy—has contributed greatly to a certain kind of anti-intellectualism in matters of religion. From an educational point of view, this must always remain an awkward and artificial situation, even where such an arrangement has appeared necessary for political and socio-cultural reasons.

The other side of the same coin is, then, that the churches in their own educational institutions are free to, and expected to, foster the study of religion within the specific framework of their own faith. In actively and consciously church-related institutions, this is also the case, and instruction in religion often forms part of the required curriculum. In the minds of students and administration, the religion courses are often seen as an annex to the chapel, and *vice versa;* this image is usually supported by the fact that the chaplain also teaches in the Religion Department.

This ellipse of state schools and church schools contributes to the conviction that religion cannot and should not be taught unless it is taught within the faith: only the believer can "understand" the Bible or the Creed; and since the aim of teaching religion is conceived of as a religious or at least a moral response, this presupposition remains unchallenged.

Among the American universities and colleges, a large and qualitatively most significant number are neither state nor church related. In most of these institutions there are courses and even departments and degree programs in Religion (not considering seminaries and divinity schools). Here the patterns and the underlying educational philosophy vary. There is a strong undercurrent of unbroken tradition, which to many seems to need little reasoned support. In some cases the connection with chapel and chaplaincy is self-evident. Most of these schools take for granted that their "tra-

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dition" is Protestant in the broadest sense. Attention is usually given to the major World Religions (which, however, seldom include post-Bibical Judaism or Roman Catholic Christianity). It happens that Jewish, and in a few cases Roman Catholic, scholars are added to such departments.

In many of these diversified situations, the teacher of religion labors under a considerable amount of false expectations and misleading preconceptions, which do not plague his colleagues in other departments. Friends and foes alike expect instruction in this field to be different, or something more—or something less—than instruction in history, philosophy or economics.

One of the decisive factors contributing to this situation lies no doubt in the relation between the study of religion and the professional—and confessional—training of the clergy. Everybody knows that a candidate for the priesthood, the ministry, or the rabbinate receives theological training, and it is reasonable that such training is carried out in the context of a community of faith. Beginning in the 19th century, as the theological seminaries became separate entities within the universities or outside of any university structure, a striking professionalization of religious studies took place, a development which both contributed to and was caused by the emancipation of college education from the monopoly of the churches. The net result of this development was a structure of education in which religion could be studied and taught only by men who thought of themselves as called to the ministry of the churches. The field of religion became confined to the clergy. The seminary curriculum, governed by the needs of the clergy, was slow in exploring emerging new areas of study, such as history of religions or sociology of religion or cultural anthropology or psychology of religion or phenomenology of religion. Thus it was in fields like these that the study of religion found its way back into the faculties of arts and sciences. It also appeared as if these were areas which could be handled without specific theological presuppositions. In this light it is understandable that History of Religions mostly meant the history of other religions than Judaism and Christianity which were relegated to the theological schools. A parallel to this phenomenon can perhaps be seen in the bracketing of early Christianity in the field of the Classics. The standard Greek Lexicon by Liddell-Scott-Jones does not cover "ecclesiastical" writers, but this is not a chronological line of demarcation since it does consider "secular" writers like Philostratus and Plotinus in the third century of the

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Christian era. While such an arrangement has its roots in classicism, it illustrates and contributes to the artificial isolation of Christianity in the Graeco-Roman culture, making it the realm of theologians.

It is, however, time to break off the historical observations and to take a look at the actual state of the field of religious studies today.

The vast majority of substantial doctoral programs in the field of religion in this country are Ph.D. programs under the auspices of faculties of arts and sciences; only a few divinity schools which form part of a university give the Th.D. degree. One could ask whether this development is a sound one or whether it is a sign of lack of academic self-confidence in the theological community. One could also ask whether this change in nomenclature is anything more than —just that. Has the well known tendency to make the Ph.D. a union card for college teachers forced the theological schools to fall in line, by knocking humbly on the door to the Ph.D. granting committees?

It should, however, be noted that this development is primarily an outward sign of a general tendency to overcome the professional and confessional confinement of religious studies. From an academic point of view, it must appear strange that large segments of religious thought and phenomena could only be studied by those who by belief and commitment identify themselves with the church's ministry, and who for that purpose seek a seminary education. In some Ph.D. programs in Religion, as many as twenty-five per cent of the students have not earlier earned the B.D. degree. They may be believers or agnostics, but they have chosen religion as their area of interest and research, without "clerical" intentions or inclinations. Within the Roman Catholic universities the same phenomenon is now coming to the fore, and programs are set up to make the study of religion possible for others than the clergy, a new departure of considerable significance when one considers the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic tradition. In short, it does not appear possible any more to confine the field of religion to clerical institutions. The university is forced to reconsider its often traditional, sometimes reverent, sometimes condescending, always arbitrary tendency to think of the field of religion as "different" from other fields of learning.

Why should religion be "different"? The fact that men have strong convictions about religion does not separate it from other areas of human concern. If the problem is the unwillingness to deal with the controversial, in order to avoid pressures from groups and

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individuals, then the issue is one of academic freedom and integrity, and there can be only one answer. The question is rather whether the study of religion is equally possible for every student, regardless of his faith or non-faith; or does the believer claim to have access to the truth by means not open to the non-believer? Or does the Roman Catholic scholar claim a knowledge which the Protestant by definition is deprived of? If that were the case, the field of religion would indeed be different from other fields; or, we should rather say, if that were so, then such means of truth would presumably affect many other areas of human knowledge, from philosophy to geology. The issue is not to what extent certain beliefs influence man's judgment—they obviously do. The question is rather whether these judgments are argued on the basis of information in principle available to everyone—regardless of a man's beliefs.

A significant answer to these questions is of an actual rather than a speculative nature. There is little doubt that a common ground and a common discourse have been established in the study of religion. This discourse has grown out of the methodology in the History of Religion, as this relatively young discipline has come of age, has become increasingly sensitive to the nature of its material, and has grown into a phenomenology of religion. While few scholars in any field would claim an absolute and lofty objectivity, we have learned to go beyond sympathy and antipathy, beyond apologetics and condescension into a mood of empathy. The big and pretentious word *meaning* has broken up into two tenses: What *did* something *mean* in the original, to later generations, to contemporary authors; and what *should* it *mean* (if anything) to the contemporary reader. The former question can be answered by the historian. The second normative question rests on hermeneutical principles which can be properly analyzed, but the validity of which depends on specific religious presuppositions.

Since the study of religion is largely a study of texts, the historical question is of primary importance for the scriptures and other documents. The proper analysis of these sources requires historical empathy, as well as historical distance. The believer has empathy without effort, but is in constant danger of losing the distance. He is especially tempted to think that his immediate or his traditional reaction is the true one. He often, wrongly, takes for granted that these great texts deal with his own problems. The non-believer more easily feels the distance but has to acquire a certain empathy without which he cannot interpret adequately. He must

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be sensitive to the nature and intentions of religious documents. But at every point where two interpreters differ, they are able to adduce data which are equally available to both. The question what Paul or Luther or Jonathan Edwards *meant* is often a difficult, but always a purely descriptive question which cannot differ from any other questions of historical interpretation.

Equally descriptive is the task of analyzing and scrutinizing the principles of hermeneutics by which texts and experiences are—consciously or unconsciously—translated into systematic theology and theological ethics. This becomes a study of the actual "grammar" underlying theological thinking. The only point where the descriptive and analytical approach is transcended is in the actual production of "a systematic theology," and it would be hard to see how such a product could ever form part of the common academic discourse, or could be accepted as a Ph.D. dissertation. Such a product is rather the *object* of academic investigation, just as the symphony or the novel is related to the work of a department of music or a department of comparative literature.

Thus there is a common task and a common discourse within which scholars in the field of religion with diverse theological presuppositions find themselves in meaningful and equal discussion. Within such a study of religion, there are standards of competence and standards of true and false interpretations, which are of the same nature as those in other academic fields, without reference to creeds or traditions. It is not due to "ecumenical" interests that many of the journals in the field of religion include articles of scholars from different traditions, and that many of the leading contributors to the field would label themselves agnostics. This is rather due to a new and viable methodology in the study of religion.

Western education grew under the heavy monopoly of Christianity. When this structure broke up in the 19th century, theological scholarship became by and large relegated to the seminaries. The time has come when the distinction between church and university has become sufficiently clarified to permit the study of religion on an equal footing with other fields in the faculties of arts and sciences.

In some quarters, ecclesiastical as well as secular, there is much hesitancy concerning such a development. Many find it strange that religion should be studied rather than preached. They would look to courses in religion primarily as a means toward the strengthening of religious and moral values. They would find it surprising or alarming if a college found the best man to teach such courses to

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be of a faith or a non-faith alien to the tradition of the college. They would expect such courses to be—as we have said—something more and something different from other courses. But this attitude will slowly disappear as one becomes used to the new but obvious thought that one can teach about religion as one can teach about literature and economics, or about any other manifestations of personal and social creativity. Religious creativity will always have its center in the churches, and their ministers will be trained to foster the life of faith and to care for the souls. They will do so according to their faith and calling, in obedience to their traditions. That is the task of the church.

By its very nature, however, religion transcends the walls of cathedrals, meeting houses and synagogues. It became and it becomes part of the culture. As a cultural and historical phenomenon, religion should be studied and understood, and for that reason it must be a part of the general education. In the long run both church and society will suffer from a strange schizophrenia if the "hands-off-religion" principle is perpetuated, even in the mild form of making the study of religion in the university different from other fields of study. The present walls of partition contribute to ignorance and bigotry. In no field is the time-lag between primary research and popular penetration more conspicuous than in the field of religion.

Rather spectacular new insights into the origin of Christianity and its relation to Judaism would have considerable significance for our life together. Significant changes in our understanding of the Reformation could have similar effects. And apart from any pragmatic effects, it is good to know more adequately how it all began and why things are as they are. There is little reason to expect the study of religion to make the students more religious—or less. But it is reasonable to think that they will understand better what religion is about.

When one discusses the place of religion in the university, there are always those who fear and despise it; and there are those who want it to resume its old theological role as the queen of the sciences. While a Christian would claim that God is the king of the universe, he is not so sure that the royal prerogative should be transferred to the study of religion. It may well be that theology paid the price for its medieval arrogance when the study of religion was confined to the seminary and became professionalized. It seems as if the time has come to find a more humble and more realistic place for religion as the university works toward a new image of culture.

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GEORGE A. KELLY

The Expert as Historical Actor

Society rises to its challenges, abates its fears, and calms its nerves with expertise. At moments of great stress it may also use experts * to transcribe its protests and inspire its revolutions. New knowledge or new ways of putting the old, whether forbidden or public, sacred or secular, are the province of the expert, who "sees combinations we do not see," and by his vocation, as we presently define it, helps to translate them into action. He pronounces anathemas and justifications that serve us but are beyond our skill. Experts are revered or reviled; but they have been indispensable in history.

The expert as policy counsellor has been available to societies from earliest times, wearing among other transitory costumes those of magician, tax collector, confessor, constitution-writer, strategist, and economic planner. The form has changed with convenience, values on the scale of knowledge, morale, and culture; but the function has stayed rather constant. If not always enlisted as a guide to salvation or the millenium, the expert has at least been the confidant of dark secrets or the pathfinder toward some ancillary truth. This role seems little abridged even in a "scientific age" when an expert may be implored not to "take sides" but to remain the neutral judge of contingencies. The expert proposes, he does not dispose; but we must assume that his neutrality is a discretionary one.

Today much attention is focused upon the expert's collaboration with political authority. This is not new: in former times experts

* From L. *expertus* → *experire*, "one who has experienced or discovered through experience." The widest use of the word, up to comparatively recent times, has been in French jurisprudence (*cf.* "expert" testimony). But it is the modern definition of "expert" with its full technocratic connotations, that commands our interest here.

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had been closely woven into the fabric of state councils as soothsayers, lawyers, confessors, private secretaries, etc. The fundamental novelty is, rather, that the form of official expertise seems finally to have caught up with the needs of a complicated bureaucracy and been assimilated to it. This contributes to a rather high *esprit de corps* among experts of the moment.

Yet the expert is essentially a lonely figure. Never have the unifying principles of knowledge and action been more obscure, both because of the multiplication of particular fact and the alienation of the intellectual disciplines from each other. We must dwell on the idea of a world steadily reduced to conceptual particles if we are to grasp the evolution of the expert function. It may be that the expert is learning to be content with his crumb. But many believe that the fragmentation of knowledge, together with the splitting of the atom, of the psyche, and of existential man from his fellow creatures, has produced a condition—our modern ethical philosophers have said it—where man (experts included) is *forlorn.* Not only does the expert fail to grasp a unity which, if it ever existed, seems to be slipping further away; but he despairs that men find it impossible to collaborate effectively in seeking one.

An immediate problem of expertise is then suggested, that of communicating knowledge upward to those who "make" history, collegiately, and downward to the uninitiated so that it will arrive on time, with the proper impact, and ungarbled. This problem is eloquently illustrated by the frequency of questions of the following order: Does Khrushchev *know* we mean business in Berlin? Does the President *believe* counterforce strategy will work? Can the people be *persuaded* that fallout shelters are important?

The modern expert has often reacted to this modern form of despair by becoming deeply preoccupied with his channels of communication, especially with others who labor with scraps of expertise. This effect is sometimes represented as deadening committee-system procedure or even as social extravagance subsidized by a plethora of willing sponsors. But the diagnosis should go much deeper. Since the modern expert is *forlorn,* he does not thunder, heroic and alone, with rolling Carlylean periods, but manages modestly and monotonously in the jargon of his discipline. He needs certainty, even microscopic certainty, and the assurance his colleagues can provide. And so he worries about communication, and he perceives that others, more powerful than he, are troubled with the same problem.

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The modern expert is generally more willing and eager to render his services to the secular authority, long regarded with deep suspicion by the purer type of intellectual. There are various reasons —personal, moral, and political—that drive the expert to the bosom of the state. There is the anguished concern at human imperfection and social dilemma. There is the hyperdramatic issue of physical survival and the control of the forces which place it in irrevocable jeopardy. And there is the feel for the spotlight, the Faustian temptation to translate knowledge into power. Henry Adams was only the first to reflect: "Though Washington belonged to a different world, and the two worlds could not live together, he was not sure that he enjoyed the Boston world most."[1]

But there *is*, above all, *forlornness* and the dream of a rational order which must, after all, be built of crumbs if these are all you have. Today the nation-state—though some experts are avidly building "Europe"—appears uniquely capable of the range of power that might command any sane reconstitution of a partitioned world. It also seems the single and best confraternity, perhaps more so than the fabled "international brotherhood of learning" where the personally wrought pieces of the knowledge machine can be brought together and assembled.

But the state must also be understood as the field of action where knowledge and power collide and where the most explicit faults of expertise—of understanding, communication, or execution —come to light. Knowledge alone is something held and challenged only by academic inquisition; knowledge as power is released and exposed, a scapegoat of its own and other failures. Several troubles may occur. The uses of power may easily become confused with the cognitive presuppositions assigned to them. The furious drive, under time pressure, to integrate semi-digested bits of knowledge, far from blasting new channels of contact, may block existing ones.

There are, to be sure, moral imperatives that yoke the expert to the state, and they are important ones. But although the state has considerable advantages as a matrix for collaborative expertise, it can take outrageous liberties with the orderly solution of problems. The expert has no cause for complaint. Expertise, like the affiliated technique of divination, has rarely—unless among its own sects—been construed as an end in itself. It demands a patron and becomes the marriage knot between knowledge and power. If it were a true art and not a function, it could glory in all its shades and colors. "Let there be Maecenases, and there will be no lack of Virgils."

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But authority demands consistency and obedience from its technicians, not a giddy plurality of options.

The expert also has several problems of a subjective order. First, what does being an "expert" imply about his personal thoughts and opinions? Shall he be neutral in his testimony and "engaged" in his life? Obviously, under the pressure of some events, he not only can but must because new occasions teach new duties. The physicist Hans Bethe, who led the United States delegation to the Second Technical Conference on the Detection of Nuclear Testing in 1959, had the responsibility of presenting "new evidence" on the difficulty of underground detection; he later wrote in a magazine article that this was one of the most distasteful things he had ever had to do.[2] Here was one man's response to his predicament; but it does not point the way to any universal solution.

Secondly, the expert is at least vaguely aware that he occupies a certain position in the social order. He shares various reflexes with other professionals, though he may deplore some of their attitudes. He sometimes imagines himself either as an individual or part of a cohesive class, and he may attempt to work out his own rules of life on this basis. Reality usually intrudes bitterly on this self-portrait, for in most cases he shares the prejudice and reason of other groups of human beings. He may bring his sacks of grain to be ground into grist at the mill of power, but he knows he is not the miller; neither is he the bureaucrat who bakes nor the consumer who buys and eats. This functional limitation is often a source of annoyance which affects the expert's view of the social order. Indispensable as part of a functioning system, he would prefer to be defined as the wisest part of it.

Thirdly, the expert is confronted, as we have suggested, by personal judgments regarding the development and transmission of knowledge. He must argue and debate, interpret, prevail, concede, and conciliate. And above all, throughout history, he has been part of a permanent panel to decide on the scope of useful knowledge, worthless knowledge, and dangerous knowledge. A great deal of expert knowledge in all periods of violent change and shifting premises has been pretty strong medicine. The Egyptian priestly cult was, after all, a panel of experts; so, too, one must suppose, is a committee that grants security clearances.

Fourthly, the expert must be drastically concerned with the implications of the knowledge he provides. In this sense he is a secondary agent of power. A human drama accompanies the trans-

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mission of knowledge. Even if, in the words of Burke, it is up to the statesmen to decide which matters "they will leave to a wise and salutary neglect," the expert knows that increments of power have a habit of being used and not neglected. How can he control his own destiny as an agent of change?

Power attracts advice. Where a measure of centralized power exists, there, too, is the expert, sometimes more in sun, sometimes more in shade; in harmony with the rationale of power or working to change it; sometimes the "lion beneath the throne," sometimes the god Thoth handing the sacred letters to the temporal ruler and adding to his divinity. Leader of a priestly cult or sponsor of a busy corps of technocrats, the expert stands with a foot in knowledge and a foot in power, and prepares the arcane for practical use. He must define useful knowledge in terms of the capacities of power and in terms of the understanding and belief of his age. Now in addition—though units of society have been faced before with times of famine, flood, and conquest—he must gloom over the data of survival and measure this ominous quantity against other concerns. He must establish priorities. He must cultivate the unscientific talent of persuasion for use among his fellows and in the ante rooms of power.

Some of the most serious matters which the expert faces, consciously or not, are his historical role in the construction of knowledge systems, his collaboration with the state in crisis periods, his mediation between the systems of knowledge and the systems of power, and his right of trespass in politics. We shall try to comment on these dilemmas in the paragraphs to follow.

The Question of Useful Knowledge

"A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds," wrote Francis Bacon. "Therefore let him seasonably water the one and destroy the other." The expert must come to feel somewhat this way about the details of knowledge which abound so infinitely. If he cannot practice Socratic surgery on this mass, he must at least exercise a measure of discrimination. In so doing he implies a structure of knowledge, even if he does not attempt to build one outright. Decision-makers act on skeletal constructs which have been fleshed out. Each skeleton incorporates a bias, and the greatest structures of all, by their pattern, establish the unique flavor of a civilization.

But every growing civilization is, at prime moments, in a kind of Hobbesian civil war when the great issues of architecture are

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debated. Here, the involved experts must choose sides, which is to say, they must contend over the directions in which knowledge itself is to be developed. They must become moral philosophers, if this is not already their vocation, for upon their judgment and means of persuasion will depend results destined to dominate the human condition.

Such encounters are rather familiar and frequent throughout Western European history: the nominalists against the realists; the Baconians against the pseudo-Aristotelians; the Hegelians against the rationalists, etc. We have chosen a somewhat more obscure, but no less important, debate to illustrate the point because it bears some relation to the expert's current predicament. This is what we might describe as the three-way dispute over useful knowledge that reached its pitch in the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century and centered in such incidents as the "battle of the books."

This ardent controversy, which began in France, engaging the polemic of writers like Fontenelle and Perrault, and rapidly spread to England,[3] is traditionally described as occurring between two adversaries: the "ancients" and the "moderns." The "ancients" were, of course, the classical writers of Greece and Rome and a few of their more disciplined followers in modern Europe. This faction contended, with a heavy tone of moralism, that virtually all useful knowledge could be found in the pages of classical literature and that it was folly to try to improve on it. They admired, moreover, the directness and simplicity of that literature. The "moderns"—critics, dramatists, poets, poetasters, and wits of the time—were held guilty of empty and pompous constructions and, frequently, an attachment to the new experimental science which was just emerging. The metaphor of the controversy was the fable of the "ancient" Bee who distributed his sweet honey a little bit everywhere and the "modern" Spider who spun elaborate and mystifying strands from his own entrails.

Actually, this intellectual combat makes little sense unless we regard it as tripartite. The true "ancients" are perhaps the least important part of the triad: one could not really be a 17th century writer and yet write "anciently." However, classical literature, with its vast prestige, was used as a convenient club with which to beat one's opponent over the head. In the controversy as it related to style, the ancient models were important; but in the controversy over useful knowledge, they formed a part of the *arrière-plan.* The real battle-lines were drawn, one feels, between a tradition of knowl-

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edge centered on ethics—which we might describe as Christian-Stoic-psychological—and another based on experience—progressive, sceptical, and neutral. The issue went increasingly in favor of the latter group though they were forced to concede certain points to their enemies. Within the prevailing European rationalist trend, the intellectual architecture became progress-oriented and optimistic—which would account in large part for its future pessimism—rather than normative; the day of the modern expert was almost in sight. His supremacy as well as his fragmentation could be predicted.

Although the glories of pure experiment—we call it pure research—are widely acknowledged by our present intellectual society, no one can fail to see what difficulties this approach raises in defining useful knowledge or in rendering any qualitative judgment about knowledge at all. We owe much of our magnificent advance and our confusion to the same source. The English Royal Society, chartered in 1662, made no bones about its intentions; ". . . this Society will not own any hypothesis, system, or doctrine of the principles of natural philosophy, proposed or mentioned by any philosopher ancient or modern, nor the explication of any phenomenon whose recourse must be had to originall causes. . . ."[4] By the twentieth century the feeling would grow among experts that their task ended when the last equations had been inscribed and submitted to the secular authority. The "neutrality" of science, indeed of all rigorous expertise, became a moral goal in itself.[5] It was difficult, anyway, to draw ethical conclusions from scraps of a fragmented knowledge system; only the combinations, which were the responsibility of power, could prove deadly or beneficent.

Today's experts, with the scientists in the forefront, are not so sanguine about their intellectual acts. The familiar questions of survival are raised, together with other doubts about economy and utility: Is it better to clear slums or put a man on the moon? Is not the world population problem more menacing than nuclear weapons? Shall we have to eat seaweed in 2050? But the thrust is still outward, and all the avenues of experimentalism are still precious. No fact is to be taken too lightly; no problem can contain too many facts. Few experts in communication with authority, unless perhaps they are spiritual advisors, will be found to say, with John Locke:

> Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought

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to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.[6]

Yet as the years go by, expertise, though still experimental, may be seeking more and more the cover of an ethical umbrella. Wary of the sociological visions which have rent his civilization in the past, but still fragmented and *forlorn,* the expert searches for new ways of galvanizing his scraps of knowledge even if the king's horses and men cannot reassemble them. It may even fall to him to create drastic controls for the technology inspired by the vision of his ancestors.

On Macroexpertise

Keynesian economics has been described as a new science developed for the use of policy-makers. Another term often applied to it is *macroeconomics,* which means simply that its conceptual starting point is the society at large, its wants and needs. By contrast, *microeconomics,* the "classical" economics of Adam Smith and his successors, begins with the study of the individual or individual firm as an economic unit and argues that practices efficient and rewarding to him or it will be good for the entire society. Viewed in another fashion, microeconomics is "classical" because it presumes to hold true at all places and in all times, whereas macroeconomics is a tool developed for present emergency, temporally and geographically defined: it is not "cosmopolitan" but expedient and empirical. Our circle of definition may be closed by noting Keynes's assertion that once an economy can be brought back into equilibrium, the laws of classical economics will generally apply.

Can we approach the problem of expertise usefully by making the distinction between *microexpertise** and *macroexpertise?* Surely, as we have suggested above, there is a relevance to the two terms as they regard the economic expert. We presume also that a wider application of the idea is appropriate. Macroexpertise is a constellation of particular types of advice given to the secular authority to meet situations of crisis without any implication that its application shall become universal. It will perhaps not endure into calmer times nor be relevant to the next crisis.

Emergency planning or, as we have called it, macroexpertise will face a number of special problems and betray certain distinct

* We relate microexpertise to the "sociological vision" described in the next section, but this is a hesitant and not a dogmatic connection.

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characteristics. The ageless goals of the society may have to be set aside in the face of a present danger. Whether we speak of the Renaissance Italian city-state or World War I America, the planning in time of crisis becomes more rigorous: men must be impressed into military service or hired; the mechanical or commercial supports of war must be mobilized; a patriotic sensibility must be intensified. Or, as with Keynes, a humanitarian revulsion against factories lying idle, people going jobless and hungry, and the uncontrolled downward spiral of consumption and production spurs the conviction that something must be done.

Up to the present crisis of survival, the vision of the international system has compelled the attention of the macroexpert less acutely. The essential became the here-and-now, the vitality of the society to which he felt himself belonging. Generally in history as a crisis has deepened, planning and expertise, with all their formulas of unaccustomed coercion and "interference with the natural order," have expanded, but at the same time they have become much less cosmopolitan in scope. "Classical" theory may have been fortified with the impression that its range was broad and timeless; but its challenger, born in the sweat and tears of emergency, is like a fireman rushing to a conflagration, little caring whether his hoses will operate for the next alarm. Yet the fireman must block off streets, forbid private interference, and establish his law within the precinct where the blaze is being fought. The "classicist" will tend to noninterference since his vision, either because it is liberal or automatic, can depend only on the cautionary counselling of individuals about acts that might transgress against another's rights as defined by ordinary law. He will not seek to substitute policy for the law. In the one case the theorist may seem powerful; but in the other the macroexpert will gather into his hands specific powers which seemed unimaginable in the palmier days of normalcy. At the same time the main thrust of his effort will become limited to the arena of the crisis.

This is but one of the jousts between freedom and coercion in which the expert becomes an accomplice. In general, it is the one in which he may be least accused of power-grabbing: both people and authority literally implore the expert to settle their worst crises. Bankers, workers, scholars and statesmen join in the unanimous howl to summon the specialist. This is not to say that societies frequently emerge from their black moments by the intervention of calculating expertise or that the expert enjoys a pleasant reception

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once he appears. There is, nonetheless, a much greater willingness to let the expert roll up his sleeves and tinker while politics takes a holiday.

The practical curtailments of this process are all too evident, as a simple example should suffice to illustrate. In 1933 virtually all Americans, perhaps 90 per cent, ranging from the United States Chamber of Commerce to socialist ideologues, felt that some steps toward government control over the economy had to be taken. The field of action was thus quite favorable for macroexpertise; and, aside from the bewildering variety of emergency plans submitted to the government privately or corporately, it found its locus in the loose group of economic advisors that was to become known as the "brain trust." Some members of this group were known to favor solutions comprehending national, though not specifically socialist, planning, usually organized through a National Economic Council with *ipso facto* legislative power. In the economic literature of the time it was not exceptional to read statements such as: "the basic industries must be taken from the sphere of political manipulation and carried on purely as a scientific and technological enterprise." [7] A whole school of economists began to speak of the inadequacy and inaccuracy of earlier premises and "laws." In many circles, there was a confidence in expertise and pure technique, or a willingness to recur to them, never before identified in America.

Of course residual political attitudes made such a solution extremely unlikely, even if President Roosevelt had had much doctrinaire faith in it. Wisely he accepted as much efficient pragmatic control as the traffic would bear, but justified it to the nation on grounds of humanitarianism, fair play, and the moral value of employment, not in terms of a technocratic Utopia. A reading of his address introducing the National Industrial Recovery Act cannot fail to impress by its abstinence from all dogmatism and its cultivation of traditionally American themes. If we did not recognize the peculiar political development of our country, our surprise might be great at the envenomed backlash from some quarters which was to greet the President's modest emergency measures.

Even in severe emergency, macroexpertise, or the hint of it, confronts many antagonistic interests which attack its "purity" on grounds of politics, precedent, or fear of coercion. At the opposite pole from the American manufacturers and Stock Exchange, Simone Weil, from her unorthodox and deeply felt anarcho-revolutionary tradition, was writing in France:

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> The most significant movement [in curtailing liberty] is the technocratic movement which has, allegedly, in a short space of time covered the surface of the United States; as we know, within the boundaries of a closed national economy, it aims at the abolition of competition and markets, and an economic dictatorship sovereignly exercised by the technicians.[8]

Macroexpertise in America has foundered whenever it was possible to rationalize it as a political threat to a generally conservative order. But putting aside for the moment the position of American expertise today, we should consider why America is so sensitive on the subject. Chiefly, there seem to be two reasons. The first is that in a bountiful, complacent, and sheltered country, we have been led to place untold reliance on the operation of a system that is very purely political. Secondly, and this is the point I should like to develop, because of our youth as a nation, our traditions and habits are mainly those of the nineteenth century. Concepts peculiar to a brief segment of history tend to seem like a norm to us, whereas older nations may not be similarly affected. The nineteenth century was much more an age of deeds and acts—and of heroes and villains—than of expertise. If it was an age of crisis in the social order, it was still not the time in which that crisis was made most explicit. Americans learned in the nineteenth century to say with Carlyle: "By nature [Man] has a strength for learning, for imitating; but also a strength for acting, for knowing on his own account." [9] They continued to say it in the twentieth to a very great degree and were inclined to express scepticism or outrage when events challenged the noble axiom.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had known their share of technical tinkering: it was probably a complement of the growth of centralized monarchy. Mercantilist economics, especially in France, is almost a symbol of this condition. Colbert and his school, as well as later financial innovators like John Law, exercised a degree of control over the national wealth which the nineteenth century would have found immoral and the twentieth, in the democracies, at least unnatural. In the disappearance of this system of regulation a number of factors are evident. But one which is too often overlooked is that the growth of national enterprise had outrun the possibilities of technocratic control. As one historian writes: "This partial abandonment of internal mercantilism [by the British after 1660] was no doubt largely due to the fact that the monarchy

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no longer had an administrative system effective enough to maintain national regulation of economic life." [10]

Today expertise seems resurgent not because technocratic talent has again caught up with the ever-accelerating spread of national activity, but rather because our crisis is so deep that, despite serious obstacles, the rational ordering of this activity seems a *sine qua non* if our precarious system is not to collapse. In many instances it is being done *à contre-coeur*. Some of our most ponderous difficulties now arise from our having, for the first time in history, it seems, to apply wide resources of macroexpertise to what looks suspiciously like a cosmopolitan situation. But we have developed no "laws" beyond the imperatives of crisis, nor perhaps can we. "As long as governments protect the learned, in theory and practice, one remains in the old regime," wrote Henri Saint-Simon. "But from the moment the learned protect governments one really begins the new regime." Pragmatic appeals to the expert may grow more and more preponderant; they do not necessarily usher in the new order.

The Sociological Vision *

If the nineteenth century was not the great age of practicing expertise, it was the great *atelier* for theories of total expertise, or what is generally called technocracy. But we must be careful to distinguish between license for technocratic direction and the more inclusive realm of sociological system-building. Basically we may say that there are two predominant strains of system-building proceeding out of nineteenth-century theory. There is, first of all, the tradition of ideal utopian constructs, like those of Comte and the Positivists, proceeding from the general belief that man can capture the secrets of nature—including his own nature—and bend them to his will, thereby achieving the just and harmonious society in which he can expect peace, stability, and the due reward for rational effort. In this school of thought the nineteenth century combines three strains: historical utopianism or the wish for a rational order, as manifested in the schemes of Plato, More, Campanella, Bacon, etc.; the distillation of the philosophy of the *Aufklärung*, whose most important premise was that man's inherent reason was capable of liberating him from disorder; and the growing observation of social inequity and class struggle following the turbulence

* I have obtained many ideas from the brilliant posthumous work of Georges Duveau, *Sociologie de l'Utopie*, Paris, 1961.

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of the French Revolution. Many of the solutions of the "utopian" school tended to become attached to the rise of socialism, just as their proponents became described as socialists; but it was less a socialism of class apocalypse than one of efficiency and control with production publicly or technocratically organized.

The contrary method of system-building may be generally described as German historicism, with Hegel as its most refined exponent. In historicism the idea of Utopia loses its vigor, not because it ceases to be a goal but because men cease to build it; it is not achieved through the agency of men but under the supervision of historical will. Not surprisingly, elements of this kind of determinism periodically infect the utopian school, which is mainly French, thereby contributing to the difficulty of generalization. Marx—who, for these and other purposes, belongs to the Hegelians—postulates, as is well known, a societal perfection in which struggle dies and the state "withers away." This might be classified as a Utopia; but it actually is so marginal compared to the business that counts—class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat—that we may be forgiven for awarding it a very humble prominence in the system of that great Protestant and prophet.

The two schools discussed seem to present the following characteristics. *Struggle* is the essence of the system proposed by the revolutionary historicists: the end-product is rather sketchy. *Organization* is the essence of the utopian system, without a great deal of attention paid to process. The latter can apparently be legislated or enforced (e.g., by Napoleon, as Saint-Simon hoped). *Expertise* is central to the vision of the utopists. Technological experts will regulate the activities of society; they will indeed be more important than customary government in this respect. *Expertise* is negligible, theoretically, in the Marxist or any other system deriving from the premises of historicism. In the case of Marxism, the mission of history is entrusted to a class that gains its pedigree from the bias of history, not from any demonstrated capability to exercise and enforce technocratic judgment.

Expertise, then, cleaves to the utopian school of systems, which probably had its most capacious and profound exponent in the person of Saint-Simon, the patron saint of technocrats. "Imagine," said Saint-Simon, "that the nation loses Monsieur, princes, cardinals, bishops, judges, and in addition, ten thousand of the richest property owners among those who live off their incomes without producing. What would the result be? This accident would certainly

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afflict all the French because they are good . . . but no political harm to the state would result." On the other hand, if France were to lose a fraction of this number of producers, whether of the learned or managerial kind, it "would become a body without a soul" and would need "at least a generation to repair the damage." [11]

The historical lines formulated and then advanced by Saint-Simon, which have led through Comte and Durkheim to Jean Monnet and even, in certain respects, to General De Gaulle, need no defense as a continuing tradition that retains political vitality—to say that Marx was a more influential socialist is to miss the point entirely. The aristocratic French technocrat was the first to say, with detail, that the state should be given over to the experts. In his own time, he was willing to operate as the *soi-disant* advisor of Napoleon, perceiving that technocratic unity is most easily imposed by a conqueror, but also having that amazing insight, unavailable to Marx and the historicists, that unity is, in fact, plural and permissive. "Human conduct is intelligent and enlightened only to the degree it is directed by theory—though theory cannot be productive except on condition of its not being limited to pursuit of practical ends," [12] comments Durkheim, interpreting his master.

Many have remarked on the Saint-Simonian lineage of aspects of European integration. But if Saint-Simon is indirectly responsible for some of our most promising successes in the West, he also carries the banner of technocracy into battle against liberal politics. There is no sense in pointing to the fact that the other side has stifled parties and parliaments already. We should instead make the distinction that the one side believes chiefly in the power of historical momentum and that the other believes in human cunning. This is surely a prime difference.

Let us look for a moment at the image of *pax perpetua* which a variety of eighteenth-century philosophers so optimistically constructed. One contention was that this could be achieved through some radical surgery on human nature; this, in economic terms, was at the basis of the Communist belief, although limited success led them to succumb to the easier solution of *imperium.*

The Western belief hovers between trust in a controlled liberal chaos and the cultivation of a dedicated technocratic elite (Saint-Simonianism) which might have both the ardor and intelligence to lead us out of our difficulties. We elude the main issue if we speak naively of a world struggle between two types of socialism: the question of socialism as such has, frankly, been superseded. But

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we may be very right in questioning the axioms of control which our advancing choices impose on us.

We are indeed faced with the choice of believing either that final problems can be finally solved or that they cannot. Expertise, though by no means every expert, is committed to the idea that they can; this type of expert is constant throughout the last several hundred years of Western history—whether or not God or magic or science is invoked. A recent and highly intelligent commentator on the political avatars of modern science has had the following observation to make: "The scientist's quest for certainty and his confidence that reason and new methods can solve man's problems are reinforced by his conviction that something which is theoretically possible is also most likely to be politically possible." [13] The eternal question is posed. If this were true, would it be worth the sacrifices of traditional liberty to follow reason's dictates toward a promised land which no man has ever quite imagined, much less tasted and enjoyed?

*Freedom, Power, and Expertise**

Whether we like it or not, the existence of collegial expertise in close relationship with the state raises the problem of freedom and coercion. Few experts wish to prevail, to *become* the power—indeed their temperament and inclination are usually otherwise—but their function demands that they should wish their ideas to prevail. Perhaps it is desirable that, in the words of Saint-Simon, "the learned should protect governments" from their ignorance and vulgar errors, from their biases, from their inaccuracy and abuses of power. But it is just possible that governments will not wish to be thus protected, and it is especially likely that governments which claim, rightly or wrongly, to derive their authority from the people will look askance at this fundamental contradiction of their *raison d'être.*

But let us not confuse the model with the reality. History begets ingenious compromises which bear little resemblance to the philosophical controversies raging in its soul. Thus all regimes are, more or less, mixtures of license and coercion, chance and planning, expertise and ignorance. What counts, then, is probably not so much

* I have found some useful hints in Isaiah Berlin's lecture-monograph *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford, 1958), though his arguments have only an oblique bearing on the substance of these paragraphs.

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the results obtained as the fundamental doctrine by which an organized society sets about its business. Were a national society to commit itself to the proposition that "the learned should protect governments, and consequently the governed," the repercussions on our political value system would be tremendous. If, however, the same doctrine is introduced pragmatically, inch by inch and never far in excess of current crisis requirements for expertise, a society may learn to live with it, just as republican Rome "saw its ancient liberties stripped away" but turned into a tolerably well functioning Empire. Our current notions of political liberty, however jealously we cling to them, are historical upstarts. Previous societies went without them and prospered, at least for a time.

No man is thereby prevented from making a value judgment about wanting liberty and wanting it more than any conceivable kind of "scientific regimentation." Deeds and opinions involving human alternatives do create history; science, still in quest of the *just city*, has not done so up to this date, unless one considers history itself a science, albeit one that can neither be proved nor disproved. We must, it seems, deal first with the question: can science make history and make it orderly, provided that human beings are persuaded or coerced to act according to the precepts of order?* Is proper technocratic organization, in effect, nothing less than the general will itself and a guarantee against the worst forms of coercion?

Perhaps all this is just to play cruel tricks with the pros and cons of voluntarism. One starts with the hypothesis that man is free, or he is not. Certain consequences follow if we accept the electrifying analysis of Georg Buechner: "I find in human nature a shocking equality, in man's fate an ineluctable power granted to all and to none. The individual is nothing but spume on the wave, greatness is a simple accident, and the force of genius a puppet's dance, a laughable struggle against a brazen law." [14] If this *cri de coeur* is true, then it would seem to make rather little difference if man's activities are highly ordered and organized; in fact there may be a positive advantage in giving power to those whose intelligences are more apt to be in communication with the ineluctable pattern of human destiny.

* Here we intend also the less ambitious question: can science achieve maximum order? This might lead us in turn to ask: Is order a valid human goal? What, if any, are its connections with happiness, welfare, fulfilment, satisfaction?

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But if man is free, at least within the spectrum that his social relations will decide, then any man could be led to construct exhaustive and confusing catalogues of legitimate freedoms. The expert re-enters the political picture in the possible role of adjudicating among conflicting freedoms. But this is a different kind of expert from the one who uses the whip of science to drive governments and peoples toward the gleaming turrets of the just city. The "liberal" expert is in fact, as Walter Lippmann has correctly perceived, the judge and not the technocrat.[15]

There is a third solution, politically much more familiar, which defines the expert's oscillation between knowledge and power. This is the notion of crisis counsel, or, as we have previously termed it, macroexpertise. In this image, the expert guides power only to the extent that crisis requires the abrogation of accepted political function. Macroexpertise implies that the expert's hold on the reins slackens as the crisis recedes, that the expert's power is at all times politically revocable, and that the expert is concerned purely with the diagnosis and cure of functional disorder and not with commanding the construction of the just society. The possible criticisms of this solution are apparent, from both sides.

On the one hand, the expert may be badgered by incessant review and interference, and rendered unable to do his job properly. On the other hand, he may covet power discreetly and devise ways for increasing his hold on it or for perpetuating his usefulness. He may become a pawn or ally of political elements themselves contending for a greater share of power. Probably, however, he will not build the just city and impose it on his fellows. The question is one of measure, and measure is an instinctual talent.

We should underscore the element of revocability, for this mechanism joins expertise squarely to the political process. There is the danger it might be used capriciously—politicians are not, after all, supreme metaphysicians—but the danger is greater in theory if the instrument is not available. Let us not ignore, however, that as crisis lengthens and new political relations become customary, revocability could become a dead letter. Since many believe that the invention of nuclear weapons has, in fact, ushered in an era of perpetual crisis, this possibility may be worth considering. In such a situation entrenched expertise might be expected to cultivate the natural belief that it was not merely a salvationary convenience but a real improvement over what had gone before. Thus "Utopia" might be

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reached without even having first been spied in the distance and admired.

The practical question is one of priorities and personnel. Societies must always decide between their principles and their security. Today's expert, from all observation, stands ready to help and not to take power. The political resistances against even the modest exercise of his talent are tremendous, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In fact, he normally acts in such a way as to demonstrate his political humility, as before committees of the Congress. Furthermore, he is often at odds with his own peers over scholarly and political issues, and he does not especially cherish his capacity for collective action. Who can fear him?

Only the long-range history of our world's crises, the changing sociology of the expert group, and the acts and abnegations of statesmen can ultimately decide whether the learned will one day protect governments and whether or not this will be, in Simone Weil's words, "oppression exercised in the name of function."

In Place of a Conclusion

Today the position of the expert is vastly enhanced in his function of macroexpertise because nations have been deeply involved in vast and periodic crises. But the Saint-Simonian dream of the "administration of things" has not been fulfilled. The expert is neither the Party in the Soviet Union, nor is he the government apparatus in the democracies. He may, however, be moving increasingly into these spheres, by a mode of adaptation that is not altogether clear, as crisis succeeds to crisis and generates an atmosphere of perpetual emergency.

In three areas his expanded role particularly stands out. The first of these regards the critical problem of bringing the ex-colonial nations into the world community and animating their economies. This process is still too young to be much more than speculative, but the penchant of the new nations for "arriving in a hurry" *via* the planned society and the customary requirement of a national plan as the prerequisite for economic aid are straws in the wind.

The second area where the expert is especially involved—with the United States leading the way—is military strategy and corollary notions such as arms control. Military planning has become an arcane subject increasingly detached from the political process—as such slogans as "push-button war" and "command and control system" eloquently indicate. Few pretend that this hypothetical dis-

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parity between action and consultation is going to diminish or that the role of the expert will be any less significant in establishing doctrine. The American people place great faith in the delegation of political power where the matter of security is concerned—a willingness they certainly do not show in the economic field. But the question must be raised: is there a point beyond which the learned will indeed be protecting the government? The concept of disarmament with heavy doses of control and inspection presents some analogous problems and prospects for the expert.

Thirdly, amid some juvenile disorders and national recriminations, an entity called "Europe" seems to be emerging. There is an undercurrent of controversy as to whether it shall be a "planned Europe," as emphasis on function might indicate, and to what degree it will inevitably have to be planned. Brussels has become the city of experts, perhaps even more so than Washington. "Europeans" are debating these questions; and many believe that it is here that Saint-Simon has the greatest chance of achieving success. The pure political tradition shared by ourselves and some of the Commonwealth nations does not act as so great a counterforce on the Continent, though diplomacy may, and the polytechnician—"the man who knows everything, and nothing else"—is held in higher esteem. One Belgian analyst has written: "The act of decision itself should remain completely the prerogative of the politician, himself the technician of that *ars artium*, the government of men." [16] Others are far from agreeing. But the quality that perhaps strikes one most forcibly about the technicians of the "new Europe" is that they are workers first and visionaries only second. Despite the vast temptation to construct their edifice on notions of the *just city* and to spin a sociological myth thereon, it is precisely they who are most aware of practical limitations and the concurrent demands of policy and action outside of Europe. This realism could not be a more hopeful sign.

What, finally, of the expert in power: that goal of the utopians, bugbear of the liberals, and conceivable recourse of the zealous and discouraged alike? We have already hinted that the traditions of this civilization militate heavily against such a solution, short of the incidence of all-out catastrophe, in which case the experts are as apt to be executed as summoned. But there seems also to be a radical discontinuity between the application of knowledge and the exercise of power that cannot be totally explained away as administrative imperfection. Power relies upon an unbalanced formula of

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knowledge in which expertise is never fundamentally at home. Its abuses may be attributed to this imbalance; but so, then, must be its successes. One may doubt that any crisis, even the ultimate one, will be construed as grave enough to consecrate the millennial reign of the expert in our society.

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JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN and JAY KATZ

Why an "Insanity Defense"

THE CRIMINAL LAW is one of many mechanisms for the social control of human behavior. It defines conduct which undermines or destroys community values. It seeks to protect the life, liberty, dignity, and property of the community and its members by threatening to deprive those who contemplate such conduct, and by depriving those who engage in proscribed activity, of the very values the law is intended to protect. The sanctions authorized, whether they be designed to punish, restrain, reform, or deter, constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, dignity, and property. Because of the inherent conflict between the values ultimately to be preferred and the sanctions authorized, the criminal law has sought to minimize the consequences of this paradox. Through rules of law it restricts the state's authority to intervene. One of these rules is that before the state can inflict sanctions it must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, each material element of the crime charged so as to overcome the presumption of innocence which favors all of us.

Traditionally, the requisite material elements of a crime have been a *voluntary act, purposely causing a result* which is deemed offensive. In so defining crimes, lawmakers seek to exclude from liability those whom the community would not wish to restrain. The state cannot hold a person criminally responsible for murder, for example, if there is no causal relationship between the shot fired and the death of the victim; or if the shot was fired without the intent (*mens rea*) to kill, even though death was caused by the shot; or if the victim did not die even though the shot was fired with intent to kill. Recognizing that the elements of a given offense may not

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be sufficiently precise to exclude all those who ought to be free of criminal liability, the state has formulated exceptions which are called defenses, for example, self-defense. The evaluation of any device for sorting out who is and who is not an appropriate subject for criminal sanction requires identifying the community goals being supported or subverted. No device has troubled the administration of criminal law and obscured the goals involved more than "insanity" as a basis for relieving persons of criminal responsibility.

Criminal responsibility results when each element of a crime charged against an accused has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then is the state authorized to exercise its power to impose certain specified sanctions against the offender.[1] "Insanity" at the time of the offense, we are told, relieves the offending actor of criminal responsibility. This may mean that "insanity" is to serve as *evidence* which precludes establishing a crime by leaving in doubt some material element of an offense. Or this may mean that "insanity" is to serve as a *defense* to a crime, even though each of its elements can be established beyond doubt, so that a value threatened by the imposition of an authorized sanction can be safeguarded. "Insanity," however formulated, has been considered a defense. To evaluate such a defense, it is necessary to identify the need for an exception to criminal liability. Unless a conflict can be discovered between some basic objective of the criminal law and its application to an "insane" person, there can be no purpose for "insanity" as a defense. Until a purpose is uncovered, debates about the appropriateness of any insanity-defense formula as well as efforts to evaluate various formulae with respect to the present state of psychiatric knowledge are destined to continue to be frustrating and fruitless.[2]

To demonstrate the kind of analysis essential to a meaningful examination of insanity as a defense, we think it useful to analyze the concept of a traditional and seemingly less complex defense such as self-defense. If a person intentionally kills another human being, the criminal law, in support of a basic community objective—the protection of human life—defines such conduct as a crime and authorizes life imprisonment of the offender.[3] Few would disagree about the ultimate objective of protecting life, but there may be little or no consensus about what deprivations are appropriate or what purposes they are to serve.[4] The imposition of life imprison-

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ment rests on a variety of conflicting and mutually inclusive assumptions shared by legislature, court, and community about deprivation of liberty and its psychological significance. As *punishment,* life imprisonment is assumed to satisfy and channel the community's need to express feelings of vengeance or desires to effect rehabilitation of the offender.[5] As *restraint,* it is assumed to remove from circulation a person who is believed likely to kill again, to provide a structure for satisfying community vengeance, or to offer an institutional opportunity for care and rehabilitation. As *rehabilitation,* it is assumed to reduce the likelihood that he who has killed once will kill again, to increase the likelihood of returning an individual to the community, and to provide a basis for rationalizing community vengeance. As a *deterrent of others,* it is assumed to reinforce internal controls over the urge to kill through external threats of punishment, restraint, rehabilitation, and stigmatization. Thus, through a variety of assumptions which may or may not be related to an actual impact on any one offender or on other members of the community, life imprisonment becomes the sanction for one who kills another intentionally.

Intentional killing in defense of self, however, is an exception which denies the state authority to impose the sanction authorized for intentional killings. This exception rests upon the necessity of allowing a person to protect himself from lethal harm in cases where there is no time to resort to the law for protection. Thus under circumstances where by definition one of two must die, the law seeks a solution least incompatible with its over-all objective of protecting life by preferring the life of the "law-abiding" citizen, that is, the man whose inner controls reinforced by the threat of external sanction hold in check his urge to kill except when his own life is jeopardized by someone not so deterred. The law thereby recognizes that the sanction for intentional killings is drained of any deterrent strength when external reality's system for protecting life fails and in turn releases internal reality's instinct for self-preservation.[6] Conceptualized another way, authorizing the potential victim to kill his assailant constitutes a sanction which may be assumed to fulfill punitive, restraining, and deterrent functions in the service of the community's objective to safeguard human life.[7] Thus, when a situation is identified in which the application of the authorized sanction would conflict with basic criminal-law objectives, a rational system of law would seek first to articulate why such an application

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is inappropriate and then to formulate the exception to accord with those objectives.

Having articulated the reasons for an exception to liability for intentional killings in defense of self, it becomes possible to evaluate such formulations as for example, the actor's right to stand his ground and meet force with force, or the actor's duty to do everything reasonably possible to escape without resorting to the use of deadly force. The first formulation subordinates the value of safeguarding human life whenever possible to the values of safeguarding a threatened man's right to protect his interest in property as well as his right to be free from the stigma or uneasiness associated with cowardice. The second formulation prefers the value of safeguarding human life whenever possible. Conceptually and probably in practice, the latter formulation would best serve to protect both lives. Its application would restrict to a minimum the number of instances where there is no choice and where one life must be favored over another. The sanction authorized for intentional killings, therefore, remains operative except in those situations where the choice is between one of two lives, not between, for example, life and an interest in property, pride, or reputation. Thus lawmakers, with the community values identified, can select a formulation for self-defense which is most compatible with overall community goals.

With this framework for identifying a need for an exception to criminal liability and for evaluating formulations to meet such a need, we turn to an examination of the "insanity defense."

Like self-defense, the insanity defense applies, theoretically at least, only to persons against whom each of the elements of the offense charged could be established. Like defense of self, the defense of insanity, if successfully pleaded, results in "acquittal."[8] But unlike the acquittal of self-defense which means liberty, the acquittal which accompanies the insanity defense means deprivation of liberty for an indefinite term in a "mental institution."[9] And, unlike the purpose of self-defense, the purpose of the insanity defense either has been assumed to be so obvious as not to require articulation or has been expressed in such vague generalizations as to afford no basis for evaluating the multitude of formulae.

Neither legislative report nor judicial opinion nor scholarly comment criticizing or proposing formulations of the insanity defense

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has faced the crucial questions: "What is the purpose of the defense in the criminal process?" or "What need for an exception to criminal liability is being met and what objectives of the criminal law are being reinforced by the defense?"

The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) disposed of this issue with apodictic assurance by asserting:

> We make one fundamental assumption, which we should hardly have thought it necessary to state explicitly. . . . It has for centuries been recognized that, if a person was, at the time of his unlawful act, mentally so disordered that it would be unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought not to be held liable to conviction and punishment under the criminal law. Views have changed and opinions have differed, as they differ now, about the standards to be applied in deciding whether an individual should be exempted from criminal responsibility for this reason; but the principle has been accepted without question. . . .[10]

Thus the Royal Commission reiterated the well-rounded proposition that "if a person was . . . mentally so disordered that it would be unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought not to be held [guilty, *i.e.*] liable to conviction and punishment." The Commission neither sought to identify the purposes of not imputing guilt to individuals whose conduct would otherwise be criminal, nor did it ask why and when does the imputation of guilt for being "mentally so disordered" become "unreasonable." The Commission had no basis for evaluating the changing views and opinions "about the standards to be applied," and the principle "accepted without question" remained without meaning.

A century earlier the pattern had been firmly set of accepting an insanity defense without asking: "Why an insanity defense?" or more appropriately, "What objective of the criminal law suggests the need for an exception to the law's general application—an exception which would require taking into account the mental health of the offender?" In *M'Nagthen's* case (1843), the House of Lords, acting in their judicial, not legislative capacity, asked only what is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with "insane delusions." And the innovating court in *Durham* (1954), after promulgating a new formulation, gave no guide to evaluating its adequacy beyond noting:

> Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame. . . .
>
> The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those who, of their own free will and with evil intent (sometimes called *mens*

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rea), commit acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts. Our traditions also require that where such acts stem from and are the product of a mental disease or defect . . . moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not be criminal responsibility. . . .[11]

The court leaves without definition and without identification of purpose such ambiguous words as "punishment" and "blame,"[12] and thus in effect only says "he who is punishable is blameworthy and he who is blameworthy is punishable." Never established is the relevance of these words to a defense which would compel supposedly different dispositions of persons involved in activity labeled "criminal." Moreover, the court, though not blinded by precedent, left unasked and therefore unanswered: "What underlies the 'legal and moral traditions' in 'our collective conscience' which prevents us from inquiring why a rule is required?"

Likewise, the American Law Institute (1956-1962) provides no basis for evaluating its formula for a defense of insanity. With focus on consequences, it "explains," echoing the Royal Commission and *Durham,* that the purpose of the insanity defense is "to discriminate between the cases where a *punitive-correctional* disposition is appropriate and those in which a *medical-custodial* disposition is the only kind that the law should allow."[13] Once "*punitive*" is substituted for "*custodial,*" and "*correctional*" for "*medical*" in the ALI statement, the "distinctions" seem to disappear. Moreover, criteria for evaluating what constitutes an "appropriate" disposition for either category remain inarticulate, and thus those characteristics which determine who is to fit into which category remain unidentified. This may be because the distinctions between alternative responses are never clarified. Finally, a Committee of distinguished doctors, lawyers, and religious leaders appointed by the Governor of New York (1958) to improve the defense of insanity, before formulating their rule, pronounced:

> We are unanimously of the view that there are compelling practical, ethical and religious reasons for maintaining the insanity defense; . . . . We believe . . . that it is entirely feasible to cast a formulation which . . . will sufficiently improve the statute to meet working standards of *good morals, good science,* and *good law.* (Emphasis supplied.)[14]

Never identified are the reasons labeled "practical," "ethical," and "religious," or the standards labeled "good morals," "good science," and "good law."

In enunciating yet another formula for insanity, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *United States v. Currens* (1961)

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contaminates its thinking by confusing and merging the inherently incompatible concepts of "insanity" as a defense to a crime with "insanity" as evidence to cast doubt on a material element of an offense. It suggests, as did the court in *Durham*, that some relationship exists between the insanity defense and *mens rea*, a material element of every major crime. In the *Currens* case, *mens rea* (guilty mind) is used to mean that criminal liability rests

> . . . on the assumption that a person has a capacity to control his behavior and to choose between alternative courses of conduct. . . . When a person possessing capacity for choice and control, nevertheless breaches a duty . . . he is subjected to . . . sanctions not because of the act alone, but because of his failure to exercise his capacity to control. . . . For example, an act of homicide will create no liability, only civil liability or varying criminal liability depending on the nature of the mental concomitant of the act. Generally, the greater the defendant's capacity for control of his conduct and the more clearly it appears that he exercised his power of choice in acting, the more severe is the penalty imposed by society.[15]

And the court criticized the *Durham* and *M'Naghten* formulae because:

> They do not take account of the fact that an "insane" defendant commits the *crime* not because his mental illness causes him to do a certain prohibited act but because the totality of his personality is such, because of mental illness, that he has lost the capacity to control his acts in the way that the normal individual can and does control them. If this effect has taken place he must be found not to possess the guilty mind, the *mens rea*, necessary to constitute his prohibited act *a crime*. (Emphasis supplied.)[16]

At this point the court by the force of its own reasoning *should* have been led to say:

> *Without the essential element of* mens rea, *there is no crime from which to relieve the defendant of liability and consequently, since no crime has been committed, there is no need for formulating an insanity defense.*

But instead the court actually concludes:

> We are of the opinion that the following [insanity] formula most nearly fulfills the objectives just discussed. . . .

The court uses the word "crime" first to mean "dangerous conduct" and then, without alerting itself to the shift, to mean technically the establishment beyond doubt of each material element of an

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offense. With this sleight of thought the court shifts focus from "insanity" as a *defense* which is designed to exempt a person from liability for conduct which would otherwise constitute a crime, to "insanity" as *evidence* which would leave in doubt an element essential to categorizing the accused's conduct as "criminal."

In our efforts to understand the suggested relationship between "insanity" and "*mens rea*," there emerges a purpose for the "insanity defense" which, though there to be seen, has remained of extremely low visibility. That purpose seems to be obscured because thinking about such a relationship has generally been blocked by unquestioning and disarming references to our collective conscience and our religious and moral traditions. Assuming the existence of the suggested relationship between "insanity" and "*mens rea*," the "defense" is not to absolve of criminal responsibility "sick" persons who would otherwise be subject to criminal sanction. Rather, its real function is to authorize the state to hold those "who must be found not to possess the guilty mind *mens rea*," even though the criminal law demands that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element of the offense charged. This function, in some jurisdictions, is found directly reflected in evidentiary rules making inadmissible testimony on mental health to disprove a state of mind necessary to constitute the crime charged. A more dramatic expression of abandoning the rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has slipped into those instructions to the jury which advise the ordering of deliberations:

> If you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, you will render a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
>
> *If you do not so find, then you will proceed to determine whether he is guilty or innocent* of one or both of the offenses charged on the basis of the same act.
>
> [T]here are two principal issues for you to determine. The *first* is his mental condition and the *second* is whether he committed the offenses charged or whether he is innocent of them. . . .
>
> Now, on the issue of guilt or innocence of the offenses charged, the essential elements of the first count or the housebreaking count, *if you do not find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity,* are as follows:
> First, that the defendant broke and entered or entered without breaking . . . the place described in the indictment;
> Second, that the place entered was occupied or belonged to the complaining witness; and,
> Third, that he *intended* to steal or commit the offense of larcency. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)[17]

Yet, since a verdict of not guilty results in outright release and a

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verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity results in incarceration, jury instructions must require *first* a determination of innocence or guilt and *second* a consideration of the insanity issue *only* after a determination that guilt can be established.

What this discussion indicates, then, is that the insanity defense is not designed, as is self-defense, to define an exception to criminal liability, but rather to select for restraint a group of persons from among those who would be free of liability. It is as if the insanity defense were prompted by an affirmative answer to the silently posed question: Does *mens rea* or any essential element of an offense exclude from liability anyone whom the community wishes to restrain? Thus, if the suggested relationship between *mens rea* and "insanity" means that "insanity" precludes proof beyond doubt of *mens rea*, then the "defense" is designed to authorize the holding of persons who have committed no crime. So conceived, the problem really facing the criminal process has been how to obtain authority to sanction the "insane" who would be excluded from liability by an over-all application of the general principles of the criminal law.

If, however, the relationship between "insanity" and *mens rea* is rejected, we must try to understand why the consequence of this defense, unlike other defenses, is restraint, not release. Even though each of the elements of an offense may be established, release will follow acquittal if, for example, any of the traditional defenses are successfully pleaded. Assuming, then, that all elements of an offense are to be established before the insanity defense becomes operative, the question remains: "Why restrain rather than release?" Restraint cannot be attributed to potential "dangerousness" associated with the crime charged, no matter how serious, for that kind of "dangerousness" is characteristic of defendants whose defenses prevail. The crucial variable leading to restraint seems to be the "insanity at the time of the offense," that is, a fear of danger seen in the combination of "mental sickness" and "crime."[18] This fear of freedom for those acquitted by reason of insanity comes sharply into focus at the close of the *Currens* decision. The court, uncertain of the consequences of such an acquittal for federal offenses outside of the District of Columbia, warns, in reversing the judgment of conviction: "[W]e are concerned with the disposition of Currens should he be found not guilty by reason of insanity. . . . In any event [in the light of doubt about the appropriate federal procedure for commitment] should Currens be acquitted at his new trial, the federal authorities should bring him and his condition to the atten-

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tion of State authorities to the end that he may not remain in a position in which he may be a danger to himself or to the public." That mandatory commitment, not release, generally follows the insanity defense becomes then particularly striking since, to the extent "insanity at the time of the offense" is related to "mental health at the time of acquittal," the state is authorized to select from the mentally ill those who require civil restraint for custody and care. Thus the insanity defense is not a defense, it is a device for authorizing indeterminate restraint.

The real problem which continues to face legislators, judges, jurors, and commentators is how to restrain persons who are somehow feared as both crazed and criminal. This oft-unconscious fear has precluded thinking about "insanity" in terms of traditional principles of law, whether that "insanity" is conceptualized as doubt-casting evidence or as an independent defense. Though unpleasant to acknowledge, the insanity defense is an expression of uneasiness, conscious or unconscious, either about the adequacy of such material elements of an offense as *mens rea* and "voluntariness" as bases for singling out those who ought to be held criminally responsible; or it is an expression of concern about the adequacy of civil commitment procedures to single out from among the "not guilty by reason of insanity" those mentally ill who require restraint.

The problem of "whether there should be an insanity defense" or "how to formulate it" must continue unresolved as long as largely unconscious feelings of apprehension, awe, and anger toward the "sick," particularly if associated with "criminality," are hidden by the more acceptable conscious desire to protect the "sick from criminal liability." What must be recognized is the enormous ambivalence toward the "sick" reflected in conflicting wishes to exculpate and to blame; to sanction and not to sanction; to degrade and to elevate; to stigmatize and not to stigmatize; to care and to reject; to treat and to mistreat; to protect and to destroy.[19] Such ambivalence finds expression in legislative proposals that persons acquitted by reason of insanity be "committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction [not mental health] to be placed in an appropriate institution of the department of correction [not mental health] for custody, care, and treatment."[20] And such ambivalence has blinded lawmakers to their tampering, through the insanity defense, with fundamental principles on which their authority to impose criminal liability presently rests.

By obfuscating the function of the defense in terms of the ethical

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and religious values of Western civilization to care for the "sick," lawmakers have not only misled themselves but psychiatrists as well who, confused by their own ambivalence, have willingly, defiantly, unquestioningly, or with misgivings, joined in these deliberations. Psychiatrists have participated in the process without identifying the role they must play and without forcing the process to clarify that role. The plea to care for the "sick" muffles the call to segregate the "dangerous" whom the criminal law could not hold. With the real problem so disguised, the fruitless and frequent searches for new formulae and the frustrating and fighting exchanges between law and psychiatry become somewhat understandable. Thus, another low visibility purpose of the insanity defense emerges. That purpose is to keep sufficiently ambiguous the consequences of the "defense," whatever the formula, so as to prevent at least conscious recognition that the prerequisites of criminal liability have been abandoned.

Lawmakers could decide to implement any or all of these now visible purposes. Provisions could be drafted to restrain: (1) persons *charged* with a crime who are feared to be dangerous and/or felt to need care and destigmatization because of a suspicion of criminality coupled with a finding of mental sickness; (2) persons *acquitted outright* of a crime who are feared to be dangerous and/or felt to need care and destigmatization because of criminality coupled with a finding of mental sickness; and (3) persons who have *committed*[21] a crime and are feared to be dangerous and/or felt to need care and destigmatization because of criminality coupled with a finding of mental sickness. In promulgating such provisions, answers are required to a series of questions which must be consciously posed about *restraint*—restraint in what kinds of institutions and for how long; restraint for what crimes and for what mental illnesses; and restraint at whose initiative and at what stage in the process.[22] In responding to these questions, lawmakers will be pouring meaning into "the fear of dangerousness," "the need for care," and the "need for destigmatization." And if obfuscating developments are to be avoided, lawmakers must acknowledge wishes to neglect, stigmatize, punish, and destroy, and must also consider the extent to which these wishes are to be realized through *restraint.* Awareness that such wishes constantly press for satisfaction and that they are in conflict with preferred goals should stimulate the development of formulations and procedures designed to fulfill consciously thought-through preferences. Thus, it may be possible to

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deflect those conflicting and otherwise unconscious wishes which have gained satisfaction under cover of these preferences.

But such efforts by lawmakers to formulate an exception to criminal liability would be premature and may prove unnecessary. More appropriately they should consider abolition of the insanity defense, and examine "voluntariness" and *mens rea* as requisites of criminal liability. Enormous confusion about the meanings of these concepts in the definition of offenses and their construction by the courts suggests that there will be great difficulty in establishing the purposes of these elements as devices for sorting out those to be or not to be subject to criminal sanction. The need for such concepts must be examined in terms of the over-all objectives of a law of crimes. Furthermore, abolition of the "insanity defense" should force focus on the why and the adequacy of criteria for civil commitment and discharge of the "mentally ill." The question underlying each of these examinations must be: "Who are to remain free of state intervention; who ought to be restrained, and for what purposes?" Ultimately this requires coming to terms with such emotionally-freighted concepts as "blame," "choice," "free will," "capacity-to-control," and "determinism," which in the criminal law have remained slogans of exhortation beyond the reach of definition. Will such explorations lead to an insanity defense? If they do, we must know *why*.

References

1. "Sanctions are imposed by the state presumably against, or at least without regard to, the wishes of the individual being deprived. Implicit in the word 'sanction' . . . is involuntariness. In this context involuntariness is not treated as a psychological concept. Thus, for example, imprisonment is a sanction even if imposed on a person who commits a crime in order to be punished or in order to escape cold and hunger in the 'warmth' of a jail. . . . Compulsory commitment for treatment whether by civil or criminal proceeding, and for whatever stated objective, is a sanction so far as the person committed is concerned." Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice," *Yale Law Journal* (1960), Vol. 69, p. 544.

2. The quantitative extent of such debate is suggested by the entries which appear under the heading "Insanity" in the *Index to Legal Periodicals*. Since the *Durham* decision (1954) over 150 articles have appeared whose titles indicate that they deal with some aspect of the insanity-defense con-

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troversy. The *Durham* case itself has provoked almost fifty law journal notes or extended discussions. As of January 1963, according to *Shepard's Federal Reporter Citations, Durham* has been cited—both favorably and unfavorably—in approximately 140 cases.

3. We exclude from our analysis of self-defense the death penalty which may accompany a finding of murder in the first degree, for feelings about that sanction are likely to distort the already complex issues to be unraveled.

4. "As one of the great objectives of all law, and particularly of criminal law, is the protection of life, it follows that homicide must, as a rule, be unlawful, so that it is necessary to consider only those cases in which it is lawful." Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, *A History of the Criminal Law of England* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1883), III, p. 11.

5. Life imprisonment does not necessarily mean imprisonment for life. Persons so sentenced may become eligible for parole on the expiration of a statutory minimum sentence or through commutation by the pardoning authority.

6. The law acknowledges that killings in defense of self are not motivated by aggressive instincts out of control but by the ego's self-preservative interests, that is, to keep itself alive and protect itself from external danger. The ego is moderator, between id, superego, and reality demands. Law and its implementation, as viewed by ego, is part of reality. Law is recognition that id out of control would destroy us as individuals and as a society. Law, then, as a social-control device, rests on the assumption that man's ego and superego need assistance for the control of id.

7. The assailant is thus assumed not to be deterred by the authorized sanction of deadly force in self-defense which for some might have a deterrent potential.

8. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen has observed that: "In very ancient times proof of madness appears not to have entitled a man to be acquitted, at least in case of murder, but to a special verdict that he commited the offense when mad. This gave him a right to a pardon. The same course was taken when the defence was killing by misadventure or in self-defence." Stephen, *op. cit.*, II, p. 151.

9. "Before 1800 in England, and in most jurisdictions in this country, if an accused person was found to be irresponsible by reason of insanity he was forthwith acquitted and no special order looking to his safety or that of society was made. But by the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, the jury, in acquitting such a defendant, accused of a felony, was required to find specially whether such a person was insane at the time of the commission of the act, and whether he was acquitted upon that ground. Upon such a finding, the defendant was committed and detained 'during His Majesty's pleasure.'" Sheldon Glueck, *Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1925), pp. 392-393.

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10. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, *1949-1953 Report, Command* No. 8932 (1953), p. 98.

11. Durham v. United States, Second Series of the *Federal Reporter* (District of Columbia Circuit, 1954), Vol. 214, p. 876.

12. "In all civilized communities, ancient or modern, some forms of insanity have been regarded as exempting from the punishment of crime, and under some circumstances at least, as vitiating the civil acts of those who are affected with it. The only difficulty, or diversity of opinion consists in determining who are really insane, in the meaning of the law. . . ." Isaac Ray, *A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity,* Fourth Edition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1860), p. 2.

13. American Law Institute, *Model Penal Code* (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1956), p. 156.

14. "Report of the Governor's Committee on the Defense of Insanity," *New York Law Journal* (5 and 6 November 1958) Vol. 140, p. 4.

15. United States v. Currens, Second Series of the *Federal Reporter* (Third Circuit, 1961), Vol. 290, p. 773.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 774.

17. Durham v. United States, Record on Retrial under the new rule, reprinted in Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein, Richard D. Schwartz, *Criminal Law* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 776.

18. United States v. Currens, *op. cit.,* pp. 757-776. Earlier in its opinion the court quotes with approval from John Biggs, Jr., *The Guilty Mind* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955), pp. 144-145: "[T]he mental competency of recidivists should be questioned by realistic means at the earliest possible stage. So long as courts judge criminal responsibility by the test of knowledge of right and wrong, psychotics who have served prison terms or are granted probations are released to commit increasingly serious crimes, repeating crime and incarceration and release until murder is committed. Instead of being treated as ordinary criminals, they should be confined to institutions for the insane at the first offense and not be released until or unless cured." (p. 767).

    Similarly this fear coupled with the possibility of an ironic twist prompts Judge Hastie in his dissenting opinion to *Currens* to note: "If we should affirm the judgment below, as I think we conscientiously can, the result of appellant's conviction and the consequent invocation of the Youth Correction Act would be his confinement for an appropriate period in a psychiatric institution for such treatment and supervision as are best calculated, in the light of our present medical knowledge, to accomplish his rehabilitation and cure. On the record this result would be good for the appellant and good for society. On the other hand, as the majority opinion recognizes, it is doubtful whether the federal authorities could require the restraint and psychiatric treatment of the appellant, if he should be retried and, by reason of his mental illness, found not guilty. I think we need not

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and, therefore, should not thus risk the release of one found to be a criminal psychopath when restraint and treatment seem desirable both medically and socially.

"For these reasons I would affirm the conviction and commitment of the appellant. . . ." (pp. 776-777).

19. "[A]mbivalence: love and hatred directed toward the same person at the same time. Ambivalence, which is due to the dual orientation of man as an individual and as a member of society, is universal. In fact, the more one loves another, the more the narcissistic nucleus of the personality hates the loved object. Under normal conditions, however, one of these attitudes is deeply buried. This is intelligible, because there is perhaps no more perplexing situation than to hate whom you love or to love whom you hate. . . . In ordinary life the repressed hatred of a person one loves may break through when one feels betrayed by him." Franz Alexander, *Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), pp. 107-108.

20. "Report of the Governor's Committee on the Defense of Insanity," *New York Law Journal* (5 and 6 November 1958), Vol. 140, p. 4. See also: State of California, *Special Commission on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, First Report* (7 July 1962), p. 34: "In extreme cases, such as that of the homicidal offender, the security required must exceed that required for even the most dangerous convict. . . . [W]e recommend that the dangerous offender who has been acquitted by reason of mental disorder should be placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections at one of its medical facilities."

21. The word "committed" is used rather than "convicted" so as to leave open for decision the question of the stage or stages of the process at which the issue may be raised.

22. For an illustrative set of questions which might be posed, see: Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz, "Abolishing the Insanity Defense—Why Not?," *Yale Law Journal* (1963), Vol. 72, pp. 872-876.

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S. A. BARNETT

"Instinct"

TWO HUNDRED years ago Reimarus regarded instinct as a direct proof of the existence of God.[1] The complex behavior of animals, precisely adapted to their needs yet not intelligent, directed toward evident ends yet not guided by foresight, had long given philosophers an inexhaustible source of moral notions and intellectual conundrums. But today "instinct" belongs to zoology and psychology. What advances in understanding can we claim from this change?

Reimarus, like many after him, made a classified list of instincts (*Triebe*) or impulses to act. Modern ethologists often prefer to begin with a non-committal account, in the greatest detail, of the stereotyped behavior of a particular species.[2] The day of travelers' tales of gorillas seizing women for their harems is over; gossip about the remarkable powers of one's pet dog or cat is no longer likely to appear in learned works.

Objectively studied, much of the complex behavior of animals is found to be remarkably stereotyped: when one has seen the courtship of one pair of great crested grebes (*Podiceps cristatus*), one may feel one has seen the lot. The web of a spider, the song of a bird, the combat between two fighting fish—each is characteristic of the species and as standardized as the structures used by taxonomists for identification. Moreover, these performances are commonly triggered off by patterns of stimulation of equal fixity. The ecstatic zig-zag dance of the mating male stickleback (*Gasterosteus aculeatus*) can be set going by a fragment of wood with a swollen belly; his postures of territorial defense may be induced by the distant passage of a post office van painted the same red as a rival's

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ventral surface.[3] The triggering of behavior may be due to internal or to external chemical agents. That blithe spirit, the lark (*Alauda arvensis*), sings by virtue of occupation of its breeding territory and a certain concentration of hormones in its blood stream. Worker bees (*Apis mellifera*) behave strangely if their "queen" is removed but return to their normal habits of industry if a queenly odor is caused to pervade the hive.[4]

Species-characteristic fixed action patterns are often markedly unadaptable. Sometimes this automatic or machine-like quality benefits other species: a meadow pipit (*Anthus pratensis*) tirelessly feeds the cuckoo (*Cuculus canorus*) in the nest while her own ejected young squeak helplessly outside.[5]

Hormones apart, none of this would have seemed strange to Reimarus—or, for that matter, presumably, to Aristotle. That such fixed patterns of behavior can be found also in man (*Homo sapiens*) is another matter.[6] Yet the "indelible stamp of his lowly origin"[7] is to be found in his behavior in infancy. A new-born child turns his head from side to side in response to a touch near the mouth; if he encounters a nipple or similar object he latches on and sucks. Later, by virtue either of "maturation" or of "learning," he turns toward the source of the stimulus.[8] Precisely analogous observations have been made on the gaping of thrush nestlings (*Turdus merula*) in response to the return of a parent.[9] After some weeks an infant develops the habit of smiling at the sight of a human face (or of a crude representation of the upper part of a face):[10] the smiling is a stereotyped social signal, evoked by a specific visual pattern; it induces a favorable (though not stereotyped) attitude in the adults smiled at and so has survival value. Despite the marked individuality and differences of personality among infants, a substantial part of their behavior consists of standardized acts analogous to the "instinctive behavior" of other species.

In the middle of the twentieth century these statements are easy to accept. We take it for granted that our own species, like all others, has fought its way up through geological time and is a product of natural selection, and that individual development partly reflects evolutionary history. Darwin's suggestion, that selection could give rise to changes in instinctive behavior, has been confirmed in miniature in the laboratory.[11]

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Hence a not wholly false account of animal behavior can be given, in which most actions are represented as having a machine-like fixity: a stereotyped pattern of sights, sounds, odors or contacts evokes a similarly uniform pattern of movements. Each activity fits the performer for its own habitat but none is adaptable to unusual conditions. Such a scheme may be almost appropriate for some of the lowlier members of the animal kingdom: the microscopic larvae of oysters (*Ostrea*) or barnacles (such as *Balanus*) and many others are evidently guided to settlement by a few directed responses[12]—the "forced movements" described by the grandfather of mechanistic behaviorism, Jacques Loeb.[13] But it will not do for even the more complex invertebrates, let alone the Chordates from fish upwards.

Among the forty-seven *Triebe* listed by Reimarus is one which impels movement into the animal's proper environment; another drives the animal to seek food. For the past four decades such wide-ranging, rather unpredictable movements have been called appetitive. Much of this behavior is what K. S. Lashley described as "reaction to a deficit":[14] it is a restlessness induced by a departure from some specific internal state, such as a lowering of the skin temperature or a decrease in blood sugar. This allows *individual* adaptation of behavior to the environment:[15] an animal may range over an area, shift about in its nest or scratch at the walls of a problem box; from this variable behavior a single pattern will eventually emerge—one which leads economically to satisfaction of a need. Such acquired habits often become highly stereotyped in the individual, as we can deplorably see in ourselves.

The habits so developed are a product of reward: they regularly lead to the attainment of a consummatory state, such as a warm skin or a full belly. There may follow quiescence until some other bodily deficit arises. So we reach a picture of behavior directed toward a quite small number of ends, but more or less adaptable in the precise means employed to attain them. The animal so portrayed is active only when provoked by specific need.

Freud seemed to propose such a theory of human motivation when he wrote:

> The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the 'Nirvana principle,' to borrow a term from Barbara Low)—a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle. . . .[16]

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And on instincts (*Triebe*), he wrote:

> The *aim* of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by abolishing the condition of stimulation in the source of the instinct. . . .
>
> By the *source* of an instinct is meant that somatic process in an organ or part of the body from which there results a stimulus represented in mental life by an instinct.[17]

These passages, like most of Freud's writings, are vague on the physiological aspect—with some excuse, since the physiology underlying the behavior he described was, and is, unknown. It is, however, implied that the consummatory state is an absence of sensory input to the central nervous system. But of course, while an animal lives, there is always some input. It is more appropriate, therefore, to speak of optimum stimulation (as Freud implies in the first passage quoted) or of a level of stimulation toward which behavior seems directed.

A great deal of behavior, in fact, seems purposive, even though most philosophers in the past have rejected the notion that animals have foreknowledge of the goals of their complex behavior. Apparent purpose is especially evident in what Reimarus called *Kunsttriebe;* Darwin, in the same vein, wrote of "architectural instincts."[18] A nest, a honey-comb, a web—all these have a species-characteristic pattern which the builder insists on producing, often in the face of difficulty; the movements employed in the building may differ substantially between individuals, according to the demands of the materials and the terrain. (There was a time in London when birds built nests of barbed wire fragments.)

Building by animals makes a profound impression because of the complexity and elegance of the end product: what is attained is not merely a pattern of sensory impulses to the animal's brain but a lasting object which can be examined by a human observer. Since man is a maker he can readily identify himself (so he feels) with builders of other species. For similar reasons the performances of apes as "artists" have a perhaps excessive impact. Morris's chimpanzees, given the opportunity to make colored marks on paper, stopped painting when they had achieved a specific pattern, usually fan-shaped; and, if an unbalanced pattern was offered, an attempt was made to complete it.[19] Here, in an unexpected context, is the predetermined attitude to a specific visual arrangement which we observe in a biologically useful form in the building behavior of many species.

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Nevertheless, even if we include the most spectacular achievements of *Kunsttriebe,* our picture of the ends towards which animal behavior is directed is still grossly incomplete. Darchen has described the exploratory behavior of a cockroach, *Blattella germanica.*[20] This unobtrusive animal is stirred to action, not only by external disturbance and the various internal "drives," but also by anything novel in its surroundings: it does not rest until its environment has been fully explored. The exploration is not prompted by a specific need such as hunger. Such behavior had already been much studied in laboratory animals, especially tame rats (*Rattus norvegicus*).[21] A healthy and satisfied rat, in a favorable environment, expends much energy in achieving variety of stimulation: it is as if it wished to avoid boredom. (This is not an artifact of domestication, for wild rats display this behavior also: but in them it is balanced by an "instinctive" neophobia which protects them from most man-made hazards.[22]) Similarly, monkeys (*Macaca mulatta*) will exert themselves for hours at a time if by doing so they may watch a moving object such as a toy train.[23] The rather uncritical and unanalytical notion of a "curiosity drive," which has appeared in the modern literature, is not a new one. Groos, more than half a century ago, regarded curiosity as "an essential element . . . in all the principal instincts."[24]

In nature, exploratory behavior gives an animal information about its surroundings which can be used later—in a search for food, flight from danger and so on. It makes possible a process often called latent learning because its effects become evident only on a subsequent occasion. Such "learning" reaches its peak in our own species. Despite the Nirvana principle, it hardly needs proving that human beings continually indulge in curiosity, subject themselves to change and even voluntarily endure discomfort and pain without any obvious need to do so. In the process, they "learn." This behavior is by no means a prerogative of neurotics. Indeed, one sort of torture which is *not* willingly sustained is an environment in which external stimulation is almost abolished: in such conditions the opportunity to listen, repeatedly, to a recording of an exceptionally tedious lecture was preferred to silence—a notable index of the desperate state of the subjects. In the absence even of this entertainment, hallucinations and other subjective disturbances were experienced.[25]

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The drive for stimulation is a far cry from the fixed patterns of behavior with which we began. Etymologically, however, it is fitting: the Latin *instigare* has given us our word "instigate," which has much the same meaning; and it shares an origin with "instinct." We now see that much "instinctive" behavior is variable and permits learning; and that some variable behavior occurs unprompted by the immediate demands of survival or reproduction. The lability of behavior is also displayed if one studies, not the finished product in the adult, but development. The fixed action patterns themselves can often be revealed as, in fact, readily alterable by interference in early life. In describing what has commonly been called "innate behaviour" it is easy to imply fixity of development without justification.[26] Most members of a given species are reared in fairly uniform conditions; by altering the conditions one may test the developmental stability of their stereotyped behaviour. Development in general is, in Waddington's term, homeorhetic[27]: that is, if a developing system is driven off course it tends, like a guided missile, to return. Perhaps behavior is a general exception to this rule, owing to the lability of central nervous action.

Certainly, some apparently inflexible "innate" behavior is alterable and, indeed, dependent on a kind of learning. Development of the highly species-characteristic songs of some birds requires that each individual shall have the opportunity to imitate the sounds of older birds of their own species: it is the preference for the song of its own kind that is (evidently) fixed. If such birds are reared alone in sound-proof rooms, their song is grossly abnormal; if they are given the company only of members of other species, the song is abnormal in a different way.[28]

The developmental lability of some stereotyped activities is sometimes a property of only a brief stage in the life history. Lively accounts of abnormally directed following, among ground-living birds such as goslings (*Anser*), have made sensitive periods in the development of behavior familiar.[29] But this sort of thing has long been known to stockbreeders. The rhyme which begins "Mary has a little lamb" describes an example of what is now often called "imprinting": the lamb had only Mary's company at a crucial time in early life; hence a social response came to be evoked by a member of another species.

Among the instincts, or *Triebe,* described in earlier writings is

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(as Reimarus wrote) the impulse of an animal to associate with its own kind and to co-operate with its fellows. Today, we may still moralize about the "herd instinct," but we also carry out systematic experiments on its development. Work on imprinting in birds has attracted the interest of psychiatrists; but there is a big gulf between the behavior of incubated moor hens (*Gallinula*) and human psychopathology. Nearer home is the celebrated work of H. F. Harlow and his colleagues on rhesus monkeys (*Macaca mulatta*).[30] Their work has begun to define the conditions an infant macaque needs if it is to become, in a full, social sense, a monkey. Two kinds of relationship (regrettably referred to as "affectional systems") are important. A young macaque reared without a mother or companions of its own age is incapable of normal sexual behavior: this fundamental "instinctive" activity is misdirected and unorganized. Moreover, in their inability to make friends, the motherless monkeys resemble the human "affectionless characters" who (as John Bowlby suggested in a famous report) result from deprivation of maternal care in the first years of life.[31] But recently, companionship of peers has been found to be as important as maternal care for the young monkey.

It has been customary to contrast "instinct" with "intelligence" or "innate" behavior with "learned." This rigid dualism does not fit the lability of many "fixed" action patterns. In a "higher" animal —perhaps any animal—some modification of behavior is evidently going on all the time. A nervous system is more than a series of connections between sense organs and effectors: it uses information acquired on previous occasions to compute the probability of a given sort of result (a consummatory state) resulting from a given action; and it adjusts its output to the muscles and glands accordingly. The scope for variation in behavior depends on the species, the stage in the life history and the kind of activity; but there is always some individual (as distinct from genetical) adaptation to the changing chances of the environment. One way of describing this continual flux is to say that learning is always taking place; but the term "learning" names a heterogeneous class of phenomena. Its usefulness in a rigorous account of behavior is consequently small.

What determines that behavior shall be modified, that is, that a new habit shall be developed? Similarly, what decides that a fixed action pattern shall be readily evoked on one occasion but not on

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another? Both kinds of questions are commonly discussed under the heading of "drive" (or *Trieb*); as Thorpe[32] remarks, this concept, of being impelled from within, can be found in writings on behavior of all periods, even in fragments we still have from the pre-Socratic Greeks. Certainly, much modern discussion was anticipated in the later writings of classical Greece. When Freud based part of his theory of human motivation on an "instinct of self-preservation" he was echoing the Stoic's concept of the πρώτη ὁρμή.[33] (The modern word "hormone" acknowledges ὁρμή as a remote ancestor.) But the Stoics assigned this property, not to man, but to animals.

One of the difficulties in talking about drive is to decide what questions to ask. An example is the control of feeding in mammals.[34] Logically, though not psychologically, the proper first step is to decide on, say, a stipulative definition of the term "hunger drive." In fact, however, definitions become gradually more precise during experimental work. In a rat (as in other mammals) delicately localized injuries in the hypothalamus can bring about compulsive overeating and consequent monstrous obesity. Obviously, "hunger drive" has increased. But feeding behavior is more than eating: it includes the starting of activity, variable (appetitive) movements which lead to the food, eating itself and stopping. The hyperphagic rats, like some men, do not know when to stop; but, again like some men, they are exceedingly lethargic and do not exert themselves to obtain food. They could therefore be described as having *reduced* "hunger drive." All depends on the criterion used.

Many agencies, external and internal, have an effect on the time at which an animal stops eating. The passage of food merely through the mouth and pharynx has some satiating effect even if the stomach remains empty; so has the direct introduction of food into the stomach. Yet neither of these can be the primary regulator of appetite. Perhaps food consumption over a period is determined by the amount of reserve fat in the body.[35] Whatever the mechanism, in many men the "appestat" is set slightly wrong and allows an inexorable and pathogenic increase in adipose tissue—a lamentable failure of "instinct" in an environment which (unlike that of our remote ancestors) permits both immobility and unrestrained eating.

Recording the total weight of food consumed is useful but may conceal much important detail. In nature, and in the cafeteria situations of some experiments, preferences are evident and are sometimes determined by bodily need. We might talk of a "sodium chlo-

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ride drive" or a "vitamin B_1 drive." Injection of minute amounts of sodium chloride into the hypothalamus induces compulsive drinking in an animal which has already drunk its fill; evidently the "drive" is to maintain a specific salt concentration in the body fluids. A plural interpretation of drive, such as is implied here, is certainly heuristically useful[36]: feeding behavior may be analyzed in terms of a number of separate internal deficits, each instigating activity which ends only with abolition of that deficit. This holds even though the different internal states interact: thirst may preclude eating. Only a kind of pluralism can satisfy the analytical method of physiology.

The body of an animal is maintained in a steady state, often in the face of difficulty. The deficits which impel action include those that tend to disturb this homeostasis. A mouse in a temperature gradient settles at a specific temperature between the extremes;[37] similarly, it builds a better nest in a cold environment than in a warm one.[38] Breathing, that most urgent of all activities, has been observed in newts (*Triton*) and the climbing perch (*Anabas*), both of which rest below the water surface and rise to gulp air at intervals. The frequency at which gulping occurs is precisely regulated by the need for oxygen; and in these animals the appetitive behavior, preliminary to the consummatory act of breathing, can be studied also.[39]

Behavior of this sort is sometimes said to lead to "drive reduction." But much behavior does not fall in this class. Exploratory behavior does not. Yet the opportunity to explore can act as a reward in a learning situation just as food can: that is, instead of offering food or some other source of comfort, as an incentive to learn a new habit, access to a new and stimulating area may be used.[40] Exploratory behavior and play, however, differ from food-seeking and also from mating and other reproductive activities in not displaying "build-up of drive": that is, they are not elicited with increasing ease as time elapses since they were last performed.

None of this diversity is surprising in the light of the survival value of the various activities. Where, as in breathing and eating, there must be negative feedback to regulate the activity, build-up is inevitable. There is no corresponding advantage in a similar internal impulsion to explore: all that is needed is responsiveness to novelty in the environment. The natural-selection process depends

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on, and indeed is an inevitable consequence of, genetical variation in fitness.[41] This variation influences all aspects of behavior. Accordingly we find no single, unifying principle underlying the different forms of "instinctive" behavior: some behavior is homeostatic, some is not; some "learning" depends on reward, but not all; the readiness with which a fixed action pattern, or a learned habit, can be evoked may or may not fluctuate independently of the environment.

Nevertheless, autonomous or spontaneous changes in motivation imperatively demand "explanation." Accordingly, discussions of drive and instinct have sometimes been embellished with mechanical models[42]: a cistern, perhaps, fills with water through a system of valves and pipes, and discharges on being opened with a key. These analogies are now out of fashion, though imagery of this sort still turns up in writings on behavior. But, as Spurway has remarked, the accumulation of a substance, for instance in the central nervous system, could be *in fact* the basis for a progressive increase in the readiness with which an act is performed.[43] In this sort of way imagery can be replaced by description of observed processes or by testable hypotheses.

An obvious defect in the notion of behavior as homeostatic is its lack of precision: it is not enough simply to think of the body as a hard, gem-like flame of constant characteristics. Only some bodily states are nearly constant: in a mammal, deep body temperature and blood glucose vary little; but skin temperature fluctuates and blood adrenalin may rise to thirty times its usual level. A cold skin evokes heat-conserving reflexes; and increased secretion of adrenalin is one of many processes which help to maintain the body in the face of hostile conditions. The rates of some bodily processes must be able to vary widely so that others do not alter. Much variable behavior itself belongs in this category: the central nervous system, which controls the behavior by virtue of an immensely variable output, helps to make steady states possible. Neural variation in function manifests itself in exploratory and appetitive behavior and in the learned habits which emerge from them.

The outcome of a physiological analysis of "drive" promises, then, to be a list of distinct (though sometimes interacting) processes analogous to the list of *Triebe* proposed by Reimarus. But this makes a disorderly and unsatisfying picture. What, in particular,

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becomes of the long standing belief in a "general drive"? The search for a unitary account of the internal springs of behavior has been discussed by Thorpe. He asks: "Is the animal an 'instinct republic' or an 'instinct oligarchy,' or [alternatively] is there in any sense a single governing . . . influence?" [44] Although Thorpe adds, "This is the fundamental question," experimental enquiry demands more specific questions. Thorpe himself asks whether stimulation to perform one kind of act (such as running away) makes performance of another (such as eating) more likely or more intense. Sometimes it does. For instance, rats made "anxious" by pain eat more—a phenomenon already known as a "neurotic" symptom in man.

A quite different sort of observation suggests the hypothesis of a "general drive state." Rats can be made to grow fast or slowly by controlling the food they get in early life. Fast-growing rats are more active and more "intelligent" than slow-growing.[45] In this they resemble animals which have had extra stimulation in early life: mildly stressful conditions during the nestling period improve subsequent growth, learning ability and resistance to stress.[46] Accordingly one might say that the well-fed or well-stimulated rats have the greater "general drive."

These two disparate examples have in common only that they suggest, at least to the unwary, the existence of a reservoir of general energy (analogous to Freud's libido or even, perhaps, the *primus impetus* of Cicero[47]); but nerve physiology gives this notion no support. In ourselves the concept of nervous energy becomes prominent when we find ourselves deficient in it. The old-fashioned term "neurasthenia" names (alas!) a recognizable fact of human behavior; but this is usually held to be due to inhibition, not to shortage of any neural (or psychic) commodity.

The only physiological basis for general drive comes from recent studies of a hitherto neglected component of the nervous system—the mass of small cells in the brain stem called the reticular formation. Responsiveness, alertness, "consciousness" [48]—these depend on the passage of impulses through the reticular formation and a consequent diffuse stimulation of the cerebral cortex. All action, at least in a mammal, depends on this general arousal; and Hebb has roundly declared that the state of arousal is synonymous with "general drive": "the conception of drive [now] assumes anatomical and physiological identity." [49] This "reflex" concept of general drive is a disconcerting departure from the traditions of psychology. Probably

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further shocks will follow as nerve physiology increasingly invades the study of overt behavior.

The most prominent feature of instinctive behavior is its rigidity; yet examination of the idea of "instinct," especially in complex animals, demands—as we now see—a continual emphasis on variable behavior. Variation can be formally described in statistical terms. A danger is that this may lead to elaborate mathematical analysis where there is little worth analyzing. Nevertheless, a statistical frame of reference is often helpful. Any account of instinctive behavior raises the question: how uniform is the population studied? There are two components of the variance between individuals, the genetical and the environmental. When the environmental component is, or can be made to be, high, we are dealing with labile behavior—usually, behavior in which "learning" plays an important part. Where (as in man) the genetical component is also high, we have a polymorphic population. Where total variance is low we have a typical case of "instinctive behavior" or of a fixed action pattern. In the last case it is sometimes said that the behavior is determined by the gene code: this implies the hypothesis (it is no more) that the complexity of the behavior is matched by a corresponding complexity in (presumably) the DNA.[50]

It is, however, never appropriate to say that fixed action patterns are "inherited" or "genetically determined." All the features of an organism are influenced by both genes and environment. This is the principle of epigenesis: development is not an unfolding of an organization already laid down but is a resultant of the interaction of what is given in the genotype with external agencies. It is *differences* between individuals (or between species) that can conveniently be said to be genetically determined.[51] A pair of abnormal genes can make a child imbecilic (as in phenylketonuria) who would have been normal with only one or none. This distinction is more than arid pedantry. The concept of heredity sometimes includes a false implication of a predetermined fate. This error has been exposed by the studies, already mentioned, of the development of behavior, but it still appears. It is especially pernicious applied to man, for instance when it is supposed that traits such as intelligence, madness or criminality are immutable consequences of the genetical "constitution." A phenylketonuric can be preserved from imbecility by environmental means—control of diet in early life.

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If "instinct" is not fixed and not inherited, if its manifestations are so diverse, it may be asked: what then *is* instinct? But this is the wrong question. It is often assumed (unconsciously as a rule) that because there is a *word* there must be a *thing* (or at least a well-defined class of phenomena) to match it. (Such reification might be called a natural human instinct.) But the proper question to ask first is: what are the facts? Some of them have been given in the preceding pages. They show that the terms ὁρμή, *instinctus*, instinct, *Trieb* and drive have had diverse usages. "Instinct" itself is a notable example of what Ogden & Richards[52] call a nomad: it wanders from meaning to meaning, sometimes even in a single work.

The driftings of "instinct" and its predecessors have reflected the attitudes of philosophers for more than two millennia of European speculation, but without breaking much new ground. The problems, adumbrated by the pre-Socratic philosophers and discussed by Aristotle and the Stoics, reappear in modern writings, particularly in those that seek a unitary account of "drive." Heraclitus named, what he supposed to be an ultimate source of animation, ψυχή, which descends to us as "psyche."[53] Today a primary principle is being sought, when it is sought at all, by the experimental methods of physiology. The searchers still employ (and still occasionally debate) one of the Heraclitean axioms— that there is only one mode of being. Although our language is riddled with dualistic expressions, such as mental-and-physical or psychosomatic, the practice of scientists has come to be, willy-nilly, in this regard monistic.[54] Few students of behavior now write of instinct as a "faculty of the mind,"[55] unanalyzed, inaccessible, essentially mysterious.

It is indeed now sometimes urged, with good reason, that the word "instinct" be banished from scientific writing. Certainly, whether we give it up or not, accounts of instinctive behavior (however the latter is formally defined) are more precise and reliable than ever before. But semantic rigor alone is a hollow achievement. Terms such as "instinct," "race," "soul," and many others represent an attitude on the part of the user; and attitudes are not exorcised by logical remonstration. (Granted, insistence on logic can have a prophylactic effect on students.) Ways of speaking which no longer match the needs of the times are not so much consciously discarded as neglected. A worker on feeding behavior, whether in men or rats or blowflies (*Phormia*[56]), is today likely to have as little use for "instinct" as Laplace had for a Creator in his *Système du Monde*. Unlike Reimarus, we no longer find something

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divine about *Triebe*. Instead of lists of instincts we are beginning to be able to specify, at least for a few species, individual deficits, defined in the terms of the physical sciences, which impel action. This promises to give us a plural account of the causes of behavior but one based on a primarily monistic assumption—that we need take account only of a soma wholly accessible to experimental analysis.

This is certainly an advance, given the (usually unstated) aims of science. First it makes possible a more *orderly presentation* of the facts of behavior; secondly it enables us to *predict* behavior more reliably; third, as a consequence, it holds out possibilities for the *control* of behavior—our own as well as that of other species. But there is no occasion for arrogance. Lashley wrote of "instinctive behavior so complex and precise in its execution that we can only stand aghast at the inadequacy of our concepts of its mechanism." [57] A quarter-century later we are only a little less inadequate.

There is still less ground for complacency when we turn to human behavior. The work of scientists is in one aspect a kind of exploration. In another, it is a means of satisfying material needs. Both these command respect. But when scientific enquiry is directed towards the springs of human behavior it can be alarming. To some, scientists seem possessed with a compulsive need to interfere. "Inherent in the dissecting scientific method is that its results can be used only for manipulation, control, and attempts to change." [58] Like cruder statements on the unchanging character of "human nature," this is too absolute. Whether those who make, and those who use, science employ their knowledge solely in the selfish search for power will depend on their own humanity and that of their fellows. Certainly, we have no fixed patterns of behavior to safeguard us against self-destruction. As Haldane has written: "the scope of human instinctive knowledge is limited, and we feel the lack of it. Free will is a hard burden to bear." [59]

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AGNES MONGAN

European Landscape Drawing 1400-1900: A Brief Survey

WE ARE ALL AWARE that since the turn of this century we have witnessed and are still witnessing a profound shift in artistic aims, values and meaning. Nowhere has the change been clearer than in the visual arts—and in the visual arts nowhere more intimately revealing than in drawing, that succinct, immediate, informal visual language which, as more than one writer has noted, is as attuned as a seismograph to every breath of innovation, every slight change of emphasis, every faint echo of discovery. These revelatory qualities are true not only of contemporary drawing. They have existed since pen or chalk or pencil began to mark the surface of parchment or paper, that is since the late Middle Ages. (Ancient drawings on the more resisting surfaces of stone or clay, although often superb works of art, have not the informal, experimental often ephemeral character of lines on paper.)

The number of DÆDALUS devoted to *The Visual Arts Today* (Winter 1960) pinpointed the present position of the arts. The foreword to that number noted that the arts "help define the features of our time. They carry indications of our past and also of our future." A startling section which followed was entitled "The New Landscape," a selection made from Gyorgy Kepes' brilliant book of the same title.

Possibly a brief and, of necessity superficial, backward glance at the old landscape as recorded in the drawings on paper or parchment by the sensitive and disciplined hands of gifted artists will throw some light on the road that has led to our present position. An artist's depiction of the world in which he moves and has his being almost always tells more about him and his epoch than he suspects. One needs the perspective of time to see just how much. We have such a long perspective on the opening of an era, about 1400, whose

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close, roughly in the first decade of this century, we are now beginning also to see with a certain clarity.

With the memory of hundreds of landscape paintings, drawings and prints in our mind's eye, and with the ever present camera ready to record any desired view, it is hard for us to grasp the fact that from antiquity to the late Middle Ages man paid little heed to the scenic qualities of the world about him. Even such a celebrated precursor of the change that was to take place as Petrarch, the first man known to have climbed a mountain for the pure pleasure of the view, was, as Sir Kenneth Clark points out in his *Landscape Painting*, quickly reminded by St. Augustine, whose *Confessions* he held in his hand, of the vanity of all things except the contemplation of the soul. Turning his back upon the grand sweep of Alps, Rhone and the Mediterranean, the panoramic view which had stirred him to enthusiasm, he descended the mountain in thoughtful silence.

Gardens, walled and lovingly tended, were safer places than mountains. As the Renaissance world took shape, they became proper subjects, not only for poets, but also for painters. But charmingly as they were depicted, it can hardly be said that any individual garden had its portrait painted. A drawn or painted garden was highly stylized and had a symbolic meaning. A drawing of a landscape or a garden, existing as an end in itself, was still inconceivable in the 14th century.

Mountains, indeed any landscapes, were depicted only to serve as settings for the *dramatis personae*. Their features were schematized or generalized. In comparison, man, who always occupied the foreground, was of majestic and dominating proportion, often as tall as the tree or building near which he stood.

As for mountains, the traditional—and an ancient tradition it was—way to depict them continued long after Petrarch's climb. Cennino Cennini who was born near Florence about 1370, that is about four years before Petrarch died, gave instruction in his *libro dell'arte* about the correct way to depict mountains: "If you wish to acquire a good style for mountains and to have them look natural, get some large stones which should be rough and not cleaned, and copy them from nature, applying the lights and darks as your system requires." Mountains, or the symbols for mountains—it amounted to the same thing—of the kind Cennino advocates are familiar to us in the backgrounds of late 14th and early 15th century paintings. Sometimes their structure varies a little and they have fantastic peaks, like the points of a meringue and about as substantial, or they resemble soft

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little heaps of sand. Behind the figures, the land rises sharply up toward the top of the page, leaving only a small area for the narrow, empty sky and giving no suggestion of the existence of any further space beyond the limits of the page. A rare and fine example of this early landscape style is seen in one of the earliest surviving drawings of northern Europe "The Adoration of the Magi" (Figure 1; Dahlem Print Room, Berlin).* It is a small $5\frac{5}{8} \times 4\frac{7}{8}$ in. drawing, in pen and ink on parchment, made about 1410 by an artist in the circle of the van Eycks; some noted critics think possibly by Jan van Eyck himself (1390-1440). Rather than the exact representation of a specific locale, the drawing is, in a sense, like a map, indicating through accepted symbols that the dramatic event delineated took place in an open, hilly countryside.

By the mid-15th century, some paintings, several miniatures and a few drawings began to reveal the birth of a new concept of space, of a space that was open and deep and encompassed by air and light, a space in which both men and mountains had precise positions and proportions depending on that position. Benozzo Gozzoli's little pen drawing of "St. Augustine with a Toothache" (Figure 2; Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.), drawn about 1460-63, still has the mountains that resemble little heaps of sand and a high skyline sharply delimiting the area, but Benozzo's figures have volume and begin to take their places in space. Still we would not be sure quite what that space was if the drawing lacked the revealing inscription across its lower edge "How St. Augustine seated under a fig-tree in a garden suddenly felt such a severe toothache that he was unable to speak." Garden and fig-tree need the written words in order for us to interpret the symbols. The informal narrative subject matter is also, of course, indicative of the winds of change.

It was scarcely a decade later that a youthful genius broke the mould. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) made the first pure landscape drawing that we know in Western art. (Figure 3; Uffizi, Florence.) It was the first of many that he was to draw. Like Petrarch, he too had climbed a mountain to survey the view. He records rocks

* With the exception of the Leonardo da Vinci, the Besançon Fragonard and Mr. Thacher's Cézanne, all the drawings referred to in this article have been on exhibition in the United States within the past decade, shown either in the extraordinarily fine series of Drawing Exhibitions lent from great European Collections and circulated by the Smithsonian Institution, or in special exhibitions at the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, and the Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge. The drawings from Chatsworth were lent by the Duke of Devonshire and are reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement.

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and mountains and the distant sea, but the rocks are faceted and bear no relation to those Cennino recommended. Each curving hill has its own individuality and, like the castles ornamenting the hilltops, its proper proportion. As one looks down the level valley to the distance, the hills grow lower not higher, and there is space above them. As for the trees and shrubs in the foreground, the rapid, nervous, parallel curving lines not only give them a suggestion of vibrant form, but seem to cause them to tremble in the heat of the summer day. The twenty-one year old, left-handed artist must have taken a certain satisfaction in his performance, for in his matchless mirror-writing he wrote at the upper left both the Feast Day and its date: "di di Sta Maria della Neve, addì 5 Aghosto 1473." In his maturity he made panoramic views of the Alps in red chalk or sanguine, the first time that medium was used on paper, and wrote his treatise on landscape, again the first discussion of the subject in the Western World.

Leonardo's fresh outlook and inquiring mind did not immediately banish convention. For less forward-looking men, custom held nature in its grip awhile longer. It obviously dictated the settings for the two works we shall next consider. Of widely different geographical origin, they are curiously similar in several ways. Their similarities suggest that in some pictorial concepts, Europe was still a whole. Fouquet's miniature of "Cesar Crossing the Rubicon" and Carpaccio's "Official Receiving an Ambassador" have astonishing likenesses of setting and viewpoint.

Let us go back a bit in time. The learned and gifted humanist, Leon Battista Alberti, following his investigation of the laws of perspective, had written instructions telling the manner in which one could depict three-dimensional space. The Italian edition of his *Treatise on Painting* appeared in 1436. Painters, sculptors and architects of Tuscany and Central Italy were stirred and inspired by his reasoning. The Touraine artist, Jean Fouquet, (*ca.* 1425-1481) who journeyed to Rome to paint the portrait of Eugenius IV became aware during his journey of this new way to view and to represent the world. Alberti, in the year in which his Treatise was published, went to Bologna in the retinue of Eugenius, but Fouquet probably met him in Rome where he moved in the papal circle. When commissioned, after his return to France in 1448, to supply some illustrations for an *Histoire Ancienne jusqu'à César et Faits des Romans,* Fouquet displayed his new knowledge of space and atmosphere in the setting he gave to Caesar and his legions. Caesar's army, dressed

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in 15th century armor, is massed in the left foreground at the river's edge, as Fame trumpets their imminent crossing. It is the landscape, however, not the army or its leader, which dominates the scene (Figure 4; Jean Fouquet, "The Crossing of the Rubicon," Louvre, Paris). The luminosity and airiness of this miniature are marvelously effective, even if its perspective is still somewhat steep and its figures follow the old rules in their scale. The river winding into the background, the mountains gradually losing their sharp clarity as they fade into the distance, the trees diminishing in size the farther away they are, the clarity of the atmosphere: all this proclaims the artist's acute awareness of air and light occupying a given area of three-dimensional space.

About the turn of the century in Venice, Carpaccio (active 1486-1522/27), when confronted with a problem similar to Fouquet's—figures pausing on a ceremonial occasion—sought a similar solution. (Figure 5; Vittore Carpaccio, "Unidentified Scene," Chatsworth.) It is not known what the precise incident depicted is, but once again the scene is dominated by the landscape setting: a broad river, winding into the distance, mountains of diminishing scale, trees spaced like sentinels at given degrees of distance one from another. Carpaccio, working with only red chalk and pen and brown ink, could not call upon variations of tone as Fouquet had done in his miniature, to add depth to his skies. The possibilities of wash were still to be discovered. And yet there is some suggestion of that quality that seems the birthright of all Venetian artists, a capacity to evoke upon a page, often with almost no means, a transparent, enveloping atmosphere.

In Venice, at least ten years before Carpaccio died, there appeared a young artist who was among the very first Italian artists to make landscape drawings as ends in themselves, as finished works of art. Like Leonardo, he loved rocky promontories, dense trees and turreted castles, but he lacked the Florentine logic and precision, and he was not yet clear about perspective. (Figure 6; Domenico Campagnola, "Buildings in a Rocky Landscape," Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.) Domenico Campagnola (1500-post 1552) attempts to suggest space by drawing a rather rolling landscape in which the light and dark edges of the land's contours alternate with each other into the distance. Although there is light and shadow, there is no real depth or air. Another drawing by Campagnola exhibits these same characteristics, but it adds figures of enigmatic significance. (Figure 7; Domenico Campagnola, "Four Infants, One

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Winged, in Front of a Town; An Eagle above Them," Chatsworth; see reprod.) Turrets, towers and battlements dominate the whole background, and slender nude figures of mysterious meaning gather at the river's edge in the left middle distance. In the right foreground, a group of *putti*, one winged and standing, and two seated on a recumbent ram, cower beneath a bat-winged dragon or demon. At first glance, the buildings like those in the Morgan Library drawing, seem to have solidity and massiveness, but on close examination their structure is uncertain, their foundations undefined, their volume undescribed.

The flying demon must surely have escaped from some Teutonic cave; in conception and in intent, he is a most un-Italianate creature. One recalls the legend that Campagnola, Titian's contemporary and occasional assistant, was himself of Germanic origin, if Venetian in education and citizenship. Italian devils and dragons are more solidly corporeal. They need to be in order to survive in the bright sunlight and warmth of Italy. Witches and winged demons have their haunts more naturally in northern forests, where trees drip moss from their spiny branches, where deep shadows suggest secret caverns, and strange shapes hint at weird rites. It is a commonplace that the landscape of fantasy had its home in the regions north and northeast of the Alps.

The graphic artists of those hilly areas have never been surpassed in wild and wonderful imaginings. Their drawings made in the first third of the 16th century, generally in pen on colored paper heightened with white, are like fairy tales. Naturalistic detail merges with marvels of the supernatural. All of nature appears anthropomorphic, every rock and tree about to be transformed into some breathing, twisting creature. Altdorfer of Regensburg was a master of this calligraphic, imaginative style. Nature is depicted as a mystic force (Figure 8; Altdorfer, "Landscape with Tall Spruce," Kupferstichkabinett, Dahlem, Berlin). In the same years that Campagnola was working in Venice, Altdorfer (1450?-1538) was working in the Danube Valley. A far greater distance, however, lies between these two than between Fouquet and Carpaccio. The great spruce in the foreground of Altdorfer's watercolor drawing has almost the character of Jack's Beanstalk. It dominates and divides the drawing: its roots reach into the foreground; its top is invisible in the sky; its moss-hung branches seem sharply incisive, about to close like vises. The woodcutter is a pigmy beneath the immense tree. The

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crumbling houses look like the homes of elves. Nothing in the drawing is still or at rest.

Wolf Huber (1485-1553) of Passau drew somewhat similar landscapes marked with a kindred romantic, imaginative sensibility. His line has a wiry liveliness, as though carrying an electric charge of its own. In the space of a modest page he can encompass a great sweep of mountains and valleys. (Figure 9; Wolf Huber, "View of Feldkirch," Staatliche Graphische Sammlung, Munich.) Suddenly his rhythm will change and, beneath the towering trees and the splendid rays of a setting sun spangling the sky, there will be, in minute detail, a tiny village, a castle, a bridge or a farm. Alberti's ideas of perspective and proportion have no entry here. Always the marvels of nature dominate and dwarf the life and constructions of man. Huber's view of his own town of Feldkirch in its mountain setting is one of the most memorable of the drawn landscapes in which small fact is married with bold fancy.

A few years after these Danube and Venetian artists looked at their own surroundings, a northerner traveling in Italy serenely solved all problems of light, air and distance, proportion and perspective. In his compositions, he combined a northerner's love of detail with an Italian breadth of vision. Standing at the foot of the Aventine Hill, Pieter Brueghel (1525-1569), one day in 1552, looked across the Tiber to the Ripa Grande, Rome's ancient port, and recorded what he saw. (Figure 10; Pieter Brueghel the Elder, "View of The Ripa Grande," Rome, Chatsworth.) A variety of ships, their sails furled, were moored at the foot of the harbor stairs. Up those stairs small figures made their way to the Customs Office at their head. On the far bank a peasant, pulling the lead of his heavily-laden donkey, trudged up the path. The 9th century Leonine tower was high in the clear air. At the right, the Janiculum was still an open hillside. In the foreground, faceless peasants huddled in small boats, were rowing across the Tiber, as a dog barked excitedly from the river's edge; and a peasant filled a bucket with water as his donkey waded behind him. Over all, played the magical golden light and pale transparent shadow of Rome. Two birds flew across the sky. Just above them the artist wrote "A Rypa." There was to be no mistaking the exact spot.

It would be hard to find a document—or a lyric—which would tell more of the simple external daily life of the Eternal City in the mid-16th century or give a clearer account of the Northerner's intense pleasure at being a witness to what was before his eyes. In that Latin atmosphere, Brueghel was moved to create a composition

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which, in spite of its many anecdotal details, has an extraordinary unity and emphasis.

In the very year that Brueghel made this drawing, Michelangelo, working nearby around the bend of the same river at the right, had recently completed his decoration of the Pauline Chapel. With his austere and magnificent conception of man's destiny, Michelangelo would have found little to admire in Brueghel's drawing. All landscape to him was an unworthy distraction. Flemish landscape he would not call true art. Francesco de Hollanda, who was in Rome in 1538, quotes him in a famous passage: "Their painting (that of Flanders) is of stuffs, bricks and mortar, the grass of the field, the shadows of trees, and bridges and rivers, which they call landscapes and little figures here and there; and all this, although it may appear good to some eyes, is in truth done without reasonableness or art, without symmetry or proportion, without care in selection or rejecting. . . ." Only Italian painting could meet Michelangelo's standard.

One wonders how he would have judged the drawing of those Bolognese artists who, working in Rome at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century, changed the course of Italian art with their painted decoration of the Farnese Palace. If their proclaimed aim was to unite the drawing of Raphael and Michelangelo with the color of the Venetians, they had little to fall back on when landscape was wanted. In his drawings, Raphael's landscape was brilliantly stylized in lines of stenographic brevity. Michelangelo's was non-existent. Happily the Carracci had sharp, observant eyes for the physical world, as well as well-disciplined hands. In a drawing attributed to Agostino Carracci (1557-1602), the artist seems to have placed himself in the very midst of a leafy wood and looked beyond the dense and vibrant foliage to the domes and towers of the distant horizon (Figure 11; Attributed to Agostino Carracci, "Study of Trees with a Glimpse of Distant Buildings on the Right," Chatsworth). Long before the Impressionists of the 19th century, he knew that by drawing these distant buildings with short, broken or incomplete lines he would achieve the impression of the vibrant light and air. The great puffs of summer clouds above the tower, and the light and shadow playing over the foreground foliage, suggesting the rustling of leaves, give precise indications of both a summer season and a sunny day. Before the opening of the 17th century, no artist showed in his drawings either a particular season or a precise hour (Huber's setting sun somehow gave little suggestion of approaching twilight. Its function was dramatic and spectacular rather than horological.

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We know the season of Leonardo's drawing from its inscription, and we can guess that of Brueghel's Roman landscape from the peasants' heavy clothing).

Agostino's younger and more gifted brother, Annibale (1560-1609), in his landscape drawings simplified and stylized even further in pliant pen lines. In a drawing probably connected, at least in its time of origin, with the Farnese Palace decoration of the first decade of the 17th century, he too, but with an even greater economy of means, depicts a hot, nearly windless, humid summer day with damp pervasive sunlight eating the shadows even of the quiet water's reflections. (Figure 12; Annibale Carracci, "Landscape: Scene on a Canal," Chatsworth.) A faint horizon line, where sky and water meet, suggest infinite space beyond. It is a drawing which seems to foretell what the Venetians would do with water and light reflections a century and a half later.

The Carracci's fellow citizen and follower, Guercino (1591-1666), was less poetical and more practical in temperament than they were. He made hundreds of landscape drawings (and his forgers have more than quadrupled Guercino's own production) using a quill pen and a reddish brown ink of distinctive color. The acid content of that ink has often eaten through the paper. His landscapes are almost always composed in a diagonal composition which moves from lower left inward to upper right. They are always slightly tilted. In fact, they give the impression, because they are curiously insubstantial, that they might easily liquify; then the melting scene would be funneled off from the lower left corner.

In his drawing, Guercino shows an unflagging love of the picturesque. Unlike the Germans and Netherlanders, his picturesqueness is not that of fantasy and imagination, of nightmares and incantations. Rather it is that of past history: broken antique columns, crumbling crenelated round towers, elaborately dressed anonymous cavaliers, trees and shrubs bent into strange shapes by the wind. Generally he is not moved by the seasons, nor is he affected by the time of day. A steady light with an occasional high wind is his unfailing choice. With his objective eye, however, he can be an accurate and anecdotal reporter. On at least one occasion he proved himself not only sharply observant but vastly entertaining. (Figure 13; Guercino, "Landscape: A River in Flood and Peasants with Axes and Other Tools," Chatsworth.) It is as though he had moved his contemporary television camera up close in order to record what happened one day, early in the 17th century, when the land flooded.

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Rushing waters sweep across the foreground. In the left middle distance, peasants armed with picks, forks, spades and long hooks advance to work on the levees. In the middle distance, a ladder is abandoned against a tree as the water rises. The nearby farm house is half under water. Its occupants are signalling for help from its tiled roof. In the distance a long line of peasants, each one with his hook or pick, is advancing to take his place in the battle against the rising river. At a quick glance, the drawing might seem no more than a river scene with a tall tree and some shrubs. It is only when one begins to "read it" carefully that its reportorial character becomes evident. It is precisely in this character that it is not only picturesque but new and unusual. Not only does it record the forces of nature. It pictures man puny in scale, pitting himself against natural forces in a battle he hopes and expects to win.

Another northerner voyaging in Italy had a different point of view. He seems always to have been aware of the forces of nature, in fact so conscious of them that one wonders if in his stay at Mantua or on his way down the Peninsula, he heard discussed some new ideas about the dependence of motion on force. Surely few artists have been more aware of all aspects of life and thought than Rubens (1577-1640), or more deeply cultivated, in the very best sense of that term. He was fluent in several languages, widely read in ancient and contemporary literature. In Rome, in the opening decade of the 17th century, he absorbed history and archaeology. He learned the rules of open and secret diplomacy. During his travels, his chalk and pen were always with him, copying paintings and sculptures, noting details of architecture. It is clear that he saw and was influenced by the drawings of the Carracci, in fact so strongly influenced that more than once it has been disputed whether a drawing was made by Rubens or Annibale Carracci. Possibly this was a natural confusion since many Carracci drawings were copied even as they came from the artist's hand.

Rubens returned from Italy to his native Flanders, a mature Baroque artist, with an enlarged vision of the world. Nothing shows the energy and complexity of his vital talent more clearly than a study he made of "A Tree-Trunk with Brambles" (Figure 14; Chatsworth). In the lower right, the drawing bears the inscription "afgavellen bladein ende ofs sommighe plaetsen Schoon gruen grase dern kyken" (fallen leaves and in some places green grasses peep through). If, as Dr. Julius Held believes, the handwriting is too crude to be Rubens' own (although it has often been so described),

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it must repeat what he had written, perhaps along the now-cropped lower edge. A warped and knotted tree-trunk, with bursts of jabbing crooked branches thrusts its height diagonally through a tangle of underbrush. The tensile, hindering vines have been unable to pull down the twisted tree. The drawing was first sketched in chalk, then in ink with bistre wash and a few tones of color added. Clearly, this particular bit of evidence of the forces of nature had deeply moved Rubens. He returned to it not only in another drawing but to use it as a part of the background of his painting of *ca.* 1616-20, "The Boar Hunt" (Dresden). To contrast this tangle with its thrust and pull, with the still perfection and clarity of Dürer's "Large Clump of Turf" is to see how the view of the world had changed in a hundred years. How far it had come, too, in the two centuries since Cennino's advice on how to draw mountains!

Rubens who loved and walked often in his own countryside had examined and actually known and observed the tree and thicket—and used his knowledge of it later in a finished composition.

Rubens' pupil, Van Dyck (1599-1641), when he reached England, carried matters a step further. Van Dyck's view of the "Ypres Tower at Rye" (Figure 15; Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, England), which we know he visited in the summer of 1623, reveals in its precise and controlled pen line his technical inheritance from Brueghel. His habit of seeing is similar, too, but there is a billowing in the land and a movement in the sky quite unlike Brueghel's quiet construction. Once Van Dyck had ventured beyond the shoreline into the cool, silvery light of England, he was inspired to do, with brush and watercolor, a remarkable series of landscape drawings that are very different from his pen drawings, freer, bolder, larger. The surge of the hills, the long and deep shadows which play over them, the clouds scudding across the sky are seen with the foreigner's fresh delighted eye. The pale yellow, soft greens and light transparent blues of these watercolors (Figures 16 and 17; Chatsworth) are new in Van Dyck's work.

Just as England's light had been a revelation to Van Dyck, the watercolors that he made were a revelation to English artists and collectors. A competence in drawing (not painting) was part of the cultural equipment of the "compleat gentleman" of the time. Out of the Englishman's admiration and emulation of such landscape drawings as these by Van Dyck, the flourishing English watercolor school was to develop.

Van Dyck's watercolor landscapes have little to do with topogra-

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phy. The 17th century had its gifted artists, however, in that rather dry category. When Henry Howard, Earl of Arundel, that fascinating figure who was a patron of both Rubens and Van Dyck, made a trip up the Rhine in 1636, he took along as his official artist the Bohemian, Wenceslaus Hollar (1607-1677). Hollar's duty was to make a graphic record of the journey. Many of his drawings survive. Two offer precise profiles of at least two of the cities visited, Frankfurt-am-Main and the town of Engers. The ducal party passed the latter on April 30. (Figure 18; Chatsworth.) Apparently their bannered barge was greeted with a fine salvo from the castle's round tower. From May 5th to 7th they stopped at Frankfurt, (Figure 19; Chatsworth) long enough for Hollar to gain an exact idea of the lay of the land, the course of the river and the variety of steeples and towers. Stiff and a little dry, these drawings yet have charm because of their precision, their careful balance, their delicacy of tone and line, their unpretentious honesty. As works of art, however, they are not to be compared either to the drawings of the two great Flemings or to the incomparable landscape drawings of Hollar's exact contemporary Rembrandt (1606-1699), the greatest landscape draughtsman of them all.

The two great Flemings and the supreme Dutchman were near contemporaries in time and not far removed from each other in miles, but they were profoundly different in their reactions to the world around them. These differences are instantly and graphically visible in their landscape drawings. Rubens and Rembrandt each walked in his own beloved countryside, making notations of what he saw, but their eyes were drawn to different sights and their imaginations stirred by different stimuli. For Rubens all of nature had a pulsating vitality. For him every living tree, branch or vine was nourished by an elixir of life which gave it growth and energy. This springing strength he captured in every sketch or study. Rembrandt, who made few detailed sketches of isolated objects, saw a more unified world with a different rhythm. He preferred to regard the Dutch landscape in quiet contemplation, carefully composing scenes of rural tranquillity. His horizons are low, level and distant. Under immense, humid skies, luminous and still, not agitated or stormy, lie quiet fields bounded by peaceful, reflecting rivers or narrow canals. Cattle ruminate in the fields, and ducks glide upon the tranquil waters. Behind worn and tilted palings, the simple thatched cottages are shaded by clumps of sheltering trees. In his drawings even the great wings of the accenting windmills are motionless. Only

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the air vibrates. Kenneth Clark has noted that "Throughout history the landscape of perception has been small." At present, there are nine landscape drawings by Rembrandt from Chatsworth on exhibition in this country. Each is a small masterpiece. Only one, and that by only a few fractions of an inch, is larger than 6 × 10 inches. Yet each seems to encompass not only a vast space but, in its infinite skill and penetrating perception, to show a profound understanding of the phenomena of nature, and more, to give evidence of a spirit serenely at one with his subject.

All nine were drawn in the early sixteen-fifties. Rembrandt was then at the height of his artistic powers, if already past the peak of his popular favor. His mother and father, Saskia, his son Rumbartus and Saskia's daughter Cornelia, had all died. His worldly affairs were going badly (he was declared bankrupt in 1656). But these very years are the years of his most accomplished, expressive landscape drawings. Sunlit, with limpid shadows, they show both quiet foreground and still distances. Whether of familiar woodland paths (Figure 20; Rembrandt, "Road Leading through a Wood," Chatsworth) or river views (Figure 21; Rembrandt, "A Farmstead by a Stream," Chatsworth; and (Figure 22; Rembrandt, "View on the Amstel at Omval: on the Left The Ringvaart of the Diemermeer," Chatsworth), they are of exquisite deftness and a deeply moving magic.

Many Dutch artists of the 17th century made landscape drawings of the familiar and much-beloved countryside, but none could rival either Rembrandt's comprehensive yet unpretentious understanding or his power of synthesis.

It was not only the Dutch who loved these quiet scenes. They had and continue to have a universal appeal. They have always found particular favor with the French.When Samuel Sorbière, the courtier, skeptic and gossip, went to visit Descartes, who during the sixteen-forties was living in a charming house outside of Leyden, he wrote: "He lived in a small chateau, beautifully situated, near a great and fine university (Leyden), three leagues from the court and hardly two hours from the sea. He had . . . a nice garden with an orchard beyond it; and all around there were pastures from which stood out many steeples of various heights, until in the far horizon they appeared as mere points. He could go in a day by canal to Utrecht, Delft, Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Haarlem or Amsterdam. He could spend half his day at The Hague, and return in the evening, making his excursion by the most beautiful road in the world,

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through meadows . . . and then through a great wood bordering this village, which is not inferior to the fairest town in Europe." But neither on this road, which many well-traveled Dutch still find the most beautiful in the world, nor in any of the cities mentioned did Descartes and Rembrandt apparently meet. It is unlikely that they would have found each other sympathetic had they chanced to, so fundamentally different were their temperaments, interests and points of view.

The simple, modest scenes beloved by the Netherlanders are the very antitheses of those favored, in the very same years, by the two great French artists resident in Rome in the 17th century: Claude Lorrain (1600-1682) and Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665).

They, too, walked by rivers and in the countryside, but the rivers were the Tiber and its tributaries, and the countryside, the Roman Campagna. Rather than a quiet simplicity, they were seeking themes of nobility and grandeur. In their large drawings they give us broad, sweeping vistas of mountain ranges; curving, gleaming rivers, and great masses of noble trees. In their near views there are ancient ruins or shadowed shrubs or complexes of tree trunks.

Poussin gradually put behind him, as he grew in technical surety, the linear language of his youth. The brush supplanted the pen, a brush used with a control and a dexterity that a Chinese calligrapher would not scorn. In the application of a single wash he could vary the tone from a beautiful transparency to a rich darkness. To those who know only his classically composed and highly intellectual paintings, the play of brilliant sun and trembling shadow, the effects of wind and air that he captures in his drawings must come as a revelation (Figure 23; Nicolas Poussin, "Landscape," Louvre, Paris). Details are not delineated. It is the shifting value of light and shadow, playing against each other in intricate sparkling rhythms, that forms the subject matter of many drawings.

Seen at first glance his group of "Trees on a Plain" (Figure 24; Nicolas Poussin, "Trees on a Plain," Louvre, Paris), might seem spiritually nearer 19th century Impressionism than the formal classicism of the 17th century. A second and third look will reveal a largeness of conception and a spaciousness of outlook that the 19th century rarely achieved.

Claude, the younger of the two, who seems the older because he lived the longer, was temperamentally different from Poussin, less intellectual, less commanding in presence, simpler in education and in manner of life. Indeed all this is suggested by the fact that Claude

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since his own day has generally been referred to by his first name, Poussin always by his last. But it is Claude rather than Poussin who summons up a vision of a lost Arcadian world, where shepherds pipe in a golden twilight and nymphs dance in charmed circles. He knew every mile of the Campagna, Tivoli and the Alban Hills, the Tiber and its bridges. In his long solitary life he drew them over and over, sometimes using only pen on a pale blue paper, adding his highlights in Chinese white, more often using a white paper and pen, and adding washes that vary from a pale blonde tone to a rich brownish-black. (Figure 25; Claude Lorrain, "Landscape with Cattle," the Cleveland Museum of Art, Gift of Mr. and Mrs. Edward B. Greene.) In many of his landscape drawings the foreground, broadly sketched, lies in full or partial shadow. It is the middle distance which catches the full sunlight and the features of major interest. In the distance are hills and valleys. Shepherds and their flocks lend a quiet animation to the scene, but the wind gently moving the great masses of foliage in the trees which soar above the houses and tower of the village in the middle ground lends it more life. (Figure 26; Claude Lorrain, "The Banks of the Anio," Louvre, Paris.) There is an exalted harmony in these noble landscape drawings. In actual size Claude's drawings are not much larger than Rembrandt's, but they seem larger because of what they represent and the sentiment they express.

A century later, two other French artists were in Rome. They, too, went out to sketch in the Campagna and stayed at Tivoli: Honoré Fragonard (1731-1806) and Hubert Robert (1733-1808). Whether their compatriots, who had been their immediate predecessors in Italy, had brought back to Paris drawings from Venice or whether they themselves had seen Venetian drawings in Italy, we do not know; but it is clear that they knew what the "Vedute" or *View Painters* were doing with light, atmosphere and distance.

Antonio Canaletto (1697-1708) went around his native city, pen in hand, making accurate notes for future compositions. He drew in swift, energetic diagonally slanting, parallel lines. The severity of these lines is quickly relieved, here and there, by ornamental squirls suggesting leaves or vines or decorative Baroque achitectural details. In the 18th century, Venice, living gaily and heedlessly on her past glories, was the playground of all Europe. Although Canaletto found his patrons among the visitors to this holiday haunt, neither they nor the Venetian inhabitants themselves are more than puppets or bit-players in the dramatic scenes he presents. All the

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emphasis is on the light of Venice as it plays over the buildings, land and water. Not uncommonly he lays his basis in straight lines, even a few lightly ruled lines, either for perspective or for the sharp edges of buildings, but these straight lines, generally in a red-brown ink, are immediately softened in effect by cooling gray washes or ornamental, enlivening touches in pen. When he undertakes a broad view or invents an imaginary one, assembling, to suit his purpose, a fountain noted in one corner of Venice, a tower in another, a dome or a column or a belfry—even transposing to Venice architectural details that he had seen in his journeys to London, Eton and Warwick—the view, however unreal it may be, is made plausible by the accuracy and vivacity of the flickering, warm, transparent, palpable atmosphere that plays over the scene, uniting its various features. (Figure 27; Canaletto, "Circular Church," Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.)

Canaletto's compatriot, Francesco Guardi (1712-1793) also made innumerable detail drawings of Venice. Turning again and again to this rich source, he drew *Capricci*, fanciful compositions of endless invention that have an air of actuality. Though his subject matter was the same and even the vocabulary seemed alike, his use of it was quite different. Where Canaletto had erected his scenes on a solid, firm base, Guardi seems to have begun from the top, with a flickering pennant, a sun-drenched dome, a sail drying in warm air. Then his pen descends down walls and masts to water which was itself reflecting back light towards the sky. In his dancing sunshine his scenes seem to float in a golden, misty light. They are stable yet weightless, held between water and sky. (Figure 28; Francesco Guardi, "San Giorgio Maggiore," Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.)

In the hot summer months, Guardi went up into the Tyrol to visit his mother's Austrian relatives, taking his pen, brushes and paper along. One of the largest and one of the liveliest landscape drawings of the 18th century, Guardi made on such a journey. (Figure 29; Francesco Guardi, "A View of the Levico in the Sugana Valley," Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Donald S. Stralem.) At the lower edge he wrote not only the town's name, but added that the valley is the place where the Brenta rises. A wonderfully gusty wind sweeps across the scene, tossing the branches of the trees, moving across the mountain slope, making flickering patterns of light and shade, animating portals, fields and tiny figures. His nervous line always

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reads and has reason. Its vigor and meaning, the many imitators have always failed to capture.

The last of the great Venetian painters, Giovanni Battista Tiepolo (1696-1769), always based his magnificent imaginative compositions upon exact knowledge of particular details, which he had sketched in pen and wash. His landscape drawings are few—unassuming in scale, subject matter and finish. Grandeur and elegance were his inherent qualities. Even a simple farmyard gateway is transformed by the glow of the brilliant light and shadow which his incredibly dextrous and industrious hand created on the shining white pages where he has recorded modest scenes of the Venetian *terra firma.* Curiously, although Tiepolo populated his frescoed creations with hosts of figures, his landscape drawings are empty of human life, though the mark of man's handwork is always evident. (Figure 30; Tiepolo, "A Group of Farm Buildings," Fogg Art Museum, Mass.)

Further south in Rome, Fragonard was using Claude's favorite medium of bistre wash over quick, free, black chalk guide lines, but with quite different effects. Gone are the grand sonorities and immense vistas of 17th century Rome. In their place are more intimate scenes. Graciousness and elegance take the place of noble sentiments. We know that Fragonard studied Rembrandt's drawings as well as Claude's and was both impressed and instructed by them. He scrutinized with particular application Rembrandt's handling of wash. Effervescent southern Frenchman that he was, however, he did not imitate the calm restraint or the elliptical references of the great Dutchman. His brush moved with verve, making quick, dark, vivacious accents here and there. A drawing, variously described as the Garden of the Villa d'Este or the Villa Pamfili or the Villa Borghese (Figure 31; Fragonard, "The Umbrella Pines at the Villa d'Este," Besançon) is one of his happiest inventions with the brush. It has a more vaporous atmosphere than any of Claude or Poussin. Animated groups of small figures in the dress of the day chat together or play with the small children in the shadow of the tall parasol pines while shafts of sunlight illumine the many statues on their pedestals. It is informal and intimate, the grandeur of its setting a hold-over from a past no one regards.

More often than the brush, both Fragonard and Robert used the red chalk, so long the beloved medium of French draughtsmen, a tool so much easier to carry and use than pen or brush. The 18th

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century mastery of it has, in richness and variety of effects, never been surpassed.

For some months in 1761, Fragonard and Robert were the guests of the Abbé de St. Non at the Villa d'Este. Neither was yet thirty years old. The pair spent the summer drawing in the famous gardens. In Fragonard's drawings from that stay, one can hear an echo of 17th century grandeur in the sweep of some compositions, such as "The Garden of the Villa d'Este." He used the red chalk with authority and assurance. In his hand it suggests the dense dark foliage of the tall, flame-like cypresses, the prickly surfaces of the clipped hedges, the slow drift of summer clouds. Then he strikes the note that is pure Fragonard: the children playing gaily in the shadowed foreground just as he saw them. They give the whole composition a joyous, not a solemn, flavor.

As he grew more expert with practice, Fragonard's contours became fewer and shorter, his touch lighter, his accents more delicate. On his return to Rome in 1773-74 with the Fermier Générale de Bergeret and the financier's party, he recorded with delightful wit and accuracy a picnic luncheon on the way. In flickering sunlight they gathered to eat in a small clearing under great oak trees, their servants and carriages near at hand. The sanguine scarcely seems to touch the heavy ivory-colored paper, yet the structure is as solid as the scene is memorable. (Figure 32; Fragonard, "Le Dejeuner de Bergeret," Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, Rotterdam, Holland.)

A half century later other gifted Frenchmen also went sketching in the Campagna. The Revolution had then swept away the taste for elegance and wit. With them had vanished, as far as the travelling artists were concerned, colored chalks and colored papers. Ingres (1780-1867) and Corot (1796-1875) used a simple hard pencil on a clear white paper. Not for them, at that time, vaporous atmosphere. Rather they preferred a clear, bright, limpid light that sharpened edges and defined shapes. Ingres's many precise views of Rome, first published in 1958, have been a surprise to all but the most knowing. On the other hand, Corot's drawings made on his first trip to Italy have been known and treasured in this country, particularly in Boston, even before the sale of the contents of his studio after his death in 1875. The range, structure and control of Corot's "Mt. Soracte" (Figure 33; Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.) seems nearer in spirit to Horace's reference to it than to Lord Byron's lines in *Childe Harold*. If there was nothing in his tempera-

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1. School of Van Eyck. The Adoration of the Magi. Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin-Dahlem. 5⅝ x 4⅞

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2. Benozzo Gozzoli. St. Augustine with a Toothache. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 3¾ x 5⅛

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

3. Leonardo da Vinci. Landscape. Uffizi Gallery, Florence. 7⅝ x 11¼

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4. Jean Fouquet. The Crossing of the Rubicon. The Louvre, Paris. 17½ x 12¾

5. Vittore Carpaccio. Unidentified Scene. Chatsworth Collection. 6 9/16 x 7¾

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

6. Domenico Campagnola. Buildings in a Rocky Landscape. 6 x 7 11/16
Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.

7. Domenico Campagnola. Four Infants, One Winged, in Front 6 1/8 x 8 3/4
of a Town. Chatsworth Collection.

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8. Albrecht Altdorfer. Landscape with Tall Spruce. 8 x 5 7/16
Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin-Dahlem.

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9. Wolf Huber. View of Feldkirch. Staatliche Graphische Sammlung, Munich. 12⅜ x 8¼

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

10. Pieter Brueghel the Elder. View of the "Ripa Grande" Rome. 8 3/16 x 11 1/8 Chatsworth Collection.

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11. Attributed to Agostino Carracci. Study of Trees with a Glimpse of Distant Buildings on the Right. Chatsworth Collection. $10^{15}/_{16} \times 7\frac{1}{2}$

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

12. Annibale Carracci. Landscape: Scene on a Canal. Chatsworth Collection. 4 5/16 x 8



13. Guercino. Landscape: A River in Flood and Peasants with Axes and Other Tools. Chatsworth Collection. 10 3/8 x 16 11/16

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14. Peter Paul Rubens. Tree Trunk with Brambles. 13¾ x 11¾
Chatsworth Collection.

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

15. Anthony Van Dyck. The Ypres Tower at Rye, seen from the Sea. FitzWilliam Museum, Cambridge, England. 7½ x 11¾

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

16. Anthony Van Dyck. Unfinished Landscape with Meadows, Trees and a Square Tower in the Distance. Chatsworth Collection. 10¾ x 13⅜

17. Anthony Van Dyck. Landscape with House among Trees. Chatsworth Collection. 7½ x 14¼

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

18. Wenceslaus Hollar. The Rhine with the Town and Fortress of Engers. Chatsworth Collection. 4 15/16 x 10½

19. Wenceslaus Hollar. View of Frankfurt-am-Main. Chatsworth Collection. 4⅜ x 10¾

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20. Rembrandt van Rijn. Road Leading Through a Wood. Chatsworth Collection. 6 3/16 x 7 15/16

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21. Rembrandt van Rijn. A Farmstead by a Stream. Chatsworth Collection. 4¼ × 8 15/16

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

22. Rembrandt van Rijn. View on the Amstel at Omval: on the Left The Ringvaart of the Diemermeer. Chatsworth Collection. 4¼ x 7¾

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23. Nicolas Poussin. Landscape. The Louvre, Paris. 10 x 7¼

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24. Nicolas Poussin. Trees on a Plain. The Louvre, Paris. 9⅜ x 7⅛

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25. Claude Lorrain. Landscape with Cattle. Museum of Art, Cleveland. 14 x 15¾

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26. Claude Gellée, called Le Lorrain. The Banks of the Anio. The Louvre, Paris. 8⅝ x 11¾

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

27. Antonio Canaletto. A Circular Church. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 7¾ x 13

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

28. Francesco Guardi. St. Giorgio Maggiore. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 5⅝ x 12¼

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29. Francesco Guardi. A View of Levico in the Sugana Valley. Estate of Mrs. C. I. Stralem, New York. 16⅛ x 24⅞

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30. Giovanni Battista Tiepolo. A Group of Farm Buildings. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 6⅜ x 10¼

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31. Jean Honoré Fragonard. The Umbrella Pines at the Villa d'Este, Tivoli. 13⅞ x 19¼
Museum of Fine Arts, Besançon.

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32. Jean Honoré Fragonard. Le Déjeuner de Bergeret. 11¼ x 12¾
Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, Rotterdam.

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33. Camille Corot. View of Mount Soracte. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 11 x 16⅜

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

34. John Constable. Brighton at Noon. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 7 1/16 x 10 1/4

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35. J. M. W. Turner. Solway Moss, Cumberland. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 10 5/16 x 16 1/4

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36. Vincent van Gogh. The Blue Cart. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 15½ x 20½

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37. Cézanne. Mount Saint Victoire. Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass. 15¼ x 19⅝



38. Cézanne. Mount Saint Victoire. Mr. John S. Thacher, Washington, D. C. 12⅛ x 18⅛

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ment to ally him to the cold classicism of David, this view of an ancient countryside, heavy with history, has surely exalted the spirit of the gentle Corot. The landscapes which he drew many years later in France are almost the direct antithesis: generalized in shapes, imprecise in forms with a heavy, vaporous enveloping atmosphere.

Before he left Paris for Rome, Corot may have seen Constable's painting "The Haywain," a landscape which deeply impressed many young French artists when it was shown at the Salon of 1824 in the Louvre. (Delacroix completely repainted the sky of his "Massacre of Scio" in four days after he saw the beauty of the sky in Constable's painting.) It is unlikely, however, that Corot knew Constable's drawings. The English artist sketched in his own familiar countryside. Although he based his paintings on the principles he had learned from Claude and Rubens, his drawings reveal with what a fresh and sensitive eye he regarded every altering cloud-form, every slight movement of wind and the exact angle of the sun's rays. The immediate transcription of the changing light before his eyes gives to his drawings a wonderful spontaneity. As for coloring effects, no one has rivalled his capacity to record them.

Constable's talent had matured slowly. It was only in his forties and fifties that he attained full stature as one of the greatest landscapists. He was forty-eight when he went out sketching one sunny October day at Brighton (Figure 34; Constable, "Brighton at Noon," Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.). He has written in pencil at the upper left edge of the drawing "18 Octobre 1824, Noon." The autumn sun was veiled with a thin layer of clouds. A light onshore breeze blew from the Channel. On the shore in front of the artist, fishermen were spreading nets to dry, and at the right two men and a horse were working a primitive winch to draw a boat from the water's edge up onto the beach. The daily occupations of simple folk animate the foreground. Beyond them stretches the Channel dotted with sails leaning away from the wind. Not even the 17th century Dutchmen, the Van der Veldes who went out to record the sea battles from their own boats as official government observers, had been as precise as to name the very hour of the day. Such exact observation would be with Constable only an exercise to be remembered in general when a more ambitious theme was later attempted in paint. It was not by chance that he filled the foreground with simple people at their daily tasks. He was, after all, almost the exact contemporary of Wordsworth. The social scene was changing in a new age.

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In Germany, in the early 19th century, there was a resurgence of interest in landscape and many of the artists of the Romantic School also went out in their own countryside to sketch. Others made the journey to Italy. The nature that they preferred was nature on the grand scale, preferably untamed by man: great, craggy, snow-topped, mountain ranges; up-land meadows carpeted with wild flowers; waterfalls and cascades. Yet when one thinks of Turner's dazzling success with similar themes, the German drawings, in spite of the wild splendor of their subject matter, seem a little tame in execution.

Turner (1775-1851) had begun modestly, drawing and painting in a traditional rather tight manner, although always with an exquisitely light and accurate touch. As he grew older and his competence increased, his manner loosened, until suddenly in the eighteen-thirties, it seemed to burst free of all restraints. He then dared to attack what had seemed unpaintable: the splendor of sunsets, the translucence of mists and sprays, the density of fog and steam. He had followed contemporary experiments made in optics, and he was fascinated by what photography, then new to the world, could record. In contrast to these scientific interests his own works seem to be poetic visions of light and color. Later when Pissarro and Monet were in London, it was Turner's attempts to paint transient effects of light and sunshine that they studied. The 19,000 drawings and watercolors which Turner bequeathed to the British nation show him an unrivalled master of atmospheric effects. It has been only recently, however, that his very late watercolors have been appreciated. In fact, the latest were shown for the first time in the summer of 1962 at the British Museum. Without Turner's name they might have been considered the creation of our own time.

A few early drawings announced the road Turner was to follow. "A View of Solway Moss, Cumberland" (Figure 35; Fogg Art Museum, Cambridge, Mass.), a drawing which once belonged to Ruskin, was made when Turner was returning from his Scottish tour in 1801. With a few, quick strokes of soft pencil, he has drawn the rough terrain of the foreground and the figures bent in the wind and, beyond the water, a line of distant hills darkened with a single stroke of wash. Then he has, with a wash that shades from dark blue-gray to palest gray, brushed in a stormy sky lowering over the distant hills and approaching the foreground figures. It is a drawing of magnificent sweep and ominous mood done with an absolute minimum of means.

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Van Gogh (1853-1890), in the blazing sun of southern France in 1888, had little concern for storm effects. Like his famous Dutch predecessor, Rembrandt, he seems to have preferred quiet, rural scenes. Van Gogh's scale was larger, however, although the preferred means were the same, a reed pen and bistre on white paper. He used that pen in a language of dots and dashes of infinitely varied shapes and emphasis. It can suggest changes of textures and differences of intensity. It is an extraordinarily expressive, eloquent tool in the hand of an artist who was seeing this landscape with the excitement of discovery, strange in its southern brilliance but not unlike his native Holland in its level distances under an immense sky. As he wrote his brother Theo, "The fascination which these vast plains have for me is very strong." That fascination he communicates to us.

It was Cézanne (1839-1906), at the close of the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th, who marked the real change. In his own work he both summed up the past and foretold the future. The problem of how to render luminous space preoccupied him. As he developed his own way to solve that problem, the perspective of Alberti, which had served artists for four and a half centuries, gradually disappeared. As a schoolboy, as recent research has discovered, Cézanne had won prizes both in science and mathematics. He had, thus, a solid basis for his experiments even though he may have not knowingly used his knowledge.

As a mature man, he haunted the museums, small sketch books in hand, making pencil notes of forms. According to his friend Gasquet, whose portrait he painted more than once, he considered that the roots of his art were in Florence, Siena and even Venice. When he exclaimed, "Imagine Poussin remade entirely after nature, that's the classicism I understand," he was speaking with profound self-knowledge. "Everytime that I come away from looking at Poussin, I know better what I am." If his long hours in the museum were passed, pencil and notebook in hand, his longer hours in the open found watercolor added to his kit. It was in the use of watercolor that he attained a unique mastery and developed a new language.

For Cézanne space was dynamic. It had both volume and tone. These aspects he could not communicate without color, for space modified and changed all colors comprehended in it. To suggest space Cézanne did not seek nuances of tone within a single wash. Instead, he placed pure, clear washes of infinite range, within a limited number of colors, in small touches on the page. Through the astounding accuracy with which he selected and placed them, they

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define the precise spot in space which an object occupies. Their massing and their placing, with a patient exactitude and often with miraculous brevity, develop both form and depth. It was an exacting, exhausting, exhilarating method. When employed by this master of structure, whose technique grew in authority and freedom, it gave weight and volume as well as distance. At first the great impressive mass of Mt. Ste. Victoire, that mountain which he studied in all lights, all weather and from all angles, seemed solidly still. As his skill grew he wished to translate more than its outward form and shape. He wished to evoke the tensions beneath it and around it. To him the air and space that enveloped it was as powerful and full of drama as the gravitational pulls that held it down. As he worked the shapes became heavier, the volumes simpler, more compact; their edges sharper; a world-pervasive geometry was being made visible. Then about 1900, in a terrific drama, the forms began to break up, yet strangely without disturbing the whole composition which is still held tightly together.

In the years before his death in 1906, the great mountain seems to be alive but no more alive than the air around it—and this air is not a transparent envelope covering only a thin surface of the earth. It is composed of elemental forces that sometimes tear it open to reveal prismatic vistas of immense heights.

It was a struggle to construct these monumental themes, to make visible these sensations of form. His experiences and the penetration of his eye and the innate geometric cast of his mind held his compositions together. But, in the very means he had chosen, he had opened the way to others with different aims. It was only a step for the Cubists to cast off the anchor which held the artist to the visible world, and for the Abstractionists to divorce color and design from familiar shapes. With those who came after, the Provençal houses became cubes; the trees, conic sections. A highly intellectualized approach, far more mathematical and geometrical than Cézanne's own, looks not for what is easily visible. It assays a simultaneous representation, in a tightly organized scheme, of the many facets of a single, known object. Nature has small place, at first, in this new development, and space does not go beyond the picture plane.

Looking back we see that the Renaissance Italians had drawn landscapes as settings and as symbols, settings for dramas and symbols of God's power and presence. Later Italians, even when they drew directly from nature, did so suffusing their scenes with a sense of man's long past. In their great period, the Germans with no

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backward glance but with the contemporary stresses of the Religious Wars lending a highly charged emotional content, saw their forests, mountains, and lakes animated by the same mysterious forces that moved their figures, so that sometimes man and trees and shrubs seemed made of the same materials and subject to the same strains. Rubens and Van Dyck seemed to feel the secret forces of the earth vibrating yet controlled beneath them, as the air moved all on its surface. Rembrandt turned his eyes calmly on his own familiar scenes. With acute powers of observation, an incomparable technique and no inclination to exaggeration, he transformed it through loving understanding and a poetic sensibility. Claude and Poussin, when they recorded a scene, did so not as an end in itself but so that they might later readjust and rearrange the elements in the more decorous design of a painting.

The 18th century refined and made less formal and less elevated the 17th century's observation. In the 19th century there began the dissolution of shapes in an enveloping light, but it was not until the end of the century that the earth itself and the atmosphere above it seemed for the first time in precarious balance.

For five hundred years, artists had followed the scientists and the inventors, adjusting their view of the world to the expanding knowledge offered by the scientists, and their technique to the innovations proffered by the inventors. Then it was an artist who announced, in clear, pure tones, the end of one era and the dawn of another. It has happened more than once that an artist's statement has proclaimed in a visual language which only a few of his contemporaries can read, the way in which the world is to move.

With Cézanne, conventional perspective was abandoned, and with it ordered, contained space. With these vanished the tradition of shaping contour and contained form. In their place came a new approach and a new feeling. It is a far cry from the mild, serene and modest mountains in the enclosed and ordered world of van Eyck and Benozzo Gozzoli.

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Notes on Contributors

S. A. BARNETT, born in Hampton, Middlesex, in 1915, is a member of the Department of Zoology, Glasgow University. He was educated at Oxford, England. During the war and afterward he did research on pest control for the British Government. For the past twelve years, he has been doing research on the physiological effects of "social stress" in wild rats and on the interaction of genotype and environment in mice permanently exposed to cold. He is author of *The Human Species* and of *A Study in Behavior,* and editor of *A Century of Darwin.*

AMITAI ETZIONI, born in 1929 in Germany, is now Associate Professor of Sociology at The Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His extensive publications include many articles and numerous books. Most recent are *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy* and *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.*

JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, born in 1923, is Professor of Law at Yale University Law School. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and Yale Law School. His publications include *The Government of a British Trade Union; Criminal Law;* and articles in the *Yale Law Journal.*

HOWARD SCOTT GORDON, born in 1924, is Professor of Economics at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. His article, "The London Economist and the High Tide of Laissez Faire" was published in the *Journal of Political Economy.*

JAY KATZ, born in 1922, is Associate Professor of Law and Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Yale University. He is a Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and chairman of the Law and Mental Health Committee of the American Orthopsychiatric Association. He is the author of numerous articles in the area of psychiatry and law, published in the *Yale Law Journal,* in the *American Journal of Psychiatry,* and in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases.*

GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, born in 1932, is a Research Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs and participates in the Harvard Defense Studies Program. He is the author of numerous articles on political and military subjects, and of a book in manuscript, Anguish in an Army: French Military Tensions, 1947-1962.

WILLIAM LETWIN, born in 1922, is Associate Professor of Industrial History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Among his publications are two recent books: *Documentary History of American Economic Policy since 1789* and *The Origins of Scientific Economics.*

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ROBERT JAY LIFTON, born in 1926, is Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Yale University. He recently completed two and one-half years of research in Japan. His recent book, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism,* is based on research in Hong Kong in 1954-1955. Dr. Lifton contributed an article entitled "Youth and History: Individual Change in Postwar Japan" to the Winter 1962 issue of *Dædalus.* He is currently working on a book dealing with his Hiroshima study.

BRUCE MAZLISH, born in 1923, is Associate Professor of History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He wrote the introduction to *Psychoanalysis and History* and served as the book's editor; and collaborated with J. Bronowski in *From Leonardo to Hegel.*

AGNES MONGAN is Assistant Director and Curator of Drawings at the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University. She has held distinguished lectureships in the United States, in Europe, and in South America. Her extensive publications include numerous articles and reviews in American and European art periodicals and in exhibition catalogues. She published with P. J. Sachs the three-volume work *Drawings in the Fogg Museum of Art.*

KRISTER STENDAHL, born in Sweden in 1921, is John H. Morison Professor of New Testament Studies at Harvard Divinity School. He is also a member of the Department of Classics in the faculty of Arts and Sciences. He has written numerous articles for scholarly journals, and is a member of the Editorial Committee of the *Harvard Theological Review.* An authority on the Dead Sea Scrolls, he is the author of *The Scrolls and the New Testament* and *The School of St. Matthew and its Use in the Old Testament.*

OVERTON H. TAYLOR, born in 1897, is Professor of Economics at Harvard University. His interest in economic theory and intellectual history has been expressed in numerous articles in journals of economics. He is also the author of three books: *Economics and Liberalism; The Classical Liberalism, Marxism, and the 20th Century; and A History of Economic Thought.*

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